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Abstract 
The first EEG-sLORETA study to investigate the cognitive and neurophysiological 
differences between High (Subclinical) Anxiety participants and (Low Anxiety) Controls 
during Episodic Future Thinking (EFT) tasks. Anxiety disorders are characterised by a 
negative attentional bias towards future thoughts. Specifically, prospections are perceived 
as more threatening and personally impactful. Episodic Future Thinking (EFT) is the cognitive 
process that allows humans to think prospectively about events rich in personally significant 
and affective detail. Neurocognitive research has posited a neural network (Episodic Core 
Network) that is recruited during EFT. This study provides the first empirical evidence that 
regions of the Episodic Core Network are recruited differently between High Anxiety 
(Subclinical) and Low Anxiety (Control) groups. 
A quasi-experimental design was used; GAD-7 and PSWQ scores divided participants 
into groups. Participants (N = 16; 8 Male, 8 Female) completed a series of EFT tasks while 
electroencephalographic (EEG) data was obtained (N = 11; 4 Male, 7 Female) using a dense-
array 128-sensor EEG net. Two time windows of interest were identified for EEG analyses – 
approximately correlating to event-related potentials (ERPs) P300 (275-325ms) and the Late 
Positive Component (LPC; 775-825ms). Mean amplitude at electrode sites of interest during 
both 50ms time windows was statistically analysed using ANOVA. Source estimation was 
then completed using sLORETA during both 50ms time windows. sLORETA results at P300 
and LPC time windows were analysed using ANOVA. 
There was no statistically significant difference in participants’ ratings of episodic 
detail between High Anxiety and Low Anxiety groups for any EFT-Valence condition. The 
results indicate that High Anxiety participants demostrated significantly higher positive 
mean potential at Left Temporal and Left Posterior regions; and significantly negative mean 
potentials at Frontal regions 275-325ms after cue word onset (P300) during EFT tasks. High 
Anxiety participants demostrated significantly higher mean positive potential at Left 
Temporal and Left Posterior regions; and significantly negative mean potentials at Frontal, 
Occipital and Right Posterior regions 775-825ms after cue word onset (LPC) during EFT. 
Analyses of sLORETA results at P300 indicate that High Anxiety participants 
demonstrated significantly higher recruitment of medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), 
prefrontal cortex (PFC), and medial temporal lobe (MTL) regions during EFT. Analysis of 
sLORETA results at LPC indicate that High Anxiety participants demonstrated significantly 
higher recruitment of PFC, mPFC, lateral temporal and MTL regions during EFT. Analyses of 
sLORETA results at LPC indicate that High Anxiety participants demonstrated significantly 
higher recruitment of the insular cortex and middle temporal gyrus (MTG) during negative 
EFT. 
In conclusion, High Anxiety participants generated negative prospections utilising 
more visuospatial, socioemotional, introspective and schematic information than Controls. 
This study provides the first set of neurophysiological correlates to anxiety’s prospective and 
anticipatory negative threat-bias and how this relates to EFT.   
Author’s Declaration 
I declare that the work in this thesis was carried out in accordance with the regulations of 
the University of Gloucestershire and is original except where indicated by specific reference 
in the text. No part of the thesis has been submitted as part of any other academic award. 
The thesis has not been presented to any other education institute in the United Kingdom or 
overseas. 
Any views expressed in the thesis are those of the author and in no way represent those of 
the University. 
Signed  ………… Jolian Ardolino ………………………………… Date ……….16/07/2019……………… 
Contents 
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………….......... 
Declaration…………………………………………………………………………………..... 
Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………………... 
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1-8 
Rationale and Structure of Thesis 
Prevalence of Anxiety Disorders 
Episodic Memory and Episodic Future Thinking 
Conceptual Overlap with Mental Imagery, Creativity and Dreaming 
Neurobiological Differences in Anxiety Disorders – what we know so far 
Neurocognitive Approaches and Explanatory Models 
CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review ………………………………………………………........ 9-25
Anxiety Disorders 
Definitions 
Issues in Diagnosis 
What is Subclinical Anxiety 
Towards a Developmental Bio-Psycho-Social Explanatory Model 
Episodic Memory and Future Thinking 
Developments in Theory and Research 
Cognitive Measures and Methods Used 
Neurobiological Research and Episodic Core Network 
A Note on Counterfactual Episodic Future Thinking 
Summary 
CHAPTER THREE: Methodology …………………………………………………………... 26-35
Introduction 
  Participant Recruitment 
  Sampling Methods 
  Quasi-Experimental Between-Groups Design 
 Measures and Method 
 EEG, ERP vs sLORETA and the Inverse Problem 
 EEG Tasks: Procedure 
 Analyses 
 Summary 
 Ethics 
  
CHAPTER FOUR: The Study ……………………………………………………………….. 36-54 
 Research Questions 
 Participants 
 Procedure 
 Materials 
 Data Screening 
 EEG Data Screening and Processing 
 Results 
  Cognitive 
  EEG Analysis 
   P300 
   LPC 
  Source Estimation Analysis - sLORETA 
 Summary 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: Discussion …………………………………………………………… 55-68 
 Cognitive Findings 
 Neurophysiological Differences – Lingual Gyrus, PCC and MTL 
 Neurophysiological Similarities 
  The Effect of Valence 
 Summary   
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 Table. 1 – Episodic Core Network (Brodmann Areas and Gyri)   23 
 Table. 2 – Cue Words from ANEW (Valence and Arousal)    31 
 Table. 3 – Episodic Future Thinking Scores      40 
 Table. 4 – EEG (10-20) Sensors for Regions of Interest    42 
 Table. 5 – Key sLORETA Findings (Visual) – LPC (775-825ms)   48 
 Table. 6 – sLORETA ANOVA Summary – P300 (275-325ms)    53 
 Table. 7 – sLORETA ANOVA Summary – LPC (775-825ms)    54 
 Table. 8 – Post-Hoc Test Results Summary for ANOVA    54 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 Figure. 1 – Illustration of Neuronal Synchronicity and Position (EEG)  32 
 Figure. 2 – GAD-7 summary on NOVO Psych iPad App    37 
 Figure. 3 – NOVO Psych iPad app results e-mail and password protection  38 
 Figure. 4 – Procedure for EEG Tasks       39 
 Figure. 5(a & b) – EEG Topographic Maps of Mean Amplitude            47-48 
 Figure. 6(a, b, c, & d) – sLORETA Images of Peak Neural Activity            50-51 
  
References …………………………………………………………………………………….         70-109 
 
APPENDICES …………………………………………………………………………………       110-188 
 Appendix A: Participant Information Sheet and Poster 
 Appendix B: Consent Form 
 Appendix C: Debrief Form 
 Appendix D: Measures Used - GAD-7 and PSWQ 
 Appendix E: Descriptive Statistics Tables and Q-Q Plots 
 Appendix F: ANOVA/ANCOVA Results Tables 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1.0. CHAPTER ONE – Introduction 
 
Rationale and Structure of Thesis 
1.1. Anxiety disorders are characterised by excessive worry, and an attentional bias 
towards negative, threatening thoughts about the future (APA, 2013). A longstanding 
and developed body of research details the cognitive elements that contribute to the 
pathogenesis and maintenance of anxiety disorders. Episodic future thinking (Szpunar, 
2010) is the cognitive faculty that enables humans to prospectively experience 
hypothetical future scenarios – a form of mental time travel akin to episodic memory 
(Tulving, 2002). Episodic future thinking is a growing area of research and there are now 
studies examining the differences between clinical and non-clinical populations with 
regards to this cognitive faculty. However, these have mainly focussed on clinical 
neuropsychological areas, including biological and physical damage such as dementias 
(Irish et al., 2016). Other studies, such as Mercuri et al. (2015) focus on the impact that 
other factors such as substance misuse may have on EFT. 
1.2. The current project makes explicit the implicit links between EFT as a human 
neurocognitive faculty and anxiety’s negative threat-bias. Specifically, the project aims 
to investigate whether this negative threat-bias has an impact on the process or 
outcomes of EFT; and if so, determine what this impact may be by applying 
neurocognitive theory. 
1.3. The following chapters are structured to provide a review of the literature together 
with the methodologies that will be employed and their justification within the project.  
The results of the project will be presented with a critical discussion of those results in 
relation to existing theory, future research, and applications.  
Prevalence of Anxiety Disorders 
1.4. This section will focus on the prevalence and morbidity rates of various anxiety 
disorders and will make reference to the staggering cost to the UK (and worldwide) 
economy resulting from anxiety disorders and other common mental disorders. The 
Global Burden of Disease (GBD) is a term used by the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
to analyse the economic impact of health issues around the world. All these factors 
contribute to the importance of further research that can improve and refine current 
understanding of anxiety disorders, how they develop, and the development of 
therapeutic interventions and preventative measures. Impact from research focussed on 
these developments may therefore reduce the Global Burden of Disease arising from 
Anxiety Disorders and other Common Mental Disorders (CMDs). 
1.5. Anxiety disorders are among the most prevalent mental disorders in both UK and 
worldwide populations, with lifetime estimates ranging from 15-20%, and median age of 
onset at 11 years (Mohr & Schneider, 2013). WHO (2017) estimate that in 2015, 3.6% of 
the global population and 4.2% of the UK population had an anxiety disorder. That 
equates to approximately 264 million people worldwide and 2.56 million people in the 
UK. This worldwide figure has increased by 14.9% since 2005, which the WHO (2017) 
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claims is due to population growth and ageing. However, it is important to note that 
governments and health services around the world have launched campaigns to improve 
mental health. For example, the UK government launched their “Time to Change” 
campaign in 2011, funded by the Department of Health; and the Improving Access to 
Psychological Therapies (IAPT) initiative launched in 2008 and continues to develop 
(IAPT, 2017).  
1.6. Often grouped into the term common mental disorders (CMDs) along with different 
types of depressive disorders, anxiety disorders cause significant emotional distress and 
interfere with average daily functioning. Reducing the prevalence of these common 
mental disorders is a major public health challenge (Davies, 2014). While other major 
psychiatric disorders such as psychoses arguably have a more significant impact on daily 
functioning, CMDs have a higher prevalence rate. This results in their cumulative cost to 
society being significantly higher than other mental disorders (Zivin et al., 2015; 
McManus, Bebbington, Jenkins, & Brugha, 2016); and even higher when co-morbid with 
a personality disorder (Rendu et al., 2002).  
1.7. The annual cost of mental illness (largely CMDs such as anxiety) in the United 
Kingdom is approximately £70 billion – 4.5% of GDP (McManus, Bebbington, Jenkins & 
Brugha, 2016). Furthermore, CMDs are more likely to lead to long term physical, social 
and occupational disability and premature mortality if left untreated (Zivin et al., 2015), 
which demonstrates the importance of improving treatment availability and 
accessibility. Anxiety disorders are some of the most enduring mental disorders and are 
ranked as the sixth largest contributor to non-fatal health loss globally as “Years Lived 
with Disability” (YLD) accounting for 24.6 million YLD in 2015 (WHO, 2017). This has 
multiple ramifications, both for the 264 million people living with anxiety disorders 
worldwide, but also for the global and UK economy. Mental illness has huge impacts on 
the UK economy, not just from treatment costs, but also from the loss of work due to 
the disabling effects of these disorders. For example, mental illness is the leading cause 
of sick days in the UK, accounting for 70 million sick days in total in 2013 (ONS, 2014); 
and 41% of people receiving Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) in 2013 did so 
due to mental or behavioural disorders (OECD, 2014; McManus, Bebbington, Jenkins, & 
Brugha, 2016). 
1.8. Anxiety is seen as a CMD by most, and funding is often directed towards depression, 
which is the leading cause of disability worldwide (WHO, 2017). However, anxiety is 
often co-morbid with depression, occurring simultaneously with either being the 
primary diagnosis (Kessler et al., 2008). This complicates the issue, as they are 
qualitatively similar in presentation yet distinct from each other in a number of ways 
(see Chapter Two). Improving understanding of anxiety disorders is paramount to 
developing treatments and informing policies across the UK and worldwide. It is part of 
a larger issue, and global organisations have set targets for political change powered by 
research into mental health – as in the WHO’s (2013) Mental Health Action Plan 2013-
2020 and the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN, 2016). 
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Episodic Memory and Episodic Future Thinking 
1.9. Tulving (1985) proposed the existence of three distinct but interconnected memory 
systems: procedural memory, semantic memory and episodic memory. Procedural 
memory relates to living organisms’ ability to learn connections between environmental 
stimuli and responses – including complex stimuli – and was proposed to be at the 
bottom of the monohierarchic structure. Semantic memory allows for stimuli-
independent models and representations of the world to be constructed and retained.  
Episodic memory (EM) is described by Tulving (2002) as a neurocognitive function 
humans possess that enables them to experientially remember past experiences. Tulving 
(2002) argues that episodic memories may be as important in our development and 
functioning as the experiences we perceive in the physical world. Most importantly, this 
human faculty of mental time travel is not simply a passive “matter-of-fact” 
reconstruction of events from an external perspective, but rather a re-experiencing. The 
individual who remembers is able to access the phenomenological aspects of the event, 
rather than being limited to external descriptions of the environment, for example. 
Therefore, the episodic memory accesses the affective components of the event and 
becomes an emotional stimulus for the individual who is remembering.  
1.10. Episodic Future Thinking (EFT) is therefore the cognitive faculty of prospectively 
experiencing a future event or situation. The level of detail is personal, relates to the 
individual’s perspective and phenomenology of the imagined event, and is not 
constrained to external details (such as environmental description) from an observer 
perspective (similar to episodic memory). This makes EFT unique, in that it demonstrates 
the human ability to mentally rehearse and pre-experience hypothetical events, to 
prepare for multiple eventualities. The affective component of EFT is important to 
consider, as humans experience emotions mentally and physically related to the 
prospective event prior to physically experiencing it in current objective reality (Lang, 
1979; Moscovitch, Chiupka & Gavric, 2013; Ji, Heyes, MacLeod & Holmes, 2016; Bullock, 
Newman-Taylor & Stopa, 2016; Skodzik, Leopold & Ehring, 2017). Damasio’s (1999) 
Somatic Marker Hypothesis posits that emotional events are marked by bodily 
sensations and emotion; and that subsequent impending recurrence of similar events 
results in similar anticipatory somatic markers. As discussed by Tulving (2002), mental 
reality may be as important to humans as physical reality. Therefore, anxiety responses 
to an imagined phobic stimulus such as flying, may lead one to continue avoiding flying 
abroad. The result is the reinforcement of the feared stimulus, continuing the cycle of 
fear and maintaining that anxiety. Similarly, positive mental imagery and visualization 
techniques in sports have been investigated with positive results within a variety of 
populations (Stanković et al., 2011; Catenacci et al., 2016; Slimani et al., 2016). This can 
be seen as an adaptive function, and a useful neurocognitive faculty from evolutionary, 
professional and everyday perspectives. It can also be utilised within therapeutic 
contexts, such as Imaginal Exposure Therapy (Wells & Matthews, 1994; 2014). This 
meta-cognitive perspective on episodic future thinking is important to consider, as it is 
relevant to the meta-worry that is characteristic to anxiety disorders such as GAD (Hirsc 
& Matthews, 2012).  
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1.11. In summary, episodic memory and episodic future thinking (EFT) refer to the human 
mental faculty to re-experience and pre-experience events. They can be seen as two ends 
of the same spectrum and share a large proportion of neural processing networks 
(Schacter, Benoit, De Brigard & Szpunar, 2015), and these will be discussed in Chapter 
Two. The atemporal version of EFT and EM is scene construction, and all three of these 
mental faculties (EFT, EM and Scene Construction) share common functional neural 
networks (Irish et al., 2015). Episodic counterfactual thinking (Schacter, Benoit, De 
Brigard & Szpunar, 2015) is also investigated as a meta-cognitive faculty to imagine an 
episodic event (memory or prospection) in an alternative way – e.g. imagining what 
could have happened if you said “X” instead of “Y” in a previous situation.  
Conceptual Overlap with Mental Imagery, Creativity and Dreaming 
1.12. While EFT is a discrete cognitive faculty that humans possess, it is also conceptually 
similar to other areas of research, such as mental imagery and creativity. Lang’s (1979) 
Bio-informational Theory of Emotional Imagery, posited the affective and physiological 
reactions that mental imagery can cause. Furthermore, these reactions have been 
investigated for their potential use in therapy for a range of mental disorders (Foa, 
Hembree, & Rothbaum, 2007; Holmes & Mathews, 2010; Ji, Heyes, MacLeod, & Holmes, 
2016). Emotional imagery is qualitatively similar to EFT in its role of planning, problem 
solving and self-regulation through emulation of possible events and their repercussions 
(Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009; Ji, Heyes, MacLeod, & Holmes, 2016). Important to consider 
are the subtle distinctions made by Tulving (2002) in his conceptualisation of episodic 
memory. One of which is relevant here. Episodic memories are specific to when, where 
and how the event happened; including what the somatic markers of the event may be 
(Damasio, 1999); and therefore, require that this event has happened in the individual’s 
past. This distinction becomes blurred in the realms of episodic future thinking because 
the imagined event has not yet happened, while mental imagery allows for the 
construction of imagined events in the present. For example, numerous studies have 
used present-tense verbal cues to elicit emotional mental imagery (Holmes & Mathews, 
2005; Ji, Heyes, MacLeod, & Holmes, 2016). Studies into EFT have – quite logically - 
repeatedly used affective cues that instruct the participant to think of a future event, 
and often sets temporal distance of the target event (e.g. 5 years). It is arguable that EFT 
is a component of emotional mental imagery, in the same way that episodic memory is a 
component of the overarching memory system. The concepts are similar in their 
neurobiological correlates, as regions activated during emotional mental imagery are 
also present in the Episodic Core Network (see Table. 1 below). Neuroimaging studies 
have found activation of the amygdala, nucleus accumbens, medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Damasio et al., 2000; Kim et al., 2007; Sharot, 
Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007; Costa et al., 2010).  
1.13. Creativity is conceptually similar to EFT, in so far as a creative individual must be able 
to vividly construct visual, spatial, musical, and semantic information into a new 
“creation” or concept. In this regard, the Constructive Episodic Simulation Hypothesis 
(Schacter & Addis, 2007) maps very nicely onto the processes involved in creativity and 
one could reasonably assume that similar neurobiological correlates would be found. 
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However, the neurological research into creativity is stagnated, uncoordinated and 
disparate in nature. A recent meta-analysis of creativity research by Dietrich & Kanso 
(2010) found numerous issues, including with the experimental definitions of creativity 
that have not developed significantly since Guilford’s (1950) divergent thinking. Broadly 
speaking, divergent thinking – thinking of alternative and novel uses for specific objects - 
has been utilised as a proxy concept for creativity, which is problematic despite its easy 
measurement. Dietrich & Kanso (2010) investigated 63 articles and 72 studies into 
divergent thinking, artistic creativity (visual and musical) and insight (so-called “a-ha 
moments”) and found no clear reliability for neurobiological findings other than creative 
tasks involved changes in prefrontal activation. They argue that creativity is too broad a 
concept to be studied holistically and instead must be broken into its component 
faculties – much like memory has been.  
1.14. Neurophysiological correlates of dreaming, creativity and emotional mental imagery 
are similar (Bassetti, Bischof, & Valko, 2005; Jung, Flores & Hunter, 2016; Kim et al., 
2007; Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007; Costa et al., 2010), generally all functions 
heavily recruit prefrontal, and medial temporo-occipital regions. However, dreaming is 
discrete in that attention-focusing areas of the brain are hypoactive during REM sleep 
and correspond with low levels of perceived control over the dreamed events. The 
purpose of these neurocognitive faculties is also significantly similar – to consolidate 
affective information and process emotional events in order to perform better in similar 
future circumstances. Maladaptive emotional imagery, prospective thoughts and dream 
disturbances have all been linked to a range of emotional psychopathology, including 
GAD (Mullin et al., 2017). For the purpose of this project, however, particular interest is 
paid to the role of maladaptive functioning within these faculties for anxiety disorders. 
Studies into anxiety disorders have shown that cognitions about the future are distorted, 
and events are seen as more threatening and emotionally impactful than asymptomatic 
perception of future events. This is reflected in the diagnostic description of anxiety 
disorders within DSM-V (APA, 2013) and the ICD-10 (WHO, 2010). Furthermore, it is the 
inability to sufficiently control the perceived and anticipated emotional impact that 
characterises a range of anxiety disorders (APA, 2013). This specific trait has been 
utilised within CBT in clinical practice, as emotional imagery of threatening prospective 
events is elicited and subsequently challenged throughout the therapeutic process 
(Holmes & Mathews, 2010; Ji, Heyes, MacLeod, & Holmes, 2016). This demands that the 
patient redirect their attention and engage in counterfactual thinking to actively 
challenge their initial imagined episodes and memories. This is important to consider, as 
current neurophysiological studies are focussing on whether neurobiological correlates 
of anxiety processing (for example, see Strawn et al., 2012) are predictive of treatment 
outcome (Hahn et al., 2016; Burkhouse et al., 2017) and to personalise therapeutic 
approaches offered to patients (Lueken et al., 2016). Interestingly, areas associated with 
emotional attention, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; which are 
hypoactive during REM sleep) appear to be predictive of treatment outcomes 
(Burkhouse et al., 2017). While further research is required to validate these claims 
(perhaps from a meta-analytic review) the initial findings are promising and provide 
further evidence to support the aim of the current project: to investigate potential 
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statistically significant neurophysiological differences between high anxiety participants 
and controls during episodic future thinking.  
Neurobiological Differences in Anxiety 
1.15. A large and growing body of research exists that utilises EEG and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the relationships between cognition in anxiety 
disorders, and neuropsychological function and structure. For example, neurobiological 
correlates of fear have been investigated to form a “cognitive-neurobiological-
information-processing model” (Hofmann, Ellard, & Siegle, 2012). Within this model, 
individuals with anxiety present with an early activation of subcortical networks such as 
the amygdala, hippocampus, and insular cortex that are involved in threat perception. 
This suggests that individuals with anxiety are “hypervigilant" in their neurological 
processing of perceived threats and therefore activate these areas significantly quicker 
than ‘controls’, prior to the subsequent activation of cortical areas involved in avoidant 
responses (such as the anterior cingulate cortex and prefrontal cortex).  
1.16. The above model was developed using explicitly clear affective stimuli; however, 
anxiety and anxious responses often involve an element of uncertainty. Zaretsky, 
Mendelsohn, Mintz, & Hendler (2010) suggest that uncertainty of emotional stimuli 
recruits a specific network involving the amygdala, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 
(dmPFC), and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). This has implications for real world 
situations, as it suggests that threat responses can recruit higher order regions of the 
brain when the threat posed is uncertain - also known as the “relevance detector 
theory” (Zaretsky, Mintz, & Hendler, 2010).  
1.17. These findings suggest that the amygdala is involved in subjective interpretation of 
threat. The amygdala and its subcortical network may respond to potential 
environmental, physical and social threats in a hypervigilant manner in individuals with 
anxiety disorders. Individuals with anxiety disorders are more readily processing 
potential threats on a daily basis, which results in increased sensitivity to anxious 
affective stimuli (or uncertain stimuli) and more frequent avoidant responses. Wheelock 
et al. (2014) suggest that unpredictable threats can elicit larger affective responses and 
that the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) serves as a “neural hub” that influences 
areas such as the amygdala when threats are unpredictable, while the same process is 
seen in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) when threats are predictable. 
Therefore, the dmPFC-amygdala network may activate more frequently (and at an 
earlier stage) in individuals with higher levels of anxiety than others with low anxiety. 
1.18. Neurobiological correlates of anxiety disorders have recently come under scrutiny 
for their predictive ability in treatment outcome, and personalised therapeutic approach 
(Hahn et al., 2015). Furthermore, studies are now tracking the neurophysiological 
changes that occur as a result of evidence-based interventions like CBT for a variety of 
psychopathology (Yang, Kircher & Straube, 2014; Hahn et al. 2015; Mason et al., 2016; 
Mason, Peters & Kumali, 2016; Burkhouse et al., 2017). General changes tend to be 
localised to the dmPFC, dlPFC and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) – all areas that are 
linked with affective attentional processing. Taken with the above information regarding 
the neurobiological correlates of mental imagery, EFT and dreaming, it is reasonable to 
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suggest that by repeatedly evoking and actively challenging threatening future thoughts, 
patients with anxiety are actively changing their neurophysiology to more closely 
resemble healthy and adaptive activity within these areas. This also predicts better 
remission rates in adults who receive treatment for anxiety (Hahn et al. 2015), 
suggesting that the brains neuroplasticity is playing a role and affective attentional 
processing is becoming more refined – translating at a cognitive level into fewer 
catastrophic misinterpretations and less threatening prospective perceptions.  
1.19. In summary, the above findings have implications for the current project. During 
experimental tasks, participants are to be presented with (predictable) affective stimuli. 
Therefore, it is possible that results may demonstrate similar recruitment of the 
amygdala-dmPFC network in participants with high levels of anxiety. The current project 
is specifically concerned with potential differences in the recruitment of the episodic 
core network (which includes the medial prefrontal cortex and other prefrontal regions) 
between High Anxiety and Control groups. Any potential differences between groups in 
these neural regions will be tentatively discussed in relation to the above points on 
hypervigilance to threat and threat (un)certainty (see Chapter FIVE below). 
Neurocognitive Approaches and Explanatory Models 
1.20. If one combines the models of cognitive theory of anxiety and the neurobiological 
findings from functional neuroimaging studies, a pattern of hyper vigilant threat 
perception quickly emerges at both levels. This relationship between cognitive theory 
and neuroscience is commonly referred to as a neurobiological correlate. The successful 
combination of both neuroscientific and cognitive theory will be referred to as 
neurocognitive theory for the purpose of this project. Neurocognitive theory proposes 
that all cognition has an underlying neurobiological correlate of networks and neural 
activity, both at the structural and functional level. These networks of neural activity are 
measurable and accessible with the use of increasingly complex technology, including 
fMRI, EEG, MEG and PET.  
1.21. Singer, Eapen, Grillon, Ungerleider, & Hendler (2012) suggest that there is abundant 
evidence that anxiety has an effect on allocating cognitive resources to processing 
threats, but little clear research and empirical evidence as to the initial selection 
procedure that identifies a threat in anxious individuals. Multiple cognitive models of 
anxiety disorders have stated that high vigilance to threat suggests an underlying 
mechanism that exists in pre-awareness. Most theories have also posited that this 
process involves relatively low-level neurological processing within the subcortical 
regions (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Öhman, 1993; Öhman & 
Wiens, 2004; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988; Singer, Eapen, Grillon, 
Ungerleider & Hendler, 2012). When combined with Hofmann, Ellard & Siegle’s (2012) 
cognitive-neurobiological-information-processing model of hypervigilant neurological 
processing in specific areas, a neurocognitive explanation can be formed. The cognitive 
resources are allocated to processing threats in a hypervigilant manner, and this is 
reflected in neurological activity, patterns of thinking, physiological reactions and 
behavioural responses. Below is a simple example of this complex, cyclical and iterative 
8 
 
process. For the purposes of application, this explanation will be applied to a phobia of 
wasps – otherwise known as spheksophobia.  
1.22. The stimulus in this example could be a buzzing sound heard from nearby. This alone 
would pass through auditory processing and link closely with neurological activity in 
areas (discussed above) related to processing threats. This threat could be uncertain, as 
the individual has only heard the buzz and not seen the wasp yet, so it could be 
emanating from other sources. Therefore, areas such as the amygdala and dmPFC would 
be involved to process the uncertain threat accordingly. As this neurological processing 
approaches conscious awareness, the individual experiences thoughts and physiological 
sensations related to threat. This could include a catastrophic misinterpretation (Clark, 
1986) such as “it’s a wasp, it’s after me” along with physiological reactions such as those 
experienced in the “fight-flight-freeze” response (Gray, 1978; Blanchard et al., 2001.). 
The interaction of these factors leads to a surge of adrenaline, spurred on by thoughts of 
impending threat and the brain co-ordinating the body to be vigilant and attentive. The 
combination may lead to the individual running away, without seeing the wasp or 
confirming the source of the buzzing noise. Now the individual has fled the source of the 
auditory stimulus accordingly, they have effectively survived what the body and mind 
interpreted as a “threatening situation” and this has repercussions. This successful result 
(no physical damage and survival) could lead to reinforcing all factors that contributed to 
this phobic reaction in the individual. When combined with long-term potentiation, the 
networks that are repeatedly activated simultaneously are strengthened – particularly 
their connections with the hippocampus (Bliss, 1993; Akhondzadeh, 1999). Therefore, 
the result (e.g. avoidant behaviour) can impact the process (e.g. phobic response) 
equally as much as the process impacts the result.  
1.23. In summary, the project will focus on investigating neurophysiological (EEG) and 
cognitive (self-report) data involving the Episodic Core Network (Schacter, Benoit, De 
Brigard & Szpunar, 2015). The aim of the project is to establish the possible 
neurocognitive differences in episodic future thinking (EFT) between participants with 
high levels of trait anxiety and asymptomatic controls. Chapter ONE has outlined the 
importance of research into anxiety disorders and briefly conceptualised episodic 
memory and EFT. The theoretical and practical considerations required to design a 
comprehensively informed and effective study are outlined in greater detail below.  
Chapter TWO will focus on the theoretical developments, specific measures and issues 
of definition that exist within the empirical literature surrounding these topics. These 
considerations are then used to inform the rigorous design of the project, presented in 
Chapter THREE. 
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2.0. CHAPTER TWO – Literature Review 
 
Anxiety Disorders 
Definitions 
2.1 Broadly speaking, anxiety disorders all share common features of excessive fear and 
anxiety, along with avoidant behaviours, often accompanied by a level of social 
withdrawal. While fear and anxiety overlap as concepts, it is important to note the 
distinction between the two as stated by the American Psychiatric Association (APA, 
2013). Fear is the emotional response to a real or perceived threat and anxiety is the 
anticipation of future threat. Anxiety is the heightened level of vigilance to future or 
imminent threats, which also involves physiological reactions and thought processes. 
Together, these two features can become maladaptive, causing disturbances in the 
individual’s ability to function “normally” in everyday life. At this point, these natural 
responses to perceived threats and danger are considered at the level of a diagnosable 
mental disorder. This section will discuss the range of anxiety disorders and the issues 
with their classification in the clinical literature. This is important because the fine but 
definitive lines drawn between distinct sub-types of anxiety disorders also reflects the 
possible fine line between subclinical and clinical levels of trait anxiety. Within the 
present study, the use of subclinical anxiety as a quasi-experimental condition to 
compare with asymptomatic controls is pertinent to the discussion below.  
2.2 Anxiety disorders can vary in their specific presentation and pathology, and therefore 
discrete categories have been formed within the diagnostic manuals available to 
clinicians. However, the main anxiety disorder focussed on within the current project is 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder, otherwise known as GAD (APA, 2013). GAD is 
characterised by the overgeneralisation of anxiety and fear in everyday life, which 
negatively impacts on an individuals’ ability to function. The clinical psychometric 
measure commonly used to monitor GAD symptomology is the GAD-7 (Spitzer, Kroenke, 
Williams & Lowe, 2006), which measures common features of GAD (diagnostic category) 
and trait anxiety (dimension upon which the general population fluctuates).  
Issues in Diagnosis 
2.3 Anxiety disorders are amongst the most common mental disorders, otherwise known as 
CMDs (WHO, 2010). Prevalence rates in adults range from 0.9% in America, and 
between 0.4% and 3.6% in other countries (DSM-V; APA, 2013). Despite being so 
common and widespread across the UK and worldwide, there remains dispute over their 
diagnoses. Their definition and diagnostic criteria have changed and developed over 
time, from a broader concept of anxiety as seen in Beck et al. (1991) earlier cognitive 
(behavioural) therapy work, into distinct subtypes of anxiety disorders reflected in 
diagnoses today. Clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, and other health professionals rely 
on guidance from a limited number of diagnostic tools which share certain features but 
differ in their underlying philosophy. For example, one such tool that provides guidance 
specifically for mental health clinicians in training is the Diagnostic and Statistical 
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Manual, which is currently on its fifth edition (DSM-V; American Psychiatric Association, 
2013).  
2.4 The DSM-V and its predecessors have been cause for great debate over the last few 
decades amongst the medical and academic community. This is mainly down to the 
underlying philosophy and science behind the categories of various mental disorders, of 
which anxiety is but one. Common medical approaches to disease and disorders include 
a strictly scientific diagnostic test based on biology. A classic illustrative example would 
be a simple blood test. However, mental disorders do not so easily lend themselves to 
this level of diagnostic scrutiny (although neuroscience aims to tackle this issue in the 
future). With that being said, there must be a basis for these diagnoses and indeed, the 
existence of these (increasingly discrete) categories of mental disorders. The best way to 
describe diagnostic terms used in the DSM-V is as operational definitions (Harkness, 
Reynolds, & Lilienfield, 2014). In the DSM-III (APA, 1980), the statement from the 
American Psychiatric Association was that diagnoses were atheoretical in regard to the 
etiology of disorders (except for disorders where this was well established). Therefore, 
the operational definitions utilised to form the DSM-V and all of its predecessors arose 
from professional therapeutic practice with patients, in a variety of psychotherapeutic 
contexts, across a variety of social and geographical contexts. Consensus on an empirical 
basis was the foundation of these definitions, and therefore it was vital to establish an 
evidence-base for these categories. Teams of professionals have heavily researched 
anxiety disorders in the DSM (research team), with the latest edition (DSM-V) 
comprising over 12 years of research. There are, however, implications for individuals 
with high levels of trait anxiety just below the clinical threshold.  Within this study, these 
individuals are referred to as subclinical, and form the quasi-experimental group 
(independent variable) for comparison with asymptomatic controls.  
2.5 Throughout the years, the number of discrete anxiety disorders has risen steadily along 
with increases in research and the resulting changes in conceptualisation of disorders 
from Freud’s early theories of anxious neuroticism (Frances et al., 1993). The point 
remains however, that diagnosis based on agreement between clinicians does not 
constitute a naturally occurring disorder that can be scientifically analysed using the 
basis of biology or physiology – these operational definitions serve as proxy diagnoses. 
Famously, and most controversially, homosexuality was categorised as a diagnosable 
mental disorder in various degrees of explicitness in DSM-II (APA, 1968), DSM-III (APA, 
1980) and DSM-IV (APA, 1994) until it was removed entirely in DSM-V (APA, 2013).  
2.6 The above examples demonstrate how any diagnostic definitions present in the DSM-V 
must be critically interpreted. On the other hand, an individual experiencing the 
symptoms of an anxiety disorder at a diagnosable level (meeting clinical thresholds) will 
be unlikely to gain access to therapeutic interventions that could help them without a 
diagnosis. Therefore, if one removes the clinical label entirely, the individual would be 
left suffering but have no access to support from clinical professionals. For this purpose, 
these operational definitions are given power to open access for members of the public 
to receive help. The above contention has sparked proposals from opponents of the 
current system of diagnoses for a review of systems (ROS) approach to address this 
“crisis in clinical description” (Harkness, Reynolds, & Lilienfield, 2013). However, for the 
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purposes of this thesis, the existing empirical framework stemming from DSM-V and 
ICD-10 (soon ICD-11) and clinical psychological research will be utilised.  
2.7 Within this project, the terms “anxiety” and “anxiety disorder” are used carefully. For 
example, the participants within the experimental group are labelled as “subclinical” 
because they score highly on clinical psychometric measures of anxiety (see Chapter 
THREE) but they have no official diagnosis. In this way, individuals with a diagnosis are 
safeguarded against participating in a study on worry that could cause them distress in 
some way. However, within the critical discussion at the end of this thesis, consideration 
is given to the fine lines between individuals with and without a diagnosis, and how this 
could be applied to wider contexts. For example, Zimmerman, Chelminski & Young 
(2004) examined the impact of clinical significance as a factor in psychiatric outpatients 
and found that it only decreased the diagnostic rates by approximately 2% – but what of 
the general population? An individual’s trait anxiety level may still impact their life in a 
variety of ways, but not meet clinical threshold for diagnosis. Is this predictive of future 
diagnoses (as in Wolitzky-Taylor et al., 2014) or simply reflective of the variance within 
society? 
2.8 Diagnostic definitions for Anxiety Disorders differ slightly between the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual – five (DSM-V; APA, 2013) and the International Classification of 
Diseases – tenth revision (ICD-10; WHO, 2016), however, they share similar traits. The 
main development from DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) to DSM-V (APA, 2013) is the subtle 
lifetime developmental perspective to classifications. For example, the DSM-V lists 
anxiety disorders in chronological order by median age of onset – starting with 
Separation Anxiety Disorder and concluding with Panic Disorder (Mohr & Schneider, 
2013). Comparatively, the ICD-10 (WHO, 2016) – which is used throughout Europe and 
the United Kingdom – is grounded in the assumption of discontinuity between adult and 
childhood anxiety disorders. This has been critiqued for its contrary position to empirical 
research, which suggests a developmental perspective, and a clinical psychology of the 
lifespan is most appropriate (Mohr & Schneider, 2013). Furthermore, the DSM-IV 
diagnoses more children with anxiety disorders than ICD-10, but not the same children – 
indicating poor compatibility between the two instruments (Adornetto et al., 2012). 
While the ICD-11 is currently under construction, it appears that Anxiety Disorders that 
occur across the lifespan are being grouped together, with a focus on distinguishing 
disorders based on apprehension (Kogan et al., 2016). The ICD-11 is expected for release 
in 2018, and some members of the DSM-V research team are working with and advising 
the ICD-11 working group on the classification of mood and anxiety disorders. Hopefully 
this will lead to increased compatibility between the two instruments, and further 
clinical utility across a wide range of geographical and cultural contexts – which appears 
to be the WHO’s aim (Kogan et al., 2016).  
2.9 At present however, the ICD-10 focusses on the presenting (often physiological) 
symptoms and gives examples of some corresponding worrisome thoughts but does not 
go on to describe the pathology of this disorder or its early signs and onset. The DSM-V 
elaborates within a developmental perspective to create a more reasonably balanced 
view of the disorder and its development. This lends itself to case formulation 
approaches used in clinical psychology, whereby the professional works collaboratively 
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with the patient to discuss relevant life factors and personal history, developing an 
idiosyncratic narrative of events leading to diagnosis (Johnstone, & Dallos, 2014; Flinn, 
Braham, & Nair, 2015; Wells, 2016; Ingram, 2016). This approach differs to traditional 
diagnoses that could be made from the ICD-10 guidance, which does not include 
background information, instead placing emphasis on symptomology. If the focus is on 
symptomology, then clinicians (such as GPs or Psychiatrists) may aim to prescribe a 
series of psychopharmacological medications to treat the presenting issues (Linden et 
al., 2013). The difference is implicit at the level of description, and explicit in the 
approach to diagnosis and treatment.  
What is Subclinical Anxiety? 
2.10 Subclinical refers to a level of trait anxiety that is above “normal” or “optimal” 
(asymptomatic) ranges, but below clinical significance for diagnosis of an anxiety 
disorder. Issues arise when posing the question – if trait anxiety fluctuates on a 
spectrum, what is normal for the general population and what constitutes a clinical 
mental disorder? Robles et al. (2015) found that 60.4% of mental health professionals 
specified that one or more diagnoses should be removed from current categories 
contained in both the DSM-V (APA, 2013) and ICD-10 (WHO, 2016). The most commonly 
cited reason for removal of mental disorders was that these diagnoses represent 
problematic boundaries between normal and psychopathological conditions. 
Additionally, the fine line between disordered and acceptable functioning in these areas 
appeared to lead to stigmatisation of certain individuals, which was cited as the reason 
for removal 24.1% of the time. It is important to note that anxiety disorders were not 
included in categories that should be removed in this study (other than mixed anxiety 
and depressive disorder). However, it does indicate the fluidity of diagnostic categories 
as operational definitions under which professionals operate; and the potential issue of 
pathologizing normal human behaviour. 
2.11 The construct validity of the subclinical anxiety category is a recent development and 
has mainly been investigated for its predictive potential as a risk factor contributing to 
later development of anxiety disorders across multi-ethnic populations (Hishinuma et 
al., 2001). However, recent work has seen promising results in treating subclinical 
populations with transdiagnostic preventative interventions (Korte, 2016). Furthermore, 
Laeger et al. (2012) found that subclinical anxiety was significantly positively correlated 
with increased amygdala-dlPFC coupling during negative word processing (using fMRI 
measures). This suggests that elevated levels of trait anxiety (prior to/without diagnosis) 
are associated with functional differences for affective processing, similar to what would 
be expected from a clinical sample. Therefore, it appears that subclinical anxiety is a 
valid discrete group within the continuum of trait anxiety (asymptomatic to disordered) 
that can be studied within quasi-experimental research. Furthermore, preventative 
measures can be developed and targeted to this group to decrease the number who 
later develop anxiety disorders, such as GAD. Within the present project, subclinical 
anxiety is used as a group within a quasi-experimental design. To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, there has been no other study that investigates potential 
differences in EFT between asymptomatic and subclinical groups. 
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Towards a Developmental Bio-Psycho-Social Explanatory Model 
2.12 Beck’s (1979) Cognitive Model of Emotional Distress is one of the most commonly 
referenced formative explanatory models of anxiety (and other affective) disorders. It 
has been extensively and empirically tested and found to be useful in the success of 
cognitive therapy for a variety of anxiety disorders including generalized anxiety disorder 
(GAD) and social anxiety disorder (SAD). Beck’s cognitive model posits that negative 
automatic thoughts (NATs) lead to symptoms - behaviours, physical responses, other 
thoughts and feelings – which then interact with each other to create a perpetuating 
cycle. Well’s (2005) ‘vicious circle’ cognitive model of panic posits that internal/external 
triggers cause an individual to perceive a threat, leading to the cycle of anxiety, 
physical/cognitive symptoms and misinterpretations. Anxiety disorders are heavily 
characterised by future-oriented NATs in the form of anticipatory questions such as 
‘what if…?’ (Clark and Steer, 1996) and catastrophic misinterpretations (Clark, 1986). 
The cognitive model of anxiety is useful in its approach to explaining anxiety disorders 
because it has been systematically developed and revised alongside application in 
cognitive therapy – as Beck was a huge advocate that no theory of mental disorder can 
be developed without being derived from practical applications (Clark and Steer, 1996). 
This is a strength that previous (mostly Freudian psychodynamic) explanations do not 
have as they were primarily inductive, not deductive. The cognitive models of anxiety 
are so closely related to their application in cognitive therapy that they are constantly 
updated in accordance with what works in practice. The above early explanatory models 
have since been developed using statistical analyses to explain discrete diagnoses – such 
as GAD. For example, the Cognitive-Behavioural Model of GAD (Dugas, Gagnon & 
Ladouceur, 1998; Dugas, Marchand & Ladouceur, 2005) posits that GAD is defined by its 
intolerance of uncertainty. This factor separates it from other anxiety disorders, such as 
Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia, for example (Dugas, Marchand & Ladouceur, 2005). 
Therefore, questions can be asked of the relationship between this intolerance of 
uncertainty and episodic future thinking. “What if…?” questions are undoubtedly 
starting points from which prospection (EFT) can begin; and prospection is inherently 
uncertain.  
2.13 Cognitive behavioural models can be applied to clinical practice in cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT) for GAD. Results from CBT demonstrate the potential to 
restructure cognitions, a contrasting view to reductionist and deterministic biophysical 
explanations and psychopharmacological treatments. It is noted however, that there is 
an interaction between the cognitive and biological explanations of disorders that has 
been focussed on more recently within the discipline, using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) technology in order to establish functional neurophysiological 
correlates (patterns of neural activity) related to ‘faulty cognitions’ of threat and fear 
(Hofmann, Ellard and Siegle, 2012). By incorporating social explanations at micro and 
macro levels, relating to negative life-experiences such as social deprivation and trauma 
or abuse (Guze, 1989), one can begin to more accurately formulate the pathogenesis 
and maintenance of anxiety disorders. Other social explanations include parenting style 
and specific related factors such as maternal and paternal control, authoritarian 
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parenting styles and overprotection or rejection behaviours (Young et al., 2013; Erozkan, 
2012; Creveling, Varela, Weems, and Corey, 2010). One may even go so far as to call 
“stigma” a significant predictive factor in the pathogenesis and maintenance of anxiety 
disorders from a social level of explanation. A recent study by McLaughlin and 
Hatzenbeuhler (2009) summarises anxiety sensitivity as a meta-cognitive fear of anxiety 
symptoms – including physical sensations of panic such as sweating or increased heart 
rate – resulting from beliefs that these are socially, physically or psychologically harmful 
or unacceptable. This idea that symptoms of anxiety are socially harmful and 
unacceptable could be strongly linked to social stigma surrounding anxiety disorders 
(and mental health problems in general). That this could predict the development of an 
anxiety disorder better than trait anxiety itself (McLaughlin and Hatzenbeuhler, 2009) 
empirically supports the contributory effect of perceived social stigma to mental 
(anxiety) disorders.  
2.14 Behavioural explanations for anxiety disorders are particularly useful when applied 
to treating phobias. For example, behaviourism takes the theories of classical and 
operant conditioning, along with social learning theory and explains phobias as learnt 
irrational fears of stimuli – as demonstrated in the classic “Little Albert” study (Watson 
and Rayner, 1920). This theory also relates to the vicious circle of avoidance (Williams et 
al., 2002), which highlights that anxiety results in avoidance of feared stimuli and 
therefore reduced belief in the individual’s ability to cope with it, and life in general 
(self-efficacy) – a form of conditioning. These explanations often result in useful 
therapeutic applications, such as systematic desensitisation – a progressive 
reconditioning therapy whereby the patient is presented with a hierarchy of phobic 
stimuli getting closer to the most phobic stimulus while actively relaxing themselves 
with techniques such as guided and focussed breathing (Bennett, 2011). For example, a 
patient with arachnophobia may be presented with images of spiders, followed by 
video, and progressively increase the exposure until perhaps even holding a spider is 
tolerable with use of relaxation techniques. Systematic desensitisation has also been 
found to be significantly effective when used concurrently with cognitive behavioural 
therapy (CBT) (Triscari et al., 2011), demonstrating the integrative possibilities of 
cognitive and behavioural explanatory models and applications for anxiety disorders. 
2.15 The current biopsychosocial model within psychology suggests an interaction 
between biological, psychological and social factors in the pathogenesis and 
maintenance of anxiety disorders. However, this has seen calls for a restructuring by 
researchers who suggest that psychological processes mediate the effects of other 
factors on developing anxiety (and other mental) disorders (Kinderman, 2013). 
Kinderman’s (2005) psychological model of mental disorder posits that biological, social 
and circumstantial factors all interact to impact on the disruption or disturbance of 
psychological processes resulting in mental disorders. Kinderman’s (2013) study found a 
significant mediatory effect of psychological processes such as rumination and self-
blame on strongly predictive factors such as family history of mental health difficulties, 
social deprivation and traumatic life-experiences in levels of anxiety (and depression). 
However, other support for this model can be found in cognitive based research on 
looming vulnerability, which has been shown to correlate highly with the development 
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of anxiety and can be actively reduced in psychotherapy (Riskind, Rector, & Cassin, 2011; 
Riskind et al., 2017; González-Díez, Orue, & Calvete, 2017). This would be an example of 
a psychological process – meant for evolutionary benefit as an ability to account for 
variation in perceived threats – which has become maladaptive due to social factors 
such as negative life events and circumstances (e.g. abuse), resulting in – or 
perpetuating – an anxiety disorder (Riskind, Rector and Taylor, 2012). These mediating 
psychological processes are intrinsically cognitive in nature and therefore can be 
targeted in cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT). Mediating psychological processes can 
be either risk-factors or protective-factors in the pathogenesis of anxiety disorders. CBT 
can aim to reduce cognitive risk-factors and focus on improving the cognitive protective-
factors to mediate the effects of life events and circumstantial factors in the patient’s 
life – developing the individual’s strengths and resilience. This helps to formulate 
personalised cognitive coping strategies for people through a more strengths-based 
approach. Doing so provides another example of the applicability of cognitive models of 
explanation for anxiety disorders which the purely biological models do not possess. 
While biological treatment options take a bottom-up approach by targeting the 
underlying physiological (neurochemical or hormonal) elements of the psychiatric 
disorder, psychotherapeutic approaches are able to work from the top-down in a 
reasonably accessible way. By doing so, the results from evidence-based treatments 
such as CBT demonstrate significant improvements without directly interfering with the 
underlying neurochemistry and therefore, psychotherapeutic approaches arguably have 
a significant advantage over biological approaches. 
2.16 The biological explanations of anxiety tend to focus on the hyperactivity of the 
adrenergic system – responsible for the fight, flight (or freeze) response. There has been 
much research into this area finding significant results correlating higher levels of 
anxiety with various biophysical differences to control samples with lower anxiety levels. 
For example, noradrenaline (NA) is a monoamine neurotransmitter associated with 
(among many other brain functions) the stress arousal response in the brain and has 
been found to be relevant in the pathogenesis of anxiety and depression (Goddard, 
2010). Goddard (2010) therefore suggests that pharmacological treatments for anxiety 
and depression – often comorbid diagnoses (see above) – focussing on the adrenergic 
system could be useful. One important region of the brain associated with anxiety and 
stress responses (among other emotional processes) is the amygdala. In a recent fMRI 
study (Robinson, Charney, Overstreet, Vytal and Grillon, 2012), anxiety significantly 
increased positive connectivity between the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and 
the amygdala, suggesting an aversive amplification system in humans which correlated 
with trait anxiety. Essentially, this supports the idea of an underlying vulnerability to 
develop anxiety disorders, pinpoints a neural mechanism in adaptive anxiety and 
suggests links with its role in maladaptive anxiety. This hyperactivity in the brain can also 
cause changes in the size of these specific areas and their localised grey matter volume, 
as suggested by Schienle (2011), who found that those with generalised anxiety disorder 
(GAD) had significantly higher levels of grey matter in the amygdala and dmPFC than 
asymptomatic controls. These findings broadly evidence either a predisposition to 
develop GAD or show consequences of symptoms related to GAD – such as chronic 
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worrying – on related areas of the brain. Key to the current project is that the 
directionality of the process is not clear. Instead, a position that these factors operate in 
a cyclical and iterative process of pathogenesis is clearly stated based on the literature 
presented here. Support for this model can be found in various biological studies 
including Laeger et al. (2012) on populations with subclinical anxiety and depression. 
This suggests a continuum of trait anxiety along which individuals vary and can progress 
(deteriorate) into clinical levels due to a range of environmental stressors, for example. 
2.17 Within the present project, participants are all between the ages of 18-30. This is 
due to existing research indicating a significant age difference in capabilities of episodic 
memory and EFT (De Brigard et al., 2016). Therefore, it is important to consider how 
underlying trait anxiety is expressed differently throughout specific age groups and their 
corresponding developmental stages. The developmental research into anxiety disorders 
point to generally transdiagnostic influences, with differential median age of 
development for specific disorders. According to Norton & Paulus (2017), parental 
influence appears to be the most significant variable across diagnoses, with specific 
interest paid to parenting style (overprotective, controlling; see Ballash et al., 2006), 
characteristics (lack of emotional warmth, childhood adversity and parent-child 
attachment). Kessler et al. (2005) found that age on onset for anxiety disorders 
(transdiagnostic) was 11 years, with variation between median age of onset that may 
reflect other developmental stages. Separation anxiety disorder and specific phobias 
were common in younger participants (early development), onset of social anxiety 
disorder peaked in early adolescence, while panic disorder, GAD and agoraphobia 
showed much later median age of onset and a greater variability. In their summary, 
Norton & Paulus (2017) argue that the differential median age of onset for discrete 
anxiety disorders may be reflective of an underlying transdiagnostic anxiety disorder 
being expressed in relevant developmental stages. For example, separation from a 
primary caregiver such as a parent, is of particular importance to younger children – and 
has been included in the DSM-V (APA, 2013) for use in diagnosing children. Further 
cognitive development is required before one becomes concerned with self-
consciousness or how others evaluate you socially – as in social anxiety disorder in 
adolescents.  For the purpose of the current project, GAD is taken as the most relevant 
anxiety disorder that participants may be approaching clinical significance for (based on 
psychometric scores on the GAD-7). 
2.18 There is a need for an integrative developmental biopsychosocial explanatory model 
for anxiety disorders that does not explicitly focus on biological factors – as has been the 
norm for psychiatry – written about passionately by Reid (2007). The wording within 
Reid’s article indicates conflict between the other perspectives in psychology and the 
‘accepted’ biological explanations commonly cited within psychiatry. There is progress 
towards more integrative models within developments such as Kinderman’s (2005; 
2009) psychological model of mental disorders. These models are in the early stages of 
empirical testing however, so results must be treated with caution until a more 
substantial empirical base is created within the literature to support or refute them. In a 
critical comparison of explanatory models, it is difficult to determine which features are 
of primary importance. It could be the applicability of an explanatory model; in which 
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case, cognitive behavioural models of anxiety disorders could be considered more 
appropriate due to their constant development and use in therapy. These interventions 
are not always available to all; however, this is changing in England with the 
development of the Improving Access to Psychological Therapy (IAPT) scheme. However, 
the applications from biological explanatory models, such as medications, are more 
readily available and easily prescribed by GPs, for example. The European Commission’s 
Green Paper on mental health stated that,  
“the mental condition of people is determined by a multiplicity of factors including biological 
(e.g. genetics), individual (e.g. personal experiences), family and social (e.g. social support) 
and economic and environmental (e.g. social status and living conditions)” 
(European Commission, 2005: p.4) 
2.19 In reality there is still an imbalance in the accepted biopsychosocial model but this is 
changing slowly with the progression of research such as Kinderman (2013) and papers 
explicitly calling for change (e.g., Reid, 2007), demonstrating the need for a more holistic 
explanatory model for these anxiety disorders. Furthermore, it is important to highlight 
the developmental transdiagnostic nature of anxiety disorders. The research presented 
during this thesis posits that trait anxiety fluctuates upon a continuum, and that anxiety 
disorders reflect the high-end of that spectrum. Therefore, the label of subclinical 
anxiety is applicable to participants within the present project based on a high level of 
quantifiable trait anxiety and the absence of current or previous diagnoses or treatment. 
It is prudent to take into consideration the developmental, biological and cognitive-
behavioural influences that may also impact participants’ levels of trait anxiety. This is 
not a strictly homogeneous group, but rather a population who have been objectively 
divided into groups for the purpose of a quasi-experimental design. 
Episodic Future Thinking 
Developments in Theory and Research 
2.20 As discussed in Chapter One, episodic memory is described by Tulving (2002) as an 
imaginative neurocognitive function that humans possess. This enables them to vividly 
remember personal past experiences in great detail. While this takes place in the reality 
of the mind, Tulving iterates the equivalent importance for humans to physical reality. 
Most importantly, this human faculty is not simply a passive reconstruction of events 
from an observer perspective, but rather an image-based re-experiencing. 
2.21 Episodic future thinking (EFT) is the phenomena of mentally time travelling to 
imagine a future scenario, with levels of detail both personal and external to one’s self 
(Suddendorf, 2010; Miloyan, Pachana, & Suddendorf, 2014; Schacter, Benoit, De Brigard, 
& Szpuner, 2015; Wu, Szpuner, Godovich, Schacter, & Hofmann, 2015; Ward, 2016; 
Rebetez, Barsics, Rochat, D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2016; Bertossi, Tesini, Cappelli 
& Ciaramelli, 2016). This can – to an extent - be described as the opposite end of the 
same spectrum of episodic memory. It involves projection into the future instead of the 
past, and growing bodies of research have found that EFT involves similar cognitive 
processes and resources to episodic memory (Suddendorf, 2010). EFT is therefore the 
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cognitive faculty of prospectively experiencing (or pre-experiencing) a future 
hypothetical event or situation. The level of detail is mainly personal, relates to the 
individual’s perspective and phenomenology of the imagined event, and is not 
constrained to external details (such as environmental description) from a passive 
observer perspective (as above). This makes EFT unique, in that it demonstrates the 
human ability to mentally rehearse and pre-experience events, perhaps to prepare for 
multiple eventualities. Miloyan, Bulley & Suddendorf (2016) summarize the evolutionary 
benefit that EFT can provide to humans, from both proximate and ultimate perspectives. 
They state that the emergence of EFT provided humans with a range of significant 
benefits over other animals. Specifically, while other animals may respond to imminent 
or anticipated threat or danger (through immediate anxiety or fear systems), the human 
capacity for EFT allows us to generate our own predictions of future threats and respond 
accordingly to minimize risk of harm. In other words, humans generate their own 
anxiety-provoking prospections – though not always accurately – and these serve to 
motivate as a call to action (e.g. avoidance of situations) that increase our chance of 
survival (Miloyan, Bulley & Suddendorf, 2016). 
2.22 The affective component of EFT is important to consider, as humans experience 
emotions related to the event without the event occurring in objective reality at that 
moment (Lang, 1979; Damasio, 2000; Moscovitch, Chiupka & Gavric, 2013; Ji, Heyes, 
MacLeod & Holmes, 2016; Bullock, Newman-Taylor & Stopa, 2016; Skodzik, Leopold & 
Ehring, 2017) and this serves to motivate our actions and behaviours accordingly 
(Miloyan, Bulley & Suddendorf, 2016). As discussed by Tulving (2002), mental reality is 
nearly as important to humans as physical reality. When an individual mentally travels 
back in time to re-experience a personal past event, they have “bent time’s arrow into a 
loop” (Tulving, 2002). One could argue that EFT stretches time’s arrow forward beyond 
the present. The individual is aware that they are not physically present in the memory – 
it is occurring within their mind – this awareness is known as “autonoetic consciousness” 
– a meta-cognitive faculty that humans possess. The emotional impact of the episodic 
memory itself, however, is accessible – much like Damasio’s (1999) somatic marker 
hypothesis. Therefore, when this autonoetic consciousness is applied to prospective 
thoughts (EFT) it can elicit physical, emotional and somatic markers in relation to the 
pre-experiencing of the event.  Most relevant to the current project is the clinical 
application of this function in therapeutic interventions. For example, Imaginal Exposure 
Therapy (Wells & Matthews, 1994; 2014) involves encouraging a patient to imagine 
gradually more threatening and anxiety-provoking scenarios or stimuli, with support and 
guidance of a trained clinician. It has shown impressive results in treating anxious 
patients, and is utilized within CBT practice, which is shown to be the clinical standard 
for evidence-based psychotherapy approved for treating anxiety disorders. 
2.23 Miloyan, Bulley & Suddendorf (2016) state that “episodic foresight is a critical 
feature of anxiety in humans.” It is hypothesized, based on literature of therapeutic 
interventions such as cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT; Beck et al., 1987; Beck, 1991), 
that individuals with anxiety will pre-experience more threatening and negative events, 
including the associated negative (anxious) affect and somatic markers. Wu et al. (2015) 
found that participants with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) demonstrated a 
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negativity bias for future events, rating negative future events as more plausible than 
asymptomatic controls. They also found that GAD participants benefited significantly 
less from repetition of future thinking to produce episodic details than asymptomatic 
controls – particularly for positive events. This finding makes logical sense based on 
GAD’s clinical symptoms of persistent and excessive worry about the future (APA, 2013).  
2.24 Anxiety serves an evolutionary purpose for humans, as summarized by Miloyan, 
Bulley & Suddendorf (2016); analogous to a smoke alarm. Its purpose is to predict 
threats and trigger avoidant or management behaviours. Broader and more abstract 
worry is initially advantageous. It facilitates flexible problem-focused coping and 
encourages the individual to be vigilant to threatening cues. However, this function 
becomes maladaptive and symptomatic of GAD, when it exceeds its normal application 
and increases generation of threatening future events. An impact bias becomes present, 
meaning anxious individuals overestimate the intensity and duration of their negative 
affective reactions to future events. This becomes more pronounced and problematic 
when this impact bias does not reduce as a result of multiple mispredictions – i.e. 
predicted threatening events not occurring (Meyvis, Ratney & Levav, 2010; Miloyan, 
Bulley & Suddendorf, 2016). Furthermore, from a meta-cognitive perspective, 
individuals with high levels of anxiety are likely to worry about their own worry – 
commonly referred to as meta-worry (Hirsc & Matthews, 2012). This meta-cognitive 
function may in theory rely on the capacity for EFT.  
2.25 Episodic memory and EFT rely on common neural networks including the 
hippocampus and medial temporal lobes (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; 
Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Botzung, Denkova, & Manning, 2008; Okuda et al., 2003; 
Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007; Szpunar, & McDermott, 2008; Miloyan, Pachana, 
& Suddendorf, 2014). Similarly, individuals with damage to their hippocampus 
demonstrate impaired episodic memory and future thinking (Hassabis et al., 2007; Klein, 
Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Tulving, 2002). Furthermore, impairments in EFT can be seen 
in patients with amnesia (Cole, Morrison, Barak, Pauly-Takacs, & Conway, 2016). It is 
therefore reasonable to predict that within the present study, participants will activate 
these areas when constructing future events. 
2.26 There have been several conceptualizations and models of episodic future thinking. 
Most of these conceptual models for EFT focus on the process of “construction” as the 
key cognitive faculty shared between all types of episodic thinking (episodic memory, 
EFT and episodic counterfactual thinking) – both past and future. It is important to note, 
that these models are applicable not just to episodic memory and therefore contain an 
implicit and explicit assumption that episodic thinking is the cognitive faculty, and that 
temporal direction (past – future) is simply one continuum within the model.  
2.27 The Constructive-Episodic-Simulation (CES) hypothesis states the episodic memory 
system is used to retrieve and recombine details into a novel future episodic simulation 
(Schacter & Addis, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Bunker, 2007; Ward, 2016). Hassabis & 
Maguire (2007, 2009; Ward, 2016) also proposed that episodic future thinking involves 
construction of a mental scene. Within their review of episodic future thinking and its 
possible applications within clinical neuropsychology, Ward (2016) summarises five key 
cognitive processes involved. These include, “episodic memory, semantic memory, 
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executive functioning, self-referential processing, and imagery.” When combined and 
utilized together, these faculties create the phenomenon of EFT and allow the individual 
to pre-experience potential future events.  
2.28 The topic of episodic simulation – both EFT and EM – is at the early stages of 
empirical investigation between relevant (often clinical) groups. There also appears to 
be some disconnect between research efforts – with most claiming results require 
replication, but few replications being published. Overarching replicable results show 
that the episodic core network is functionally implicated during the process of EFT and 
EM; and that (broadly speaking) these require two main stages: construction/retrieval 
(early post-stimulus processes) and elaboration (later reconstructive, more imaginative 
processes).  
Cognitive Measures and Methods Used 
2.29 The measurement of episodic future thinking at a cognitive level, has mainly 
involved self-report measures based on adaptations and developments of psychometric 
measures and interviews. These were originally intended for measuring 
autobiographical, episodic memory – not specifically EFT. Boyacioglu & Akfirat (2015) 
state that the psychometric properties of measures for memory phenomenology have 
been inadequately developed and tested. Most relevant to the proposed study is the 
Autobiographical Interview (AI; Levine et al., 2002), which originally focused on 
autobiographical memory by distinguishing internal and external details, and episodic 
richness of details recalled. The scoring system used in the AI assumes a distinction 
between episodic and non-episodic facets of autobiographical memory and utilizes 
categories that were adapted from the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ; 
Johnson, Foley, Suengas & Raye, 1988), which originally distinguished between 
perceived and imagined events.  
2.30 Most widely used within empirical research into episodic future thinking is the 
adapted autobiographical interview (adapted-AI; Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2008). The 
adapted-AI utilises the same basic structure as the original AI, however, it incorporates 
prompts to generate future events as well as remember past events. The scoring system 
is also the same, in so far as answers are transcribed and then qualitative details are 
assigned to either episodic (internal) or non-episodic (external) groups. Therefore, an 
event that described a higher frequency of episodic details is more episodic. Participants 
who more regularly produce episodic details rather than non-episodic details are also 
proposed to be more able to retrieve and prospectively imagine events than others. 
Participants are instructed to recall or imagine an event in four conditions: past few 
weeks; past few years; next few weeks; next few years. The event does not need to 
relate to the cue word and participants are encouraged to elaborate and freely associate 
as they choose to generate their event (Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2008). The scoring 
system for the adapted-AI relies on analysing the transcripts of interview responses. 
Information about the central event of each response is categorised as either internal 
(episodic information that relates to the central event) or external (non-episodic 
information, including semantic details, information about extended events unspecified 
in time and place, and repetitions).  
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2.31 While there is still much need for research into the psychometric properties of the 
adapted-AI (Boyacioglu & Akfirat, 2015), Ward (2016) suggests that the adapted-AI 
produces the most detail out of possible EFT measures, and studies have found 
consistently high inter-rater reliability (Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2008; Mercuri et al., 
2015). However, the adapted-AI requires a significant time-commitment for its 
completion. For example, if 10 events (3 minutes per event) were required per temporal 
condition (4 in total) then a minimum timeframe for data collection per participant is 
approximately 120 minutes. Even if the research focused solely on EFT data collection, 
the timeframe would still be 60 minutes. This presents an issue when utilizing the 
adapted-AI in EEG research, as there is a recommended timeframe per EEG data 
collection session. The dense-array EEG Hydrocel 128-sensor net is known to begin 
drying out after approximately 30 minutes (EGI, 2017). This results in loss of accuracy 
from readings due to gradually decreasing conductivity on the scalp. Therefore, the 
adapted-AI will not be utilized within the present study (see Chapter THREE). Instead, a 
novel two-dimensional scale will be used to gain immediate quantitative self-report data 
from participants about each cue word. Similar to the adapted-AI, participants are given 
a cue-word and instructed to remember/imagine an event within the past/next 5 years. 
The event does not need to be related to the cue word, and participants are therefore 
allowed to elaborate freely (in their mind). The two dimensions selected also relate to 
the adapted-AI and aim to measure level of episodic detail produced by scoring the 
individuals perspective of the event and vividness of the experienced event. 
2.32 Recently, psychometric measures have been developed for the purposes of 
measuring repetitive future thinking as distinctive characteristics within transdiagnostic 
psychiatric populations, as in the Future-oriented Repetitive Thought (FoRT) scale 
(Miranda, Wheeler, Polanco-Roman, & Marroquín, 2017). Interestingly, this measure 
sought to bring together common factors present from a number of established 
psychometric measures, including the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, 
Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) and the Generalised Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire-
IV (GAD-Q-IV; Newman et al., 2002), which both focus on repetitive and excessive worry 
and screening for symptoms of GAD respectively. The FoRT Scale (Miranda, Wheeler, 
Polanco-Roman, & Marroquin, 2017) proposes that future-oriented repetitive thinking is 
comprised of pessimism, future goals, and positive indulgence. Episodic future thinking 
can therefore be conceptualised as the faculty that differentiates these three distinctive 
subtypes. However, this measure still requires further testing and use in research to 
establish its appropriateness in the current study before being considered a useful tool 
to measure episodic future thinking distinctively from repetitive future thinking.  
Neurobiological Research and the Episodic Core Network 
2.33 Neuroimaging studies of episodic future thinking have utilized a number of methods 
and a variety of technology, beginning with Okuda et al.’s (2003) PET study. Similar 
activity was reported in neural areas for both future and past tasks, specifically in 
prefrontal regions, medial temporal lobe, including right hippocampus and bilateral 
parahippocampal gyri. Overlap between neural regions were replicated heavily in Addis 
et al. (2007), where both future and past tasks were divided into construction and 
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elaboration phases. The medial temporal (hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus) 
lobe, medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate and retrosplenial cortex, lateral 
temporal and prefrontal regions were most active across both temporal conditions 
(Addis et al., 2007; Szpunar, Watson & McDermott, 2007; Schacter, Addis & Buckner, 
2007; Addis et al., 2011; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Schacter, Benoit, De Brigard & 
Szpunar, 2015). This network is referred to herein as the Episodic Core Network (see 
Table. 1 below). Interestingly, there is a noted overlap between the Episodic Core 
Network and the heavily researched Default Mode Network (Raichle et al., 2001), which 
is found to be more active during self-referential and self-projection tasks and when 
attending to stories containing 1st person pronouns (Gusnard et al., 2001; Kelley et al., 
2002; Vogeley et al., 2001; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Decety et al., 2002; Kjaer et al., 
2002; Travis & Parim, 2017). The overlap of neural regions between these two networks 
makes logical sense in so far as the faculty of episodic thinking involves construction of 
events that are personal and phenomenological – not passive reconstructions from an 
external position. This is subjectively related to self-referential processing that would 
recruit the Default Mode Network as the individual is at the centre of the event.  
 
Episodic Core Network Brodmann Areas (BAs) 
Medial Temporal Lobe: MTL (hippocampus & 
parahippocampal gyrus) 
BA 27, 28, 34, 35, & 36 
Medial Prefrontal Cortex: mPFC BA 9, 10, 24, 25 & 32 
Posterior Cingulate Cortex: PCC BA 23 & 31 
Retrosplenial Cortex: RC BA 29 
Lateral Temporal Regions BA 21, 38, 41 & 42 
Prefrontal Regions BA 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 24, 25, 32, 
44, 45, 46 & 47 
Table. 1. – Table showing the key neural regions of the Episodic Core Network and their 
approximate corresponding Brodmann Areas.  
 
A Note on Episodic Counterfactual Thinking 
2.34 When considering episodic thinking as a cognitive faculty, it is important to note the 
human ability to think “counterfactually” – a distinctly meta-cognitive faculty. Episodic 
counterfactual thinking is the ability to imagine elements of a past event in a new way 
that may or may not (according to the individual) alter the remembered outcome of the 
event (Schacter, Benoit, De Brigard & Szpunar, 2015). For example, if an individual has 
an episodic memory of their first date with their romantic partner and is asked, “imagine 
you didn’t say X – how might that change what happened?” they are able to think 
counterfactually by utilising similar reconstructive and elaborative processes to EM or 
EFT. Their answer may be that the date ended the same way (no change to outcome of 
event) but they were able to construct an alternative narrative for what could have 
happened, retrospectively. While there has been an increase in research investigating 
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episodic future thinking and memory and their shared core neural network (Schacter et 
al., 2012), there has been less research into episodic counterfactual thinking until 
recently (Addis et al., 2013). Studies into the vividness of episodic counterfactual 
thinking and episodic future thinking have found that participants often report less 
affective significance when imagining events in general compared to recalling episodic 
memories; however, this was more pronounced in episodic counterfactual thinking (De 
Brigard & Giovanello, 2012). This means that imagining a future event is less emotionally 
intense for individuals than recalling a past episode; this is reduced further when 
imagining an alternative version of a past episode. The valence of these events made no 
significant difference to ratings of vividness or specificity of details produced, and 
therefore the emotion associated had no mediating effect of this process. In general, 
remembered events are more vivid than imagined ones (D’Argembeau & ven der Linden, 
2004). Interestingly, repeated simulation of counterfactual episodes does not increase 
their subjective plausibility (Szpunar & Schacter, 2013) despite other studies showing 
counterfactual simulations can lead to memory distortion (Gerlach et al., 2014). 
Therefore, a debate still exists in the literature with regard to the role of repeated 
episodic counterfactual thinking in memory functioning and distortion. 
2.35 The role of episodic counterfactual thinking in therapy is an important issue to 
consider for future clinical research. Ferrante et al. (2013) found that participants often 
focus on uncontrollable factors when asked to think counterfactually about their failings 
(in completing a puzzle). Comparatively, participants who were encouraged to think 
prospectively about how to succeed with this task in future demonstrated a tendency to 
focus on controllable factors for constructive improvement. This bares interesting 
applications in understanding the role of reflection in the therapeutic process. It is an 
opportunity to constructively reflect on past failings or negative experiences and to 
focus future cognitions on overcoming the event in a controllable and non-ruminative 
way. Indeed, the role of episodic counterfactual thinking as a subject for future research 
is important to note within the present project. If differences are found to exist between 
High Anxiety participants and asymptomatic controls when producing episodic future 
thoughts, it may call for research investigating differences in episodic counterfactual 
thinking as well (see Chapter FIVE for discussion). 
Summary 
The current literature available at this time suggests the following key findings: 
1. Persistent negative (threatening) future-thinking (worry) is a main defining 
characteristic of Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) 
2. Subclinical Anxiety (high trait anxiety) is highly predictive of GAD, and both cognitive 
and neurophysiological differences exist in subclinical populations 
3. Episodic thinking is made up of episodic memory, future thinking and counterfactual 
thinking and each share the Episodic Core Network of neural regions while remaining 
distinct 
4. Episodic future thinking is related to worry (as above) in GAD 
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5. There are cognitive differences in episodic future thinking between participants with 
GAD and asymptomatic controls 
 
2.36 Taking into account the above findings, neurocognitive theory can be applied to 
begin hypothesizing about how these cognitive differences may be related to neural 
regions and networks. The Episodic Core Network described above (see Table. 1.) is 
therefore important to consider when planning the analyses for such an investigation. 
So to, are other neurobiological correlates of threat detection in anxiety outlined by 
Hofmann, Ellard, & Siegle, (2012); Zaretsky, Mendelsohn, Mintz, & Hendler (2010); and 
Wheelock et al. (2014); and attention-bias for affective stimuli. How these networks 
interact when engaging in EFT is key to understanding potential differences in the 
mental prospection of adults with anxiety. Therefore, the study presented below will 
investigate these potential neurocognitive differences in formulating affective episodic 
future thoughts by comparing a subclinical group to asymptomatic controls – the first 
study of its kind. 
2.37 Chapter THREE outlines the methodology used within the present study and 
provides a critical discussion surrounding participant recruitment, quasi-experimental 
design, EEG, source estimation and the inverse problem, and ethical considerations 
within the project.  
 
Research Questions: 
1.) Is there a statistically significant difference between High Anxiety and Asymptomatic 
Control groups’ self-report ratings of Episodic Future Thinking 
Scores obtained from the self-report measures of EFT will be combined to make 4 
separate EFT scores – Total, Negative, Positive and Neutral. These EFT scores are made 
by combining scores from the two questions that measure, a.) level of detail, and b.) 
perspective of the event.  
2.) Will there be any statistically significant neurophysiological differences (as measured 
by EEG) between High Anxiety and Asymptomatic Control groups during Episodic 
Future Thinking tasks? 
Mean amplitude during both time windows (275-325ms and 775-825ms) will be statistically 
analysed for potential differences at key electrode sites between groups during EFT tasks.  
3.) Will there be any statistically significant differences between High Anxiety and 
Asymptomatic Controls in the recruitment of neural regions (as estimated by 
sLORETA) comprising the Episodic Core Network during Episodic Future Thinking 
tasks? 
sLORETA data for regions of the Episodic Core Network will be analysed to investigate 
potential statistically significant differences between groups.  
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3a.) If any statistically significant differences are found (as above), is there a 
significant interaction between Anxiety Group and Valence of cue word? 
A 2 (Anxiety group: High vs Low) x 2 (Valence: Neutral vs Negative) ANOVA will be 
completed to investigate potential statistically significant interaction effects of Anxiety 
Group and Valence on recruitment of neural regions comprising the Episodic Core Network 
during EFT tasks.  
Hypotheses: 
1.) There will be a statistically significant difference between High Anxiety and 
Asymptomatic Control groups’ self-report ratings of Episodic Future Thinking 
2.) There will be significant neurophysiological differences (as measured by EEG) 
between High Anxiety and Asymptomatic Control groups during Episodic Future 
Thinking tasks 
3.) There will be significant differences between High Anxiety and Asymptomatic 
Control groups in the recruitment of neural regions (as estimated by sLORETA) 
comprising the Episodic Core Network during Episodic Future Thinking tasks 
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3.0. CHAPTER THREE: Methodology 
 
Participant Recruitment 
Sampling Methods 
3.1. For the purpose of the current project, self-selecting sampling techniques are 
utilised; specifically snowball sampling. This allows self-selected participants to 
recommend the study to their friends, family or colleagues, for example. This technique 
is useful when conducting research that requires a bigger time commitment and one 
that can gain a lot of data from a smaller sample size. It has also traditionally been 
utilised to study “hard-to-reach” populations, such as current or previous drug users 
(Eland-Goossensen et al., 1997; Water, 2015) or childhood sexual abuse victims (Al-
Modallal, 2015). The limitation of snowball-sampling is the increased levels of bias that 
may possibly contaminate the results. For example, social proximity or closeness of 
relationships may signify other shared factors and variables between participants in a 
specific subgroup – they may share significant common interests and characteristics. 
This causes an issue when drawing causal conclusions based on the results of the 
statistical analysis because each of these unidentified factors may account for a portion 
of variance otherwise not specified (Emerson, 2015). Further statistical investigation has 
produced evidence that snowball-sampling can be useful in generating information 
about specific populations, and steps can be taken to adjust for social homogeneity by 
examining participants’ social media groups (see Rocha, Thorson, Lambiotte, & Liljeros, 
2017). Snowball-sampling can be used to reach higher numbers of “hard-to-reach” 
populations, this is particularly useful in studies that require large samples that bolster 
more statistical power for generalisation to wider populations (Emerson, 2015). 
However, within the current project, the number of participants required is lower due to 
the richness of data obtained per EEG data collection session. The number of 
participants for similar neurophysiological studies range significantly from N = 15 
(Massand & Bowler, 2015) to N = 33 (Hach, Tippett & Addis, 2014). This is indicative of a 
larger issue within neuropsychology research. Namely, the inconsistency between 
researchers in their reporting of effect sizes or statistical power obtained within the 
sample. In a systematic review of 100 EEG and ERP studies, Larson & Carbine (2017) 
found that such inconsistency made it practically impossible for recommendations to be 
made for future research design; and limited the ability to determine whether studies 
were adequately powered to detect effects of the manipulated independent variables. 
Therefore, there is no current guideline for sample size in EEG or ERP research – nor 
have any such recommendations been made for EFT research. 
3.2. While snowball sampling is normally referred to as a form of opportunity sampling, 
steps were taken to inform the selection of participants through a self-selective 
protocol. Specifically, the study was advertised using a poster asking for participants to 
take part in a neuropsychology project related to worry. Participants were encouraged 
to e-mail the researcher if interested and were then asked standardized questions for 
screening via e-mail to establish their suitability for the present study. Furthermore, only 
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participants who met the criteria for the study were asked to suggest the study to their 
friends, family or colleagues – this was the way in which significantly relevant factors 
were controlled for during snowball sampling. The selection criteria for the study were 
clearly specified on the poster. Selection criteria were as follows: i.) no current or 
previous diagnosis of mental disorders; ii.) no experience of psychological therapy for 
anxiety or depression; and iii.) no previous or current use of medication 
(psychopharmacological interventions) for depression or anxiety. This sampling method 
and exclusion criteria closely match those found in Mercuri et al. (2015) and Rebetez et 
al. (2016). The study was advertised using posters across the University of 
Gloucestershire campuses; on social media (Facebook) pages for the university; and also 
advertised to the general public across social media; and in local businesses. These 
participants may have known other friends and colleagues who shared their interests 
and were likely to take part. This occurred a number of times during participant 
recruitment for the project – 4 of the 11 EEG participants and 6 of the 16 overall 
participants were known to other participants and reported they volunteered because 
of their recommendations.  
Quasi-experimental Between-Participant Design 
3.3. Participants were divided into two experimental conditions based on their general 
level of trait anxiety and worry: Subclinical Anxiety and Asymptomatic Controls. To do 
this, self-report measures for anxiety and worry were examined for their psychometric 
properties and appropriateness when applied to the current project. One such clinical 
tool is the GAD-7 (Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams & Lowe, 2006). This brief measure of 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) was originally developed in line with the 4th edition 
of the Diagnostics and Statistics Manual (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 
1994), which is used by clinical psychologists and psychiatrists to diagnose mental 
disorders; now the DSM-V (APA, 2013). The measure was developed as a brief 
alternative to lengthy clinician-administered measures and interviews that were 
previously used in practice. It was based on a sample of 2739 participants (65% female; 
80% White, non-Hispanic). The measure has excellent internal consistency (Cronbach α = 
.92), good test-retest reliability (intraclass correlation = 0.83) and good procedural 
validity (Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams & Lowe, 2006). The scale scores 7 items from 0-3 
resulting in a total GAD-7 score of 0-21. With a cut-off point of 10 or greater, sensitivity 
and specificity exceed 0.80. A cut-off point of 15 or greater indicates severe GAD. The 
measure has good construct validity, as it demonstrated a strong correlation between 
GAD severity and a range of other measures for: mental health (0.75), social functioning 
(0.46), general health perceptions (0.44), bodily pain (0.36), role functioning (0.33), and 
physical functioning (0.30) (Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams & Lowe, 2006). It also shows good 
convergent validity by correlating with other anxiety scales, the Beck Anxiety Inventory 
(r = 0.72) and the anxiety subscale of the Symptom Checklist-90 (r = 0.74). This scale has 
also been examined in a number of populations to investigate cultural biases (80% of the 
original sample were White). For example, Parkerson, et al. (2015) investigated these 
biases and found that Black/African American participants score lower on items 1,5 and 
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7 of the GAD-7 than others with similar symptoms and this suggests a need for a 
culturally sensitive GAD-7 due to differential item functioning. 
3.4. The GAD-7 has been found to show good psychometric properties in German (Hinz, 
et al., 2017), French (Micoulaud-Franchi, et al., 2016) and American populations (Spitzer, 
Kroenke, Williams & Lowe, 2006). It shows poor psychometric properties in Lebanese 
outpatient samples (Sawaya, et al., 2016) suggesting a possible “Western culture bias” 
present within the measure’s items. However, the GAD-7 has been successfully adapted 
with positive results for Chinese populations (Tong, et al., 2016) so this is unclear. The 
GAD-7 is also used across England in the NHS Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapies (IAPT) scheme, which aims to provide a stepped-care model of evidence-
based psychological therapy to the general population. Within the IAPT services, the 
GAD-7 is used as an outcome measure for treatment success rates (IAPT, 2008; IAPT, 
2017). Therefore, after consideration of the above empirical evidence, the GAD-7 is 
deemed appropriate for use within the current project. It has strong psychometric 
properties and is already used for national research across England.  
3.5. The Penn-State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 
1990) is a 16-item self-report questionnaire which aims to assess respondents’ level of 
pervasive and uncontrollable worry – a defining characteristic of GAD (APA, 1994). The 
total PSWQ scores range from 16-80 (5 point Likert-scales are used for each item) and it 
has been found to have high levels of internal consistency (α range = .86–.93) but 
varying levels of test–retest reliability (r range = .54–.92) (Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 
1992; Meyer et al., 1990; Stanley, Novy, Bourland, Beck, & Averill, 2001, Dear, et al., 
2011). The PSWQ has also been tested cross-culturally and found to have high internal 
consistency, good test-retest reliability and good convergent-divergent validity in 
Argentinian populations (Rodríguez-Biglieri & Vetere, 2011); and Japanese American and 
European American (Watari & Brodbeck, 2000) populations. Furthermore, Scott, Eng & 
Heimberg (2002) found that nonclinical Caucasian, African American and Asian American 
populations did not differ significantly in their scores on the PSWQ or the frequency they 
met clinical criteria for GAD. This suggests that the PSWQ is cross-culturally reliable in 
measuring individuals’ level of trait worry, and how it may constitute a diagnosable level 
of trait anxiety. However, the study also found that these groups differed significantly on 
the domains their worries were related to. This was based on scores from the Worry 
Domains Questionnaire (WDQ; Tallis et al., 1992), which measures the intensity of worry 
across five specific categories: Relationships, Lack of Confidence, Aimless Future, Work 
Incompetence, and Financial. Significant differences were found both between and 
within groups, which demonstrates the variability between nonclinical ethnic groups. 
However, this study further demonstrates the broad nature of pervasive worry that is 
captured using the PSWQ. 
3.6. Behar et al. (2009) have suggested that a cut-off score of 65 provides the best 
balance of sensitivity (0.99) and specificity (0.98) when utilising the PSWQ to diagnose 
GAD symptoms. Therefore, within the present study, participants can be grouped into a 
“High Worry” (PSWQ = > 65) condition. Some research has highlighted multiple distinct 
classes of worry from the PSWQ, specifying cut-off scores of 39-54 as “moderate-high 
worry” and under 39 as “low worry” (Korte, Nicholas, & Schmidt, 2016).  
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3.7. For the purposes of the experiment, these two measures will be used to establish 
two groups: “Subclinical Anxiety” (GAD-7 > 10; PSWQ > 65) and “Asymptomatic 
Controls” (GAD-7 < 10; PSWQ < 39). They have been selected for their strong 
psychometric properties and reliability in measuring trait anxiety and levels of pervasive 
worry, respectively. Therefore, the quasi-experimental independent variable (IV1) will 
be participants’ anxiety group. The subsequent statistical analyses will investigate the 
differences (both cognitive and neurophysiological) between these two groups when 
performing the EFT tasks (see below). Both of these psychometric measures are 
completed through the NOVOPsych App for iPad (see Appendix D for examples), which 
allows for scores to be automatically generated and for data to be both passcode and 
password protected.  
3.8. Alternative methods could have included the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales – 
short version (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). This self-report measure provides a 
summary of scores for three dimensions of mental health. It has been studied across 
Western (USA and UK) and Eastern European (Russia and Poland) countries and 
demonstrated appropriate fit as a psychometric tool (Scholton, Velten, Bieda, Zhang & 
Margraf, 2017). However, this was not chosen to measure anxiety and worry because it 
was felt to not be specific enough to answer the proposed research question, and has 
been found to load onto a more general measure of negative affect (NA) in non-clinical 
samples (Henry & Crawford, 2005). There is clearly some investigation required, as 
DASS-21 total scores correlate better with co-morbid anxiety and depression than their 
respective single dimension scores (Osman et al., 2012); suggesting an underlying factor 
(possibly NA) that the measure total fits better than its component subscales. It calls to 
question the specificity of these subscales but does illustrate the utility of the DASS-21 
as a brief measure that elicits rich overall data from a trifactor model. This is not 
necessarily appropriate for the current study, and therefore more specific and clinical 
measures have been chosen that were designed with the purpose of measuring GAD 
symptomology.  
3.9. The quasi-experimental IV1 is the group to which participants are assigned based on 
their GAD-7 and PSWQ scores. However, the second independent variable (IV2) is the 
valence of the affective stimuli presented during the task. Broadly speaking, there are 
three groups of affective stimuli: positive, neutral and negative. For each of these 
valence conditions, a level of arousal is associated with the stimuli – the intensity of 
emotion the stimuli elicit within participants. Tools have been developed in order to 
standardise affective stimuli for their valence and arousal, for use within psychological 
research. For the purpose of the present study, cue words were selected from the 
Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1994) which has previously 
been used within neurocognitive research by Mercuri et al. (2015) investigating EFT 
within opiate-using populations. The ANEW words have standardized ratings that were 
established using the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM), an affective rating system 
developed by Lang (1980) that has pictorial representations with corresponding bi-polar 
rating scores for valence (positive-negative), arousal (high-low) and dominance (in 
control-dominated). Other such affective stimuli have been developed to be presented 
pictorially (as in IAPS; Lang et al., 2008); aurally via digitised sounds (as in IADS; Bradley 
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& Lang, 2007); and in longer forms of prose text (as in ANET; Bradley & Lang, 2007). Each 
of these affective stimuli are standardised for their valence, arousal and dominance 
using the SAM.  
3.10. The cue words for the present study were selected from the “all subjects” list of 
ANEW (Bradley & Lang, 1999), to ensure they were suitable for a range of participants. 
They were matched for both valence and arousal ratings to control their equivalence as 
representations of each stimuli valence condition (positive, neutral and negative). An 
illustrative example of a negative-high arousal word from ANEW would be “Assault” 
which has a valence rating of 2.03 (SD = 1.55) and arousal rating of 7.51 (SD = 2.28). 
Note that scores for each dimension are out of a maximum score of 10 – the lower the 
valence rating, the more negative and vice versa. The opposite applies for arousal, 
whereby the higher the score, the higher level of emotional arousal is experienced. To 
ensure comparative valence, cut off points for negative valence will be set at = < 3 and 
positive valence at = > 7. Both valence conditions will have arousal scores = > 6.5 to 
control for this effect. Control conditions (neutral) will be selected at valence ratings 
ranging between 4.5-5.5 and arousal ratings = < 5. The aim will be to gain comparative 
data of emotionally neutral words that do not elicit a strong emotional reaction within 
the participant. This will prove vital in later analyses investigating possible differences 
based on the valence of the cue words. However, there remains an issue. Schneider et 
al. (2016) highlight the potential problems with assuming that mid-point affective stimuli 
are in fact reflective of “neutral” valence. Specifically, they posit that stimuli which falls 
between the two extremes (positive and negative valence) are potentially ambivalent 
stimuli – not affectively neutral. Therefore, they elicit a combination of positive and 
negative emotion from the participant, and to assume this synonymous with neutral – 
which denotes no reaction or baseline – is problematic. It may limit the experimental 
control within studies – Schneider et al. (2016) found neutral images elicit ambivalence, 
but with a small sample (N = 41). Further research needs to investigate the potential 
conflation of neutral valence and ambivalent stimuli.  
3.11. The current research into EFT relies commonly on affective cue words for their 
stimuli (e.g. Mercuri et al., 2015); although use of pictorial stimuli has been used to 
reinforce context in other studies into episodic memory (Bramão, Karlsson & Johansson, 
2017). This may be due to the vagueness of such a stimulus. Participants are able to 
produce episodic prospections and memories, using the cue word as a starting point 
from which they elaborate. When the context is reinforced, the level of episodic detail 
increases. However, this presents another experimental manipulation that does not lend 
itself to initial investigations such as this.  
3.12. To control for order effects, the presentation of cue words was counterbalanced for 
temporal condition, while randomly generating the valence condition. For example, all 
cues for “past” temporal conditions were presented before the “future” temporal 
conditions – and vice-versa. However, the valence of words was randomly ordered using 
e-Prime 2.0 software. This procedure has been utilized within previous research into 
episodic memory and future thinking because it is believed to control for the cognitive 
load on participants that could be caused by switching between temporal conditions 
(Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2008; Mercuri et al., 2015). Such cognitive load could decrease 
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the level of episodic detail produced by participants, and this may be reflected in their 
neurophysiological activity.  
 Valence SD Arousal SD 
Positive 8.08 1.17 6.29 2.14 
Neutral 5.07 1.25 3.71 2.06 
Negative 2.14 1.55 7.12 2.33 
Table. 2. – Cue words from ANEW: Mean Valence and Arousal ratings with corresponding 
Standard Deviations 
 
EEG, ERP vs. sLORETA and the Inverse Problem 
3.13. The development of neuropsychology can be broadly grouped into two increasingly 
interactive bodies of research that both have corresponding methodologies and 
instruments. Borck (2016) describes these as “imaging” and “writing” approaches. 
Imaging approaches utilise neuroimaging technologies such as magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) and electroencephalography (EEG) to specifically investigate 
“localisationism” - the assumption that specific human faculties are localised to areas or 
networks in the brain.  Writing approaches, however, focus on the process and activity 
of the brain, utilising neurophysiological measures similar to the imaging approaches. 
The visualisation of this data is traditionally in the form of charts with traces generated, 
focussed on time-constraints. For example, event-related potentials (ERPs) are a useful 
way of measuring a time-locked neurophysiological reaction to a stimulus (Kropotov, 
2016). Put simply, imaging is focussed on the structural, while writing is focussed on the 
functional. These two fields yield various information and also interact to form 
functional neuroimaging research, which is quickly becoming the leading hybrid within 
neurosciences. Examples of this include fMRI-informed-EEG (and vice versa) 
methodologies, which involve improving the accuracy of the functional information 
obtained through EEG with personalised high resolution anatomical and structural 
information obtained from fMRI (Cottereau, Ales, & Norcia, 2015; Ou, et al., 2010). The 
proposed research questions fall within localisationism, but between imaging and 
writing approaches as defined by Borck (2016).  Neurobiological correlates to cognitions 
are functional, and time-constrained phenomena, and therefore integrate the imaging 
and writing approaches to neuropsychological research. From this epistemological 
position, it is possible to measure the pattern of neurological activity within discrete and 
interacting neural networks in response to specific stimuli and make analogous 
discussions related to cognitions within cognitive theory.  
3.14. Electroencephalography (EEG) is the study of electrical potentials distributed across 
regions on the scalp as a result of neural activity within the brain. The distribution of 
electrical potentials (measured at the scalp) arises from the synchronised synaptic 
activity in populations of cortical neurons (brain cells) and excitation of dendrites of 
multiple pyramidal cells in the cerebral cortex. This produces a somewhat localised 
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current flow (if the number of neurons is great enough) that is measurable at the scalp 
level (Teplan, 2011; Jackson & Bolger, 2014). Cumulatively this process results in small 
individual signals (action potentials) that are detectable as small variations (microvolts - 
µV) in activity as measured on the scalp. Important to note are the variations in neurons 
position, and their positive or negative synchronicity – see Fig. 1. below. 
 
Fig. 1. – illustrative example of neuronal synchronicity and differences in position: (a) 
Clusters of neurons positioned with negative charges facing upwards (towards the scalp 
surface) will be best measured by EEG. (b)Clusters of neurons that fire positive and 
negative signals will cancel each other out, and not be measurable at the scalp. (c) 
Neurons positioned in a way that is not parallel to the scalp will cancel each other out 
and not be measured (Jackson & Bolger, 2016) 
3.15. The positive or negative charges that are detected at each sensor site are measured 
and this scalp potential is analysed for its variation from common reference points – 
giving an indication of its individual reading relative to the grand average of activity at 
that time (measurable to milliseconds resolution – 1ms). Within the present project, the 
vertex point (marked as Cz on the EEG 128-sensor nets) was pre-marked on each 
participant’s scalp in relation to the nasion, inion, and pre-auricular clefts (Catherwood, 
et al., 2014). Historically, most EEG polygraphs in the 1950s era had no more than eight 
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channels and there was no video EEG monitoring available, yet still it was used as a 
neurodiagnostic tool while neuropsychology moved away from lesion-directed surgery 
(Loring, 2010). Use of dense-array EEG 128-sensor nets – as in the current study – 
provides higher spatial resolution when measuring the sources of potentials compared 
to traditional sensor nets. This is because the space between electrodes is smaller, and 
the number of reference points is higher – allowing for better analysis of individual 
variations in µV. One issue remains, which is that sources of electrical activity are often 
deep within the brain and there are interpersonal variations between participants. For 
example, in their skull thickness, brain folds and structures of cortices and grey matter – 
all these factors limit the accuracy of readings when trying to infer a source. 
Furthermore, the inverse problem remains.  
3.16. The inverse problem arises because action potentials from deeper areas (subcortical 
regions) will be measured across all electrodes in varying levels, and that physical 
interference is difficult to account for. In short, each electrode on the scalp will record 
potentials from an unknown and potentially large number of sources – not specific to 
their location. This creates an unknown number of possible sources for these electrical 
potentials and poses an issue with localising their respective sources (Vendel et al., 
2009). Complex formulae have been developed and are applied to resolve this problem 
– commonly known as the forward solution. One such forward solution is standardised 
low-resolution electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA; Pasqual-Marqui, 2002). sLORETA 
seeks to analyse a low-resolution construction of source potentials in 3D space – 
tentative source estimation is therefore possible, though not at the spatial resolution of 
fMRI. As a technique, it is robust against noise and its localisations are less bias towards 
superficial sources resulting in more power to detect deep subcortical areas (Ghumare, 
Schrooten, Vandenberghe & Dupont, 2018). Considering the aim of the present study, to 
identify neurophysiological differences during EFT between groups, it is important to 
utilise a reliable source estimation technique. In their comparative source estimation 
study, Hedrich et al. (2017) found that other linear methods (minimum norm estimation 
– MNE; dynamic Statistical Parametric Mapping – dSPM) and the non-linear method 
(coherent Maximum Entropy on the Mean – cMES) provide similar source estimations to 
within approximately 1mm accuracy. sLORETA is the most powerful of the source 
estimation methods available within the Geosource (EGI Software) program, and so was 
utilised within the present study to obtain accurate results. sLORETA is able to produce 
data that infer the intensity of activity at a given neural region at a specific time – or 
averaged across a selected time-window. These data will be used within the current 
project to specify which regions of interest are most intensely recruited during episodic 
future thinking in each group. However, Pascual-Marqui (2002) specifies that these 
results are pseudo-statistics and advises against their use in hypothesis testing. 
Therefore, visual representations produced by sLORETA techniques (mapped onto a 
standardised MRI) will also be used to illustrate potential differences between groups 
and tentative conclusions will be drawn from their concurrent results.  
3.17. To guide the selection of time windows of interest during analyses, event-related 
potentials (ERPs) are referenced within the present study. Several ERPs are related to 
episodic memory and EFT. Specifically, the Late Positive Component (LPC), which occurs 
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approximately 500-800ms after stimulus onset. It has been implicated in episodic 
memory and the strength of memories reported; furthermore, it relates specifically to 
self-knowledge compared to knowledge of others (Coronel & Federmeier, 2016). The 
second ERP to be examined is the P300 – a positive potential that occurs approximately 
300ms after stimulus onset. It has been related to a range of affective processing tasks, 
and the allocation of attentional resources (see Polich, 2007). However, it is also 
implicated in the retrieval of semantic information (Kotlewska & Nowicka, 2015). To this 
end, two 50ms time windows are selected: (a) 275-325ms, and (b) 775-825ms after 
stimulus onset. It is thought that mean amplitude during these time windows will 
provide rough indications of differences in initial encoding or retrieval of semantic 
information, and formation of episodic memory or prospection, respectively.  
Ethics 
3.18. This project underwent a rigorous ethical approval process via the University of 
Gloucestershire’s research ethics panel (approval obtained 23/06/2017). All suggestions 
and critiques were adhered to throughout the project to maintain high ethical standards 
with regards to confidentiality, deception and both participant and researcher safety. 
3.19. Ethical considerations for this project are complex and subtle. The British 
Psychological Society Code of Human Research Ethics (BPS; 2014) dictates that 
participants must be informed of their full involvement in the study and any information 
which must be withheld due to its potential to impact on the results of the study must 
be disclosed at the earliest possibility. Information about the independent variable (trait 
anxiety) will be detailed in the written debrief, given immediately after completion of 
the study to minimize deception. Furthermore, some participants within the proposed 
study are likely to have high levels of anxiety without a diagnosis. While this alone does 
not constitute clinical eligibility for diagnosis of an anxiety disorder, it does mean they 
may be more vulnerable to the effects of emotional stimuli used within the study. The 
affective stimuli suggested above from the ANEW are carefully selected to limit their 
possible negative effects on highly anxious participants when compared to other cue 
words that could have been selected. Negative valence cue words were limited to a 
rating of > 2, which prevents potentially upsetting words being used. Furthermore, GAD-
7 and PSWQ scores are not made available to the participants, as this could potentially 
cause further distress to those who scored highly on either measure. This decision was 
made in conjunction with suggestions from the Research Ethics Panel and the 
researcher’s supervisory team, as a way of minimising risk of potential distress to 
participants.  
3.20. Participants’ anonymity was insured by use of participant numbers. Once they had 
read and signed the consent form, they were given a number that was linked to their 
data. This number was used for the GAD-7 and PSWQ questionnaires; and during the 
EEG data collection process. Therefore, the participant’s name was not utilised 
anywhere else during or after data collection. Participants were given a written and 
verbal debrief, stating their participant number and informing them of their ability to 
withdraw their data from the study within 4 weeks of data collection – with no negative 
consequences (see Appendix C). 
35 
 
Summary 
3.21. The above methodology and procedure aims to examine the neurocognitive 
differences between Subclinical Anxiety participants and Asymptomatic Controls. This is 
a complex quasi-experimental design with a high level of control over possible 
extraneous variables that may impact results. For example, this design controls for the 
effect of the cue words’ valence by randomizing their presentation and analysing data 
from across all valence-temporal conditions. This study is not concerned with the 
valence of the EFT produced, but with the neurological process involved with producing 
them and how this may differ due to trait anxiety. It is important to consider the amount 
of data that will be obtained from this design, and how this will be used to further 
isolate the dependent variables of a.) cognitive scores of EFT (rating scales), and b.). 
neurophysiological activity and its sources at P300 and LPC. 
3.22. Chapter FOUR presents a full account of the study, including procedure, descriptive 
statistics and results at each level of analysis; cognitive, EEG, and sLORETA. Chapter 
FOUR concludes with a summary of the findings before Chapter FIVE presents a critical 
discussion of these in relation to each of the hypotheses in turn. 
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4.0. Chapter FOUR – The Study 
4.1. This chapter will present the experiment conducted to investigate the research 
questions posed. Not all participants who completed the experiment did so while EEG 
readings were being taken, therefore the analysis is divided into Cognitive (N = 16) and 
EEG (N = 11) sections.  
Research questions: 
1.) Is there a statistically significant difference between High Anxiety and Asymptomatic 
Control groups’ self-report ratings of Episodic Future Thinking 
2.) Will there be any statistically significant neurophysiological differences (as measured 
by EEG) between High Anxiety and Asymptomatic Control groups during Episodic 
Future Thinking tasks? 
a.  If any statistically significant differences are found (as above), does this 
remain significant when controlling for the effect of the cue words’ Valence? 
3.) Will there be any statistically significant differences between High Anxiety and 
Asymptomatic Controls in the recruitment of neural regions (as estimated by 
sLORETA) comprising the Episodic Core Network during Episodic Future Thinking 
tasks? 
a. If any statistically significant differences are found (as above), is there a 
significant interaction between Anxiety Group (High vs Low) and Valence of 
cue words? 
Participants 
Cognitive:  
4.2. Participants were N = 16 self-selecting volunteers (8 Men, 8 Women; M = 23.8 (SD = 
2.9) years, age range: 11 years) recruited using posters and social media. Snowball 
sampling was utilised – participants were encouraged to recommend the study to like-
minded friends, family or colleagues. This resulted in recruitment of N = 6 participants 
known to at least one other participant. Participants completed two psychometric 
measures of anxiety and worry – the GAD-7 and PSWQ. Results from these 
questionnaires were used to divide participants into High Anxiety (N = 10) and Low 
Anxiety (N = 6) groups. There was a significant effect for Anxiety Group on GAD-7 scores, 
t(14) = 5.37, p < .001; and PSWQ scores, t(14) = 8.51, p < .001. High Anxiety participants 
scores (M = 14.20, SD = 4.24); M = 63.10, SD = 6.40) on measures of trait anxiety were 
therefore significantly higher than Low Anxiety (M = 4, SD = 2.37; M = 36.50, SD = 5.36) 
participants, suggesting a meaningful difference between groups. 
EEG: 
4.3. Participants were comprised from the total sample of 16 participants above. N = 11 
(4 Men, 7 Women; M = 23.8 (SD = 2.65) years, age range: 10 years) were recruited as 
above. Participants completed two psychometric measures of anxiety and worry – the 
GAD-7 and PSWQ. Results from these questionnaires were used to divide participants 
into High Anxiety (N = 6) and Low Anxiety (N = 5) groups. All participants were asked to 
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bring corrective eyewear if needed, resulting in normal or corrected to normal vision for 
all participants.  
4.4. Participants were given a written consent form which clearly described the 
experiment, explained their right to withdraw at any time with no negative 
consequences and prompted them to ask the researcher if they had any further 
questions (see APPENDIX B). Participants were then assigned a number to anonymise 
their data records. Following the study, participants were provided with a standardised 
written debrief (see APPENDIX C) and a verbal debrief where they had the opportunity 
to ask further questions. Participants were instructed to complete two psychometric 
questionnaires using the NOVOPsych app for iPad – GAD-7 and PSWQ. Participants’ 
demographic information was recorded using NOVOPsych and records were anonymised 
by using the corresponding participant number. All results and records were 
electronically secured using both passcodes and passwords known only to the 
researcher.  
 
Fig. 2. – Screenshot of GAD-7 results summary as presented on NOVO Psych iPad App 
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4.5. Once participants had completed the questionnaires, a message appeared 
prompting them to hand the iPad back to the researcher. Following this, the results (see 
Fig. 2. above) were e-mailed to the researcher using a passcode protected and 
encrypted link (see Fig. 3. below). 
 
Fig. 3. – Screenshots of NOVO Psych iPad app results e-mail and password protection 
 
4.6. Following completion of the GAD-7 and PSWQ, participants completed a task as 
presented to them on a display monitor using e-Prime 2.0 software. Participants were 
instructed to imagine a future event/remember a past event within the next/past 5 
years and were presented with a cue word. The task comprised of two temporal 
conditions (Past vs Future) and three cue word valence conditions (Positive, Neutral, 
Negative), as described above (see Chapter Three). Cue words were presented in 
random order, and the tasks temporal condition was counterbalanced for each 
participant to control for order effect and cognitive load. For example, Past x Positive, 
Neutral, Negative – followed by – Future x Positive, Neutral, Negative (and vice-versa). 
There were 54 cue words in total, resulting in 9 per temporal-valence condition. 
Following each Cue Word presentation, participants were instructed to rate their 
imagined/remembered event for level of detail and perspective – two indicative 
measures of episodic thought. Participants were given an opportunity to practice the 
task with 3 EFT tasks (Future x Positive, Neutral, Negative).  
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 3 seconds 
 
 
 2 seconds 
 
 10 seconds 
 
Randomly positive/negative/neutral 
2 seconds 
 
 
 
 
 Participant answers using keyboard 
 
 
 3 seconds 
 
 
 Participant answers using keyboard 
 
  
 3 seconds 
 
Fig. 4. – Diagram illustrating the screens that are displayed to participants throughout the 
experiment via E-Prime 2.0 software. This example demonstrates an “EFT-Negative” 
condition. Diagram to be interpreted in descending order.  
 
 
 
Imagine a future event 
within the next 5 years 
 
+ 
 
Nightmare 
 
+ 
Please rate the event you just thought 
about: 
1= vague with no/few details; 
5 = vivid and highly detailed 
1 2 3 4 5 
Please rate how you perceived the event: 
1 = saw event through my own eyes (field 
perspective); 
5 = saw myself from an external perspective 
(observer) 
1 2 3 4 5  
+ 
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EEG tasks:  
1. Participants are presented with two tasks – “remember an event within the past 5 
years: [cue word]”; and “imagine a future event within the next 5 years: [cue word]” 
2. The valence of the cue word is randomly allocated to either positive, negative or 
neutral conditions, creating: “negative-future”, “negative-past”, “positive-past”, 
“positive-future”, “neutral-past” & “neutral-future” conditions. 
3. Participants are given 10s to mentally construct the event (silently). Participants are 
then given 5s each to answer questions – between each question will be a 3 second 
fixation cross screen. 
4. Participants are instructed to rate how realistic the event appeared to them based 
on: a.) amount of detail they retrieved or imagined (1 = vague with no/few details; 5 
= vivid and highly detailed); b.) field or observer perspective (1 = saw event through 
my own eyes; 5 = saw myself from an external perspective) 
5. Participants complete a total of 54 experimental trials (9 per valence-temporal 
condition). There will be a 3 second (fixation cross) screen between questions 
(above) and task presentation. 
6. EEG will measure activity from 100ms before cue-word presentation to 1000ms after 
cue word presentation. Activity between 275-325ms (P300) and 775-825ms (LPC) 
windows will be analysed. 
7. sLORETA images will be produced to visualise activity during P300 and LPC. 
 
4.7. Within the current study, EFT-Positive data was not included in the analysis due to a 
technical error during the data collection sessions. Specifically, the data for EFT-Positive 
tasks was only recorded for a 1ms window instead of the intended 50ms window. Post-
hoc examination of the e-Prime 2.0 script did not indicate any particular reason for such 
a recording error. 
4.8. Participants’ answers from both questions were combined and scored from 1-10 to 
create cognitive (episodic) measures for each temporal-valence condition and an EFT 
Total score. For example, a participant who rated a negative future event as 4 (vivid) and 
2 (1st person field perspective) would receive an EFT-Negative score of 8/10 (as ratings 
for perspective are mirrored so that lower scores = more episodic).  
Anxiety Group EFT Total      
(SD) 
EFT Positive 
(SD) 
EFT Neutral 
(SD) 
EFT Negative 
(SD) 
High Anxiety 7.03 (0.94) 7.56 (1.13) 6.09 (0.86) 7.27 (1.9) 
Low Anxiety 6.59 (0.44) 7.70 (0.43) 6.07 (1.36) 5.99 (0.68) 
Table. 3. – Mean Episodic Future Thinking Scores for High Anxiety and Low Anxiety groups 
for each valence condition (Positive, Neutral, Negative) and a total Mean score (with 
standard deviations). Initial analysis shows small difference between groups on EFT Negative 
scores, and EFT Total scores. EFT-Negative scores were significantly positively correlated to 
GAD-7 scores, r = .61, p < .01. 
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4.9. Participants completing the EEG study followed the exact same procedure, but while 
wearing a dense-array Hydrocel 128-sensor EEG net (manufactured by EGI). EEG 
readings obtained from Netstation 5.4 software (EGI, 2016) were time-locked to 100ms 
before cue word presentation until 1000ms (1s) after cue word presentation. These 
were automatically categorised into 6 conditions: Imagine x Positive/Neutral/Negative 
and Remember x Positive/Neutral/Negative. After filtering the data (see below), 
topography for two time windows of interest – P300 (275-325ms) and LPC (775-825ms) 
– were visually examined across groups to examine apparent differences in activity.  
Materials 
4.10. The cognitive-only data was obtained both inside (N = 11) and outside (N = 5) of the 
EEG laboratory site and conditions. Participants who completed the experiment outside 
of the laboratory were all presented with the task using e-Prime 2.0 software run 
remotely on a laptop with a 13.3” screen. 
EEG Laboratory Environment: 
4.11. The EEG laboratory was equipped with EGI 128-channel HydroCel Geodesic Sensor 
Nets of different sizes connected to a wall-mounted NA400 amplifier. Dense geodesic 
array optimises accurate recording with the inclusion of eye-blink and eye-movement 
sensors, which allow for advanced filtering post-data collection (Catherwood, et al., 
2014). Prior to positioning the net, the vertex point (Cz) was pre-marked on each 
participant’s scalp in relation to the nasion, inion, and pre-auricular clefts (Catherwood, 
et al., 2014). Participants were all positioned in the same chair at the same angle – using 
tape marked on the floor to control for distance. Task presentation was completed using 
a standardised 4:3 LCD monitor positioned approximately 30-45cm away and at eye 
level – relevant to the participant. Participants were seated away from the researcher, 
with a room divider placed to minimise interference with concentration. The study was 
completed in silence, with the blinds drawn, and doors shut. 
4.12. Participants were instructed (both verbally and in writing) to minimise all 
movements during the task – especially when presented with the cue word.  
EEG Data Screening and Processing 
4.13. EEG data was recorded using EGI Netstation 5.4 software and e-Prime 2.0 to co-
ordinate and time-lock events (stimulus presentation was offset by 14ms). Prior to 
recording, impedance testing was conducted to ensure adequate connectivity and 
sensitivity across all 128 sensors. Input impedance for the Net Amps 400 amplifier is ≥ 
1.0 kΩ and allows for scalp-electrode impedances of up to ≥ 200 kΩ (Ferree, Luu, Russell, 
& Tucker, 2001). Therefore, the scalp-electrode impedance was set for < 200 kΩ to 
ensure accurate signal acquisition.  
4.14. Following this procedure, EEG grand average wave forms for High Anxiety and Low 
Anxiety groups were examined visually for indications of bad channels (excessive noise 
and possible eye blinks), and possible differences between groups. To do this, 
topographic maps were created for each condition. Time windows of interest were 
around the P300 wave (approximately 300ms after stimulus onset) and the LPC 
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(approximately 800ms after stimulus onset). Topographic maps were created to display 
mean voltage within 50ms windows. These were set at 275-325ms and 775-825ms after 
stimulus onset.  
4.15. Examination of these visualisations indicate large differences between Anxiety 
Groups and small differences between valence condition (neutral and negative). 
Furthermore, there appear to be small differences between temporal window – 300ms 
vs 800ms. This could indicate sustained patterns of activation within the first second of 
episodic thought. See Fig. 5a and Fig. 5b (below) for topographic maps of each condition.   
4.16. Initial interpretation suggests that areas of interest are the Left Temporal region, 
which appears significantly more active in High Anxiety participants. Frontal and Right 
Temporal regions appear differentially active across conditions. Posterior regions appear 
significantly less active in High Anxiety participants during both imagine (EFT) conditions. 
Low Anxiety participants appeared to display right hemispheric dominance in general 
across conditions, with more globalised activity in the Imagine-Negative condition 
specifically.  
4.17. From this initial interpretation, regions of interest were mapped onto electrodes 
within those regions from the 128 sensors present, and a series of montages was 
created. As this study utilised a dense-array EEG net, the international 10-20 system was 
not suitable for localisation. Approximate  equivolent sensor positions are available, 
however, they are not completely comparable to established EEG research that 
investigates ERPs across the international 10-20 sytem. Therefore, the sensors that are 
selected have been labelled for their approximate region and a tentative equivolent to 
the 10-20 system is listed below. The spatial resolution of dense-array EEG is superior 
than the traditional 10-20 system and the topographic maps below are overlaid with 
sensors (black dots). The sensors covering the regions of interest were selected to create 
the montage for statistics extraction of mean amplitude across two time windows.  
 
Region of interest Approximate 10-20 sensors 
Left Temporal T3, T5 
Right Temporal T4, T6 
Frontal F3, Fz, F4 
Left Posterior Pz, P3 
Right Posterior Pz, P4 
Occipital O1, O2 
Table. 4. – Table showing regions of interest from the topographic maps presented below, 
and their approximate sensors in the International 10-20 system. This allows for tentative 
comparison between the result of this study and others established ERP research. 
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4.18. The analytical strategy used to investigate the data within the present study is 
outlined below. The richness of data obtained from dense-array EEG studies calls for 
robust statistical tests, such as parametric ANOVAs (used below), to control the risk of a 
Type 1 (false positive) error when comparing mean scores between independent 
samples (Field, 2009). Similar statistical analyses have been used in other (dense-array) 
EEG studies and also in fMRI studies investigating EFT, such as Mercuri et al. (2016) and 
Schacter, Benoit, De Brigard & Szpunar (2015). Therefore, results from statistical 
analyses within the present study are of comparable rigour to results from other 
neurophysiological studies of EFT. Furthermore, post-hoc tests from ANOVA and 
ANCOVA can produce estimates of effect size and power, which provides information on 
the size of any statistically significant difference between groups and whether the 
sample size was sufficient to find such an effect, should one exist (Field, 2009).  
Results 
Cognitive 
4.19. Analyses for cognitive data focussed on investigating possible differences in EFT 
scores (Positive, Neutral, Negative) between Groups (High vs Low Anxiety). A two-way 2 
(Anxiety Group: High or Low) x 3 (EFT-Valence Condition: Positive, Neutral or Negative) 
ANOVA was conducted.  
4.20. Assumptions for normality were satisfied for all EFT conditions using the Shapiro-
Wilks test, p > .05 (see Appendix E for Q-Q plots visually representing normality). 
Assumptions for homogeneity of variance were satisfied using Levene’s test, p > .05. 
Therefore, the parametric tests used (ANOVA) were appropriate for EFT (cognitive) self-
report data. 
4.21. There was no statistically significant difference in EFT-Total scores between High 
Anxiety (M = 7.02, SD = .94) and Low Anxiety (M = 6.56, SD = .44) groups, F (1, 14) = 1.15, 
p > .0.5, ηp2 = .08. There was no statistically significant difference in EFT-Positive scores 
between High Anxiety (M = 7.56, SD = 1.13) and Low Anxiety (M = 7.70, SD = .43) groups, 
F (1, 14) = .08, p > .05, ηp2 = .01. There was no statistically significant difference in EFT-
Neutral scores between High Anxiety (M = 6.09, SD = .86) and Low Anxiety (M = 6.07, SD 
= 1.38) groups, F (1, 14) = .00, p > .05, ηp2 = .00. The score that most closely approached 
signifance between High Anxiety (M = 7.27, SD = 1.99) and Low Anxiety (M = 5.99, SD = 
.68) groups was EFT-Negative, F (1, 14) = 2.24, p = .16, ηp2 = .14. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis was supported. There are no statistically significant differences in how 
participants across High Anxiety and Low Anxiety groups rate their Episodic Future 
Thinking.  
EEG Anaylsis 
The following processes were followed for the raw EEG data: 
1.) Filtering: - First order highpass filter set at 0.3hz; lowpass filter set at 70hz; notch 
filter set at 50hz 
2.) Segmentation: - segment lengths were time-locked to 100ms before stimulus onset 
to 1000ms (1s) after stimulus onset; offset was set at 14ms as per e-Prime 2.0 data. 
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Data was segmented into Imagine Pos; Imagine Neut; Imagine Neg and Remember 
Pos; Remember Neut; Remember Neg 
3.) Artefact detection: - Eye blink detection was set at 140uv with a moving average of 
80ms; eye movement detection was set to 55uv with a moving average of 80ms; and 
bad channel detection was set at 200uv across the entire segment with a moving 
average of 80ms. Channels were marked bad if these artefacts were detected for 
more than 20% of the segment. Segments were marked bad if a.) contained more 
than 10 bad channels, b.) contain an eye blink, or contains an eye movement.  
4.) Manual Artefact Detection: - Part-filtered EEG data was analysed visually using 
Netstation Review software. Bad channels were inspected and marked for analysis, 
however, these fortunately appeared localised to a few channels near the eyes that 
had detected eye-blinks.  
5.) Bad Channel Replacement: - A standardised Bad Channel Replacement tool was run 
on the data, which essentially replaces bad channels’ data with averaged data from 
the surrounding electrode-channels. This inferred signal is therefore included in the 
final analysis, not the original bad channel signal. 
6.) Averaging: - Good segments across subjects were averaged together to create an 
individual average for each participant.  
7.) Baseline Correction: - Individual averages were run through a baseline correction 
procedure. Baseline was created for 100ms before segment and lasted 100ms (until 
0s).  
8.) Montage: - The files were run through a montage to collect average (baseline 
corrected) readings across all 128 sensors. 
9.) Grand Averaging: - Files for individual participants were run through a grand 
averaging procedure to collate data from all participants into “High Anxiety” and 
“Low Anxiety” average files. 
 
4.22. Analysis for EEG waveform data focussed on two time windows, one covering the 
approximate P300 (275-325ms after stimulus onset) and another covering the 
approximate LPC (775-825ms). The analysis was broken down into microvoltage 
averaged across sensors in the Regions of Interest (ROI): Left Temporal (T3, T5), Frontal 
(F3, Fz, F4), Right Temporal (T4, T6), Occipital (O1, O2), Left Posterior (P3), Right 
Posterior (P4) regions.  
4.23. Assumptions of normality of distribution were satisfied for each ROI variable apart 
from Left Temporal, which was found to be significant using a Shapiro-Wilks test, p < .05. 
Assumptions for homogeneity of variance were satisfied for all ROI variables using 
Levene’s test, p > .05. Therefore, results from parametric tests (ANOVA) below should be 
treated with caution when considering the Left Temporal ROI.  
275-325ms (P300)  
4.24. A 2 (Anxiety group) x 6 (ROI) ANOVA was conducted to investigate the effect of 
Anxiety Group (High vs Low) on mean potentials at six Regions of Interest – ROI (Left 
Temporal, Prefrontal, Right Temporal, Occipital, Left Posterior, Right Posterior) during 
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EFT, approximately 300ms after stimulus onset. A statistically significant effect of 
Anxiety Group was found for mean amplitude in Left Temporal regions, F (1, 2) = 
76990.18, p < .001, ηp2 = 1; Frontal regions, F (1, 2) = 234.67, p < .005, ηp2 = .99; and 
Left Posterior regions, F (1, 2) = 60.87, p < .05, ηp2 = .97. There was no significant effect 
of Anxiety Group on Right Temporal regions, F (1, 2) = .82, p > .05, ηp2 = .29; Occipital 
regions, F (1, 2) = .74, p > .05, ηp2 = .27; or Right Posterior regions, F (1, 2) = 1.57, p > 
.05, ηp2 = .44. The results indicate that High Anxiety participants demostrated 
significantly higher positive mean potential at Left Temporal and Left Posterior regions; 
and significantly negative mean potentials at Frontal regions 275-325ms after cue word 
onset during EFT tasks (see Table. 5 below). 
 
ROI High Anxiety Mean (SD) Low Anxiety Mean (SD) 
Left Temporal (T3, T5) 29.58 (0.29) -31.40 (0.10) 
Right Temporal (T4, T6) 10.44 (1.69) 11.59 (0.64) 
Frontal (F3, Fz, F4) 0.31 (0.89) 31.73 (2.76) 
Occipital (O1, O2) -17.42 (1.15) -21.65 (6.83) 
Left Posterior (Pz, P3) 6.78 (1.15) -19.05 (4.54) 
Right Posterior (Pz, P4) 5.20 (1.97) 0.31 (5.02) 
Table 5. – Comparison of mean amplitudes (with standard deviations) for Regions of Interest 
(ROIs) during the P300 (275-325ms) window across Episodic Future Thinking tasks.   
4.25. The assumption for independence of the covariate was satisfied using an 
independent samples t-test. There was no significant difference in Neutral Valence 
between High Anxiety (M = 6.09, SD = .86) and Low Anxiety (M = 6.07, SD = 1.38) groups; 
t (14) = .04, p > .05. There was no significant difference in Negative Valence between 
High Anxiety (M = 2.28, SD = .92) and Low Anxiety (M = 2.30, SD = .84) groups; t (14) = 
.02, p > .05. The assumption for homogeneity of regression slopes was satisfied using 
ANOVA. There was a statistically significant interaction effect of Valence and Anxiety 
group on mean amplitude during P300 at ROIs, p < .05. Therefore, the parametric test 
(ANCOVA) completed below was appropriate. 
4.26. An ANCOVA was conducted to investigate this effect further, while controlling for 
the effect of Valence (Neutral vs Negative). The effect of Anxiety Group on mean 
potentials during EFT remained significant for Left Temporal regions, F (2, 3) = 
104883.23 , p < .005, ηp2 = 1; and Frontal regions, F (2, 3) = 286.49, p < .05, ηp2 = .99. 
However, Left Posterior regions were no longer significant, p > .05.  
775-825ms (LPC) 
4.27. A 2 (Anxiety Group) x 6 (ROI) ANOVA was conducted to investigate the effect of 
Anxiety Group (High vs Low) on mean potentials at six Regions of Interest – ROI (Left 
Temporal, Prefrontal, Right Temporal, Occipital, Left Posterior, Right Posterior) during 
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EFT, approximately 800ms after stimulus onset. A statistically significant effect of 
Anxiety Group was found for Left Temporal regions, F (1, 3) = 8130.26, p < .001, ηp2 = 1; 
Frontal regions, F (1, 3) = 1356, p < .005, ηp2 = 99; Occipital regions, F (1, 3) = 79.75, p < 
.05, ηp2 = .94; Left Posterior regions, F (1, 3) = 257.03, p < .005, ηp2 = .99; and Right 
Posterior regions, F (1, 3) = 120.70, p < .01, ηp2 = .97. There was no statistically 
significant effect of Anxiety Group on Right Temporal regions, F (1, 2) = 1.59, p > .05, ηp2 
= .44. The results indicate that High Anxiety participants demostrated significantly higher 
mean positive potential at Left Temporal and Left Posterior regions; and significantly 
negative mean potentials at Frontal, Occipital and Right Posterior regions 775-825ms 
after cue word onset during EFT.  
4.28. The assumption for independence of the covariate was satisfied using an 
independent samples t-test. There was no significant difference in Neutral Valence 
between High Anxiety (M = 6.09, SD = .86) and Low Anxiety (M = 6.07, SD = 1.38) groups; 
t (14) = .04, p > .05. There was no significant difference in Negative Valence between 
High Anxiety (M = 2.28, SD = .92) and Low Anxiety (M = 2.30, SD = .84) groups; t (14) = 
.02, p > .05. The assumption for homogeneity of regression slopes was satisfied using 
ANOVA. There was a statistically significant interaction effect of Valence and Anxiety 
group on mean amplitude during LPC at ROIs, p < .05. Therefore, the parametric test 
(ANCOVA) completed below was appropriate. 
 
ROI High Anxiety Mean (SD) Low Anxiety Mean (SD) 
Left Temporal (T3, T5) 30.68 (0.61) -23.89 (0.60) 
Right Temporal (T4, T6) 10.22 (0.49) 10.68 (0.12) 
Frontal (F3, Fz, F4) -0.41 (0.14) 21.99 (0.85) 
Occipital (O1, O2) -15.99 (0.36) -7.06 (1.85) 
Left Posterior (Pz, P3) 8.65 (0.29) -5.46 (1.21) 
Right Posterior (Pz, P4) 3.35 (0.23) 9.49 (0.76) 
Table 6. – Comparison of mean amplitudes (with standard deviations) for Regions of Interest 
(ROIs) during the LPC (775-825ms) window across Episodic Future Thinking tasks.   
4.29. An ANCOVA was conducted to investigate this effect further, while controlling for 
the effect of Valence (Neutral vs Negative). The effect of Anxiety Group during EFT 
remained significant at Left Temporal regions, F (2, 3) = 2032.57, p < .05, ηp2 = 1; Frontal 
regions, F (2, 3) = 1008.74, p < .05, ηp2 = 1; and Left Posterior regions, F (2, 3) = 240.81, 
p < .05, ηp2 = .99. However, Occipital regions were no longer significant, F (2, 3) = 41.1, 
p > .05, ηp2 = .99.  
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Summary 
4.30. Analyses of mean amplitudes at the six ROIs revealed significant differences between 
groups, while controlling for the effect of valence. These results have been consolidated 
into a summary table (Table 4 - below). 
 
ROI P300 Mean 
Difference 
(SE) 
Observed 
Power 
LPC Mean 
Difference 
(SE) 
Observed 
Power 
Left 
Temporal 
(T3, T5) 
Positive ** 60.98 (.13) 1.00 Positive * 54.58 (.86) 1.00 
Right 
Temporal 
(T4, T6) 
Positive – 
n.s. 
-1.16 (.74) .10 Positive – 
n.s. 
-.46 (.44) .75 
Frontal (F3, 
Fz, F4) 
Negative * -31.42 
(1.32) 
.94 Negative 
* 
-22.40 (.50) 1.00 
Occipital 
(O1, O2) 
Negative – 
n.s. 
4.23 (4.02) .08 Negative 
– n.s. 
-8.93 (1.05) .50 
Left 
Posterior 
(Pz, P3) 
Positive – 
n.s. 
25.83 
(2.39) 
.60 Positive * 14.11 (.65) .91 
Right 
Posterior 
(Pz, P4) 
Positive – 
n.s. 
4.79 (2.16) .14 Positive – 
n.s. 
-6.14 (.38) .80 
Table 7. – Key results from ANCOVAs controlling for variance of Valence (Neutral vs 
Negative) for High Anxiety group at both time windows: P300 (275-325ms) and LPC (775-
825ms). Key: p < .005**; p < .05*; n.s. = not significant; Mean Difference (SE) = High Anxiety 
– Low Anxiety with Standard Error; Positive = positive mean potentials at ROI compared to 
baseline; Negative = negative mean potentials at ROI compared to baseline. 
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High Anxiety (300ms)  vs. Low Anxiety (300ms) 
Fig. 5a – Topographic maps for P300 (275-325ms after stimulus onset). The left four maps are for the High Anxiety group, while the right four 
maps are for the Low Anxiety group. Condition is in order of Remember Neutral (1a/1b), Remember Negative (2a/2b), Imagine Neutral (3a/3b), 
Imagine Negative (4a/4b). Spectrum goes from Dark Blue = negative potential compared to baseline; Dark Red = positive potential compared to 
baseline; White = no potential differences. Black dots are the 128 sensors from the dense-array EEG net. 
1a 2a 
3a 4a 
3b 
1b 2b 
4b 
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High Anxiety (800ms)  vs. Low Anxiety (800ms) 
Fig. 5b – Topographic maps for LPC (775-825ms after stimulus onset). The left four maps are for the High Anxiety group, while the right four 
maps are for the Low Anxiety group. Condition is in order of Remember Neutral (1a/1b), Remember Negative (2a/2b), Imagine Neutral (3a/3b), 
Imagine Negative (4a/4b). Spectrum goes from Dark Blue = negative potential compared to baseline; Dark Red = positive potential compared to 
baseline; White = no potential differences. Black dots are the 128 sensors from the dense-array EEG net.
1a 2a 1b 2b 
4b 3b 4a 3a 
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Source Estimation Analysis – sLORETA 
4.31. While the above analyses indicated a statistically significant differences in mean 
amplitude between groups at the Left Temporal, Left Posterior and Frontal electrode 
sites, this is limited by low spatial resolution. Further analyses revealed the approximate 
source locations of the differences found above. To help visualise these sources, 
sLORETA was conducted and images are displayed below (see figures 5a-d).  
4.32. Upon initial visual inspection, apparent differences in localisation of peak amplitudes 
emerge between High and Low Anxiety groups, and between Neutral and Negative 
Valence conditions. There was little difference in either group between source 
potentials at 300ms and 800ms time windows. Therefore, images presented are selected 
for the 800ms time window, as this was hypothesised to reflect more elaboration than 
the initial (300ms) early period of processing (see Chapter THREE for discussion). The 
sLORETA images presented below have been selected because they effectively 
demonstrate localised peak activity and allow for easy comparison. 
 EFT Neutral EFT Negative 
High Anxiety • Left hemispheric 
dominance 
• Peak amplitude in 
Medial Temporal Lobe; 
Superior Frontal 
Cortex; Hippocampus 
and Amygdala 
• Peak amplitude in Occipital 
Lobe; Posterior Cingulate 
Cortex; Medial Temporal 
Lobe; and Amygdala. 
• Marked by positive potential 
at Occipital Lobe – visual 
cortex – and PCC compared 
to Neutral 
Low Anxiety • Peak amplitude in 
Medial Temporal Lobe; 
Amygdala; Superior 
Frontal Cortex; and 
Middle Frontal Gyrus. 
• Similar to High Anxiety 
EFT Neutral, except for 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 
activity 
• Right hemispheric 
dominance 
• Peak amplitude in Superior 
Temporal Gyrus; Medial 
Temporal Lobe; Amygdala; 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus; and 
(left) Subcollosal Area. 
• Marked by increase in right 
frontal activation in the 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus. 
 
Table. 5. – Key findings from visual analysis of sLORETA images indicating peak intensity for 
High Anxiety and Low Anxiety groups, at approximately 800ms (775-825ms) after stimulus 
onset for both Neutral and Negative (valence) EFT tasks. These represent the approxiate LPC 
ERP activity. 
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Maximum (60.65)     Minimum (4.66) 
Fig. 6a: - sLORETA images (Sagittal – Coronal – Axial; from left to 
right) for High Anxiety group during EFT-Neutral tasks at 
approximately 800ms (775-825ms) after cue word (stimulus) onset. 
Peak amplitude is located in (Left) Brodmann Areas (BAs) 28, 35, 20 
and 36. Together, these BAs are localised to the Inferior Temporal 
Gyrus and Perirhinal Cortex of the Medial Temporal Lobe. Further 
peak activity was found in the Temporopolar area of the Superior 
Temporal Gyrus (BA38); left and right Hippocampus; and Amygdala. 
Activity reflects the recruitment of the Episodic Core Network, with 
slight left hemispheric dominance but general lateralisation of 
potentials. (Right) frontal and prefrontal areas were visually weaker 
(less active) than others. 
 
Maximum (73.52)     Minimum (4.23) 
Fig. 6b:- sLORETA images (Sagittal – Coronal – Axial; from left to 
right) for High Anxiety group during EFT-Negative tasks at 
approximately 800ms (775-825ms) after cue word (stimulus) onset. 
Peak amplitude is localised to Brodmann Areas (BAs) BA17 (Lingual 
Gyrus) and BA18 (Lateral Occipital Gyrus) of the Occipital Lobe. 
Further peak activation is seen throughout the Posterior Cingulate 
Cortex (BA23 and BA30); Medial Temporal Lobe (BA 28, 20, 35, 36); 
and Amygdala. Peak activity in the visual areas (Occipital Lobe) and 
Posterior Cingulate Cortex is markedly higher than in EFT-Neutral 
condition.  
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Maximum (62.38)                  Minimum (5.12) 
Fig. 6c:- sLORETA images (Sagittal – Coronal – Axial; from left to 
right) for Low Anxiety group during EFT-Neutral tasks at 
approximately 800ms (775-825ms) after cue word (stimulus) onset. 
Peak amplitude is localised to the Medial Temporal Lobe (BA 28, 35 
and 36); (right) Amygdala; Temporopolar area of the Superior 
Temporal Gyrus (BA38); and Middle Frontal Gyrus (BA10 and 44). 
Localised peak amplitudes appear similar to EFT-Neutral tasks in 
the High Anxiety group, with the exception of increased activation 
within the Middle Frontal Gyrus. 
 
 
 
Maximum (79.35)                 Minimum (4.74) 
Fig. 6d:- sLORETA images (Sagittal – Coronal – Axial; from left to 
right) for Low Anxiety group during EFT-Negative tasks at 
approximately 800ms (775-825ms) after cue word (stimulus) onset. 
Peak amplitude is localised to the (right) Superior Temporal Gyrus 
(BA 38); Medial Temporal Lobe (BA 28, 34, 35 and 36); Amygdala; 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (BA 44, 45 and 47); and (Left) Subcollosal area 
(BA 25). Localised peak amplitudes appear similar to the EFT-
Neutral tasks in Low Anxiety, with the exception of increased right 
frontal activation within the Inferior Frontal Gyrus.  
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slORETA Analyses 
4.33. Assumptions for normality of distribution were satisfied using Shapiro-Wilks test for 
normality and Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance. No significant results were 
found for BAs across P300 or LPC conditions. Therefore, it was appropriate to complete 
the parametric tests (ANOVA) reported below. 
P300 (275-325ms) 
4.34. An ANOVA was conducted to investigate the effect of Anxiety Group (High vs Low) 
on mean recruitment of neural regions (Brodmann Areas – BAs) comprising the Episodic 
Core Network (as estimated by sLORETA) during EFT tasks. A statistically significant 
effect of Anxiety Group (High vs Low) was found for the Left BA 09, F (1, 3) = 16.75, p < 
.05, ηp2 = .85; Left BA 23, F (1, 3) = 16.98, p < .05, ηp2 = .85; Left BA 28, F (1, 3) = 10.9, p 
< .05, ηp2 = .78; Left BA 35, F (1, 3) = 18.22, p < .05, ηp2 = .86; and Left BA 36, F (1, 3) = 
11.68, p < .05, ηp2 = .8. These regions of the Episodic Core Network were recruited 
significantly more in High Anxiety participants than Asymptomatic Controls during EFT 
tasks. 
 
BA (Gyri) High Anxiety 
M (SD) 
Low Anxiety 
M (SD) 
F Sig. ηp2 Observed 
Power 
LBA09 (mPFC)* 12.24 (0.48) 9.77 (0.66) 16.749 .026 .848 .772 
LBA23 (PCC)* 27.35 (0.28) 26.03 (0.39) 16.977 .026 .850 .777 
LBA28 (MTL)* 59.26 (1.52) 57.03 (1.59) 10.901 .046 .784 .606 
LBA35 (MTL)* 73.90 (3.97) 72.39 (3.71) 18.222 .024 .859 .802 
LBA36 (MTL)* 72.15 (2.72) 69.91  (2.53) 11.678 .042 .796 .633 
Table. 6. - Summary Table (ANOVA results) of Brodmann Areas (BAs) found to be recruited 
significantly differently between groups (High Anxiety vs Low Anxiety) between 275-325ms 
after stimulus onset, during EFT tasks. Areas activated in the left hemisphere are highlighted 
in orange; areas activated in the right hemisphere are highlighted in grey. * = p < .05. 
 
LPC (775-825ms) 
4.35. An ANOVA was conducted to investigate the effect of Anxiety Group (High vs Low) 
on mean recruitment of neural regions (Brodmann Areas – BAs) comprising the Episodic 
Core Network (as estimated by sLORETA) during EFT tasks. A statistically significant 
effect of Anxiety Group was found for the Right BA 08, F (1, 3) = 16.96, p < .05, ηp2 = .92; 
Left BA 09, F (1, 3) = 16.96, p < .05, ηp2 = .92; Left BA 09, F (1, 3) = 23.55, p < .05, ηp2 = 
.94; Right BA 09, F (1, 3) = 13.37, p < .05, ηp2 = .9; Right BA 11, F (1, 3) = 21. 07, p < .05, 
ηp2 = .93; Left BA 21, F (1, 3) = 31. 08, p < .05, ηp2 = .95; Left BA 24, F (1, 3) = 101.56, p < 
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.005, ηp2 = .99; Right BA 24, F (1, 3) = 310.79, p < .001, ηp2 = 1; Left BA 35, F (1, 3) = 
13.36, p < .05, ηp2 = .9; and Left BA 36, F (1, 3) = 21.7, p < .05, ηp2 = .94. These regions 
of the Episodic Core Network were recruited significantly more in High Anxiety 
participants than Asymptomatic Controls during EFT tasks. 
BA (Gyri) 
High Anxiety 
M (SD) 
Low Anxiety 
M (SD) 
F Sig. ηp2 
Observed 
Power 
RBA08 (PFC)* 10.59 (1.86) 9.11 (1.63) 16.964 .023 .919 .831 
LBA09 (mPFC)* 10.39 (2.19) 9.02 (1.89) 23.553 .015 .940 .922 
RBA09 (mPFC)* 7.01 (0.11) 6.05 (0.11) 13.373 .032 .899 .745 
RBA11 (PFC)* 16.20 (2.21) 15.39 (1.66) 21.072 .017 .934 .896 
LBA21 (Lateral 
Temporal)* 
13.02 (0.95) 12.29 (0.81) 31.076 .010 .954 .969 
LBA24 (mPFC)** 9.75 (1.87) 8.31 (1.74) 101.562 .002 .985 1.000 
RBA24 (mPFC)** 7.83 (1.70) 6.07 (1.62) 310.791 .000 .995 1.000 
LBA35 (MTL)* 69.56  (1.78) 65.49 (1.02) 13.357 .032 .899 .744 
LBA36 (MTL)* 68.43 (2.98) 64.63 (1.11) 21.695 .016 .935 .903 
Table. 7. - Summary Table (ANOVA results) of Brodmann Areas (BAs) found to be recruited 
significantly differently between groups (High Anxiety vs Low Anxiety) between 775-825ms 
after stimulus onset, during EFT tasks. Areas activated in the left hemisphere are highlighted 
in orange; areas activated in the right hemisphere are highlighted in grey. * = p < .05; ** = p 
< .005. 
 
Negative Episodic Future Thinking – LPC (775-825ms) 
4.36. An ANOVA was conducted to investigate the effect of Anxiety Group (High vs Low) 
on mean recruitment of neural regions (Brodmann Areas – BAs) comprising the Episodic 
Core Network (as estimated by sLORETA) during Negative EFT tasks. A statistically 
significant effect of Anxiety Group was found for the Right BA 13, F (1, 4) = 23.2, p < .05, 
ηp2 = .92; and Right BA 21, F (1, 4) = 306.15; p < .05, ηp2 = .69.  
BA (Gyri) High 
Anxiety  
M (SD) 
Low 
Anxiety M 
(SD) 
High Anxiety – 
Low Anxiety 
Mean 
Difference (SE) 
Observed 
Power 
RBA13 (Insular Cortex) 13.40 (.65) 11.32 (.86) 2.08 (.43) .69 
RBA21 (Middle Temporal 
Gyrus) 
30.20 (.35) 29.78 (.21) .42 (.26) .20 
Table. 8. – Post-hoc test results from ANOVA displaying Mean Difference (Standard Error) of 
intensity from sLORETA at RBA 13 and RBA 21 during LPC; and Observed Power. 
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Source Estimation Summary 
4.37. sLORETA findings (both visually and statistically) indicate that the Episodic Core 
Network is differentially activated between groups within both 50ms time windows. 
High Anxiety participants recruited the Left MTL, mPFC and prefrontal regions more than 
Asymtomatic Controls. ANOVA findings indicate statistically significant differences 
between Anxiety Groups in recruitment of the Right BA 13 (Insular Cortex) and Right BA 
21 (Middle Temporal Gyrus) regions during Negative Episodic Future Thinking tasks. 
Specifically, High Anxiety participants recruit these regions significantly more than Low 
Anxiety participants during Negative EFT. 
Results Summary 
4.38. There was no statistically significant difference in participants’ ratings of episodic 
detail between High Anxiety and Low Anxiety groups for any EFT-Valence condition. 
4.39. The results indicate that High Anxiety participants demostrated significantly higher 
positive mean potential at Left Temporal and Left Posterior regions; and significantly 
negative mean potentials at Frontal regions 275-325ms after cue word onset (P300) 
during EFT tasks. High Anxiety participants demostrated significantly higher mean 
positive potential at Left Temporal and Left Posterior regions; and significantly negative 
mean potentials at Frontal, Occipital and Right Posterior regions 775-825ms after cue 
word onset (LPC) during EFT. 
4.40. Analyses of sLORETA results at P300 indicate that High Anxiety participants 
demonstrated significantly higher recruitment of LBA09 (mPFC), LBA23 (PCC), LBA28, 
LBA35 and LBA36 (MTL) regions during EFT. Analysis of sLORETA results at LPC indicate 
that High Anxiety participants demonstrated significantly higher recruitment of RBA08 
(PFC), LBA09 and RBA09 (mPFC), RBA11 (PFC), LBA21 (Lateral Temporal), LBA24 and 
RBA24 (mPFC), LBA35 and LBA36 (MTL) regions during EFT. 
4.41. Analyses of sLORETA results at LPC indicate that High Anxiety participants 
demonstrated significantly higher recruitment of RBA13 (Insular Cortex) and RBA23 
(Middle Temporal Gyrus) during negative EFT. 
Hypotheses: 
1.) There will be a significant difference between High Anxiety and Asymptomatic 
Control groups’ self-report ratings of Episodic Future Thinking (Reject) 
2.) There will be significant neurophysiological differences (as measured by EEG) 
between High Anxiety and Asymptomatic Control groups (Accept) 
3.) There will be significant differences between groups in the recruitment of neural 
regions (as estimated by sLORETA) comprising the Episodic Core Network during 
Episodic Future Thinking (Accept) 
a. There will be significant differences between groups in the recruitment of 
neural regions (as estimated by sLORETA) comprising the Episodic Core 
Network during Negative Episodic Future Thinking (Accept) 
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5.0. Chapter FIVE – Discussion  
This chapter aims to critically discuss each of the key findings from the analyses performed 
and reported above in Chapter FOUR in relation to each of the experimental hypotheses. 
These findings will be reviewed with consideration of a wide range of relevant empirical 
literature on anxiety disorders and EFT. Recommendations are also made for potential 
future investigations of EFT in anxious populations. Following this discussion, a summary of 
the project and conclusion from the key findings is presented.  
Cognitive Findings 
Hypothesis 1: There will be a significant difference between High Anxiety and Asymptomatic 
Control groups’ self-report ratings of Episodic Future Thinking (Reject) 
5.1 Firstly, analysis of the cognitive data (measure of EFT) obtained within the present study 
found no significant differences between groups (High vs Low Anxiety) and no significant 
interaction between Anxiety Group and Valence condition. However, this information 
was somewhat secondary within the project as there already exists a range of 
information available regarding cognitive differences during EFT and EM for anxiety 
disorders at the clinical level (Miloyan, Pachana & Suddendorf, 2014). The general 
findings from studies such as Miloyan, Pachana & Suddendorf (2014) is that anxious 
participants produce more negative (but not less positive) prospections and memories 
than healthy controls. For the purpose of this analysis, the only conclusion that can be 
drawn is that High Anxiety participants did not produce significantly more episodic 
prospections than Low Anxiety participants, in any valence condition, based on the 
results of the novel measure used. However, this also raises methodological issues with 
the self-report questions that measured episodic vs semantic details. This was a novel, 
brief (two questions; 5-point Likert scales) measure that has not been replicated or 
utilised in other research before. Therefore, there are no current indications of its 
psychometric appropriateness or validity within this project. It was used as a proxy 
measure to obtain self-report data on two factors of episodicity – vividness and 
perspective. The reason such a measure was utilised in place of traditional and reliable 
measures, such as the adapted-AI (Addis & Schacter, 2008) is due to time contraints that 
are unique to EEG data collection. Specifically, the dense-array EEG hydrocel nets 
utilised within the present study rely on an electrolite solution that increases skin 
conductance, improving accuracy of readings obtained from the scalp. However, these 
sensors begin to dry out after approximately 30 minutes (EGI, 2017), resulting in a 
significant deterioration in the quality of data obtained. Tried and tested measures of 
EFT and EM such as the adapted-AI require timely administration, which would not be 
compatible with the current study. The present study kept the EEG data collection to 
below 30 minutes per participant, to maintain a high level of accuracy for EEG data. 
However, it is noted that these measures (or similarly time-consuming measures) have 
been utilised within fMRI research, which is not limited by such a practical time-
constraint. Retrospective methodological critique of the present study may call for novel 
uses of EFT measures such as the adapted-AI. For example, one such design may involve 
completing the adapted-AI immediately after the EEG tasks. This could involve the same 
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cue words for easy comparison. However, this may cause distortions between memory 
and prospection as the participant would essentially be remembering their previous 
prospection from the EEG task. Therefore, it would be significantly unclear whether 
participants’ EEG recordings were reflective of the level of episodic detail (obtained later 
by adapted-AI) they generated during the EEG tasks. 
5.2 Alternative stimuli could also yield more ecological validity for the phenomenon of EFT. 
For example, while the present study utilised ANEW (Bradley & Lang, 1994) for 
standardised affective stimuli, future research could utilise alternative affective stimuli. 
The vagueness of presenting a single cue word may not be as useful in generating 
episodic memories or prospections compared with a small prose text (such as ANET; 
Bradley & Lang, 2007), or pictorial affective stimuli (IAPS; Lang et al., 2008) or aurally 
(IADS; Bradley & Lang, 2007). For example, Altgassen, Kretschmer & Schnitzspahn (2017) 
demonstrated the significantly positive effect increased context and purposeful cue 
instructions had on generating more episodic details across adolescents and young 
adults. This suggests that by improving the specificity and personal purpose (goal-
directed) of the EFT task, the individual is more able to generate episodic prospections. 
Future research should similarly investigate whether the mode of affective stimuli 
significantly effects the level of episodic details produced during EFT or EM. 
5.3 D’Argembeau & Mathy (2011) utilised more personally relevant cues for participants 
and found a significant difference in the level of episodic details produced depending on 
the type of cue. For example, cues relating to personal life goals (e.g. “to have a job I 
like” or “to have children”) resulted in the most episodic details, compared with people- 
or location-based cues. Therefore, personal cue words could be generated in future 
research and categorised accordingly. Participants could be instructed to complete the 
adapted-AI and generate prospections that are positive, negative and neutral to them, 
prior to the EEG task (separate data collection session), and then suggest a cue word or 
phrase that corresponds to their most episodic prospections for use within the EEG task. 
However, this presents similar issues to the above suggestions – these prospections 
would be subject to distortion during the EEG task and not clearly prospections at all. 
This would risk the data collected reflecting neurophysiological activity related to EM – 
not EFT – which would be difficult to distinguish because of the significant neural 
overlap during EM and EFT. These projected difficulties highlight the meta-cognitive 
nature of EFT as a discrete human faculty, and demonstrate compatability issues with 
EEG research compared to fMRI research. Future research into EFT differences based on 
trait anxiety may be better suited to fMRI neuroimaging methods. It allows for better 
spatial resolution compared to sLORETA EEG techniques; it has been utilised within a 
range of other EFT research and therefore may allow for better comparison between 
findings; and it allows for more accurate but time-consuming measures of EFT (such as 
adapted-AI) compared to EEG.  
5.4 Regardless of the measure of EFT utilised, it is the qualitative content of negative future 
thoughts that is significant and typical of anxiety disorders – the negative threat-bias 
(Ellis & Hudson, 2010; Hirsch & Matthews, 2012; Goodwin, Yiend & Hirsch, 2017). No 
measures of EFT to date – to the best of the researcher’s knowledge – incorporate 
ratings of subjective meta-cognitive threat, fear or anxiety related to the prospection 
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itself. Indeed, even the standardised ratings from the Self-Assessment Manikin – SAM 
(Lang, 1980) – would only yield ratings of valence (positive – negative), arousal (low – 
high) and dominance (in control – controlled/dominated). Of these three affective 
dimensions, dominance would be the most relevant as a proxy measure of how 
subjectively “threatening” a prospection may appear to the participant. Possible future 
research could include the use of SAM for a measure of dominance to investigate 
possible differences between High and Low Anxiety groups, or GAD and Control groups. 
This woud allow for analyses of meta-cognitive ratings between groups – 
GAD/Subclinical Anxiety participants may rate their negative future prospections (EFT-
Negative) as more dominant than Asymptomatic Controls.  
Neurophysiological Differences  
Hypothesis 2: There will be significant neurophysiological differences (as measured by EEG) 
between High Anxiety and Asymptomatic Control groups (Accept) 
5.5 While there were no clear cognitive differences in EFT between groups – based on the 
above information – there were significant neurophysiological differences. Episodic 
future thinking (EFT) and Episodic Memory (EM) is believed to recruit a core network of 
brain regions, referred to as the Episodic Core Network. This functional network 
comprises areas that overlap with the Default Mode Network (DMN), a recently heavily 
investigated neural network with connotations of self-referential processing at 
resting/no-stimulus (conscious) state (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Spreng & Grady, 
2010; Andrescu et al., 2014), and introspective meditation (Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts & 
Kallio-Tamminen, 2016). Key findings from visual analyses within this project indicate 
that High Anxiety participants, during negative prospection (EFT-Negative tasks), showed 
peak activity in visuospatial (occipital lobe) and self-referential (PCC) neural regions of 
interest; Low Anxiety participants showed peak activity in the superior temporal gyrus 
and medial temporal lobe – both associated with scene-construction, episodic memory 
and EFT (Addis et al., 2007).  
5.6 The Occipital Lobe has been implicated as the brain’s centre of visuospatial processing, 
and has long been associated with processing external visual sensory information. 
However, more recently it has been studied for its involvement in EM. For example, 
Kukolja et al. (2016) found that EM deficits (specifically for information consolidation) in 
older adults were related to a failure to increase connectivity of the lingual gyrus (BA17) 
to the broader DMN. Similar neurophysiological deficits have been found in patients 
with Bi-polar Disorder during the encoding stage of EM tasks, with lower activity in the 
lingual gyrus, anterior cingulate gyrus and precuneus compared to controls (Oertel‐
Knöchel et al., 2014). Furthermore, Maratos et al. (2001) found that the lingual gyrus of 
the occipital lobe, and the PCC were implicated in the retrieval of contextual information 
for negative EM tasks (see below for further discussion). Interestingly, activity in the 
occipital gyri has been shown to correlate with level of episodic detail produced during 
EM tasks (Viard et al., 2011). However, findings from Viard et al. (2011) suggest that in 
healthy participants, this activity was specific to episodic memories compared to EFT, as 
memories were more episodic than prospections in general. Therefore, when applied to 
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the results of the current study, there is an empirical basis for suggesting that High 
Anxiety participants were producing more episodic prospections for negative events, 
with more contextual information compared to neutral prospections, and compared to 
Low Anxiety participants.  
5.7 The posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) has a wide-range of functions within the DMN, and 
in EFT and EM processing respectively. Irish et al. (2015) found that the PCC plays a key 
role in the task of scene construction, the atemporal version of EM and EFT whereby no 
temporal direction has been specified – participants simply imagine a scene. 
Interestingly, this area appeared key to performance across the Alzheimer’s Disease and 
Control groups within the study, which suggests that despite neurodegenerative atrophy 
in other regions associated with the dementia (hippocampus and temporal regions, for 
example), the PCC was the specific region implicated in overall scene construction. EFT, 
EM and scene construction all rely on similar underlying cognitive and neurological 
factors, and therefore it is reasonable to infer that increased PCC activity correlates with 
a more episodic prospection during EFT – as seen in the current findings for the High 
Anxiety x EFT-Negative condition. The PCC also plays a role in generating visuospatial 
imagery (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006; Irish et al., 2015). This appears to interact with peak 
activity within the lingual gyri of the occipital lobe, which is also implicated in 
visuospatial processing during episodic tasks. The PCC is thought to play a key role in the 
consolidation of complex novel information with stored semantic (schema) information 
during the process of episodic memory tasks (Bird et al., 2015). This highlights an 
important potential role of the PCC during EFT – to consolidate the individual’s stored 
schemata (cognitive script-like representations of “how the world works” in certain 
situations; Reinecke, Becker, Hoyer & Rinck, 2010) to generate a new hypothetical event 
or simulation. This also supports the Constructive Episodic Simulation Hypothesis 
(Schacter & Addis, 2007), which states that previously stored knowledge is flexibly 
combined to form a novel simulation – the prospection. In the case of GAD, for example, 
this could indicate that the individuals schemata predicts a negative event to be 
threatening as a matter of course. However, the nature of the episodic prospections 
produced within the present study was not measured and this leaves the possible 
correlation between negative-bias and content of prospections uninvestigated. 
Furthermore, Irish et al. (2018) found that cortical thinning of the PCC due to 
Frontotemporal Lobar degeneration (dementia) is related to deficits in recent 
autobiographical memory performance. This suggests that the PCC is involved in 
processing recent, personally significant information more than distant, more historical 
information. Therefore, the PCC may be sensitive to temporal distance. Within the 
opposite temporal framework (EFT), increased activity within the PCC may indicate how 
immediate or temporally close the prospection appears to the individual. Applied to the 
findings of the present study, this could indicate that the High Anxiety group were 
processing their negative prospections as more immediate (closer in the future) than 
Low Anxiety participants – despite the standardised temporal instructions (within the 
next 5 years). However, no measures for perceived temporal distance were taken and 
further research is needed to investigate this possibility, as it would further clarify the 
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role of the PCC and its potential sensitivity to perceived temporal distance of 
prospections or memories. 
5.8 A further significant finding is most prominently displayed in the Topographic Maps from 
Chapter FOUR (see Fig. 5b). Low Anxiety participants displayed right-hemispheric 
dominance in the temporal regions across most conditions, while High Anxiety 
participants displayed hemispheric lateralisation at temporal regions – with a slight left-
temporal dominance in peak amplitude. This difference was found to be statistically 
significant (p < .001), and sLORETA suggests that the positive amplitude may be related 
to activity in the left medial temporal lobe (MTL) and superior temporal gyrus. The MTL 
plays an important role in EFT and EM (Szpunar et al., 2007; Addis et al., 2009; Schacter 
et al., 2012; Hzu & Sonuga-Barke, 2016), and many studies have concluded that 
increased activity positively correlates with future temporal direction compared to 
imagining the present (scene construction) or past (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Xu et 
al., 2016). While this would implicate the MTL as being temporally sensitive and provide 
evidence for how it functions differentially across “mental time-travel” tasks, a recent 
review and study by Palombo et al. (2018) suggests otherwise. Activity within the MTL 
appears to be increased when emphasis is placed on the spatial context of the imagined 
scanario (Palombo et al., 2018). Therefore, the MTL plays an important role in the 
process of scene-construction specifically – the atemporal version of EFT (see above) – 
and is not necessarily related to EFT more than EM. Palombo et al. (2018) critiques 
previous work investigating the MTL’s role in episodic thinking (future vs present), 
suggesting that methodological issues (such as measures or tasks used) conflated the 
separate processes of scene-construction and EFT. For example, Xu et al. (2016) utilised 
a procedure which placed greater emphasis on scene-construction for future temporal 
(EFT) tasks compared to present (scene construction). Palombo et al. (2018) investigated 
this by adjusting the methodology used in Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010) and found that 
high scene-construction tasks elicited greater functional activation (fMRI data) 
compared to low scene-construction tasks. A slight left-MTL dominance was found for 
high scene-construction tasks. Furthermore, the results showed no significant effect of 
temporal direction (future vs present) on MTL activity. When taken together with the 
results of the present study, one could infer that the greater lateralised activation of 
both right and left MTLs present in the High Anxiety group across EFT tasks reflects a 
greater emphasis on scene-construction overall. Specifically, this might suggest that the 
prospections generated by the High Anxiety group were more spatially or contextually 
specific than the Low Anxiety group. Together, these two factors indicate that 
prospection is more episodic than semantic in nature, which seems to be the case here. 
Future research into this potential relationship would be needed to investigate any such 
correlation. Furthermore, there are other studies that have investigated the functional 
differences between the left and right MTL – relevant to the right-hemispheric 
dominance of the Low Anxiety group. Findings from studies into patients with damage 
to their right or left MTL point to different deficits in perspective processing tasks – 
namely, allocentric vs egocentric spatial memory tasks (Lambrey et al., 2008). Right MTL 
structures – including the right hippocampus – are implicated in imagining a scene from 
an alternative visuospatial perspective (allocentric); according to impairments 
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demonstrated by patients who had undergone right MTL surgery for epilepsy (Lambrey 
et al., 2008). Interestingly, the left MTL was sensitive to egocentric (first-person) 
visuospatial perspectives and this indicates a specialisation for both left and right MTLs 
for processing perspectives. Furthermore, patients with unilateral MTL epilepsy retain 
their abilities to construct gist-like episodic memories (the initial construction phase is 
relatively unaffected), however, they are lacking in detail due to the neural obstruction 
during the elaboration process. McCormick et al. (2018) found that patients with left 
MTL epilepsy recruited neocortical regions, including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC) during elaboration phases for episodic retrieval tasks. Healthy controls 
however, recruited bilateral hippocampal regions, including the MTL, during their more 
episodic retrieval. Bilateral hemispheric MTL activation is therefore paramount to 
constructing detail-rich episodic (autobiographical) memories, due to its role during the 
elaboration phase of the episodic process (McCormick et al., 2018). High Anxiety 
participants demonstrated increased bilateral activation of MTL areas across EFT 
conditions compared to Low Anxiety participants. Combine this with evidence 
suggesting that right MTL is associated with allocentric perspective processing (external 
visuospatial details), while the left MTL is associated with egocentric perspective 
(internal, personally relevant visuospatial details); and a clear pattern begins to emerge. 
Across all EFT conditions, High Anxiety participants recruited regions of the Episodic 
Core Network that have been correlated with processing scenes (episodic simulations) 
that are more spatially and contextually rich, and with greater level of detail. This 
conclusion is tentative, due to the small sample size within the present study. However, 
it does follow findings from cognitive research into anxiety disorders, whereby 
prospective cognitions (future thoughts) are predominantly worrisome in nature and 
involve a threat to the individual.  
sLORETA Findings 
Hypothesis 3: There will be significant differences between groups in the recruitment of 
neural regions (as estimated by sLORETA) comprising the Episodic Core Network during 
Episodic Future Thinking (Accept) 
5.9 Statistical analyses of sLORETA results suggested significant differences between groups 
in the recruitment of neural regions comprising the Episodic Core Network. During the 
earlier 50ms time window (275-325ms) significantly greater recruitment was found in 
High Anxiety participants (compared to Low Anxiety) of the left middle frontal gyrus 
(MFG; BA 09), left PCC (BA 23), and left MTL (BA 28, 35 and 36). As discussed above, 
increased recruitment of the left MTL is associated with egocentric visuospatial 
processing, future-oriented scene construction, and is important to EM and EFT (Szpunar 
et al., 2007; Lambrey et al., 2008; Addis et al., 2009; Schacter et al., 2012; Hzu & Sonuga-
Barke, 2016; Palombo et al., 2018); increased recruitment of the PCC could be related to 
more episodic constructions and is particularly sensitive to recent (temporally sensitive) 
events (Irish et al., 2015; Bird et al., 2016). The left middle frontal gyrus (BA 09) of the 
mPFC is associated with directing attentional resources to emotional stimuli and the 
expectancy of emotional stimuli (Bermpohl et al., 2006). Also, as suggested by Zaretsky, 
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Mendelsohn, Mintz, & Hendler (2010), increased acitivity in the mPFC is implicated in 
processing of uncertain threats; and Wheelock et al. (2014) suggest that the mPFC is 
involved in processing unpredictable threats. Therefore, when the above findings are 
taken together it is reasonable to suggest that the significant differences between 
groups reflect differences in early affective processing. Specifically, High Anxiety 
participants recruit areas that allocate attention to emotional stimuli – including 
unpredictable or uncertain threatening stimuli – more than Asymptomatic Controls.  
5.10 Within the later 50ms window (775-825ms), High Anxiety participants recruited the 
PFC, mPFC, Lateral Temporal regions, and MTL significantly more than Low Anxiety 
participants during EFT tasks. As in the earlier time window, High Anxiety participants 
recruited neural regions associated with allocation of attention to emotional 
(unpredictable or uncertain threatening) stimuli, and areas associated with egocentric 
visuospatial processing, and future-oriented scene construction significantly more than 
Low Anxiety participants. These regions are integral to the process of EFT (and EM), as 
discussed above. Furthermore, High Anxiety participants recruited Left BA 21 – Middle 
Temporal Gyrus (MTG) – significantly more than Low Anxiety participant. The MTG is a 
key neural region for the integration of of semantic, visual and auditory information 
(Visser, Jefferies, Embleton & Ralph, 2012). This could indicate that High Anxiety 
participants generated more multisensory semantic prospections during EFT tasks 
compared to Low Anxiety participants. Particularly interesting is the significantly greater 
recruitment of the Right BA 11 – the Orbitofrontal Gyrus (OfG) – an area that is 
associated with recognition of emotional context (Maratos et al., 2001), and emotional 
enhancement of memories (Kumfor, Irish, Hodges & Piguet, 2014). Significantly greater 
recruitment of the OfG (and increased connectivity with the Left Amygdala) has been 
found in patients with Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) compared to healthy controls; and 
suggestions were made that this led to significant differences in the processing of social 
and emotional situations (Geiger et al., 2016). Beer et al. (2003) found that patients with 
damage to their OfG performed significantly worse than healthy controls in tasks 
requiring self-conscious emotional processing and this had a subsequent negative 
impact on their ability to regulate their social behaviours. Similar findings come from 
Kreuger et al. (2016) when examining behavioural disinhibition within dementia 
patients. Socioemotional disinhibition was directly associated with neural atrophy and 
lesser recruitment of the OfG, suggesting it plays a central role in regulating behaviour 
and emotional processing in social situations. Taken together, the significantly greater 
recruitment of the OfG within High Anxiety (relative to Low Anxiety) participants during 
this later stage (775-825ms) indicates greater emphasis on socioemotional processing, 
and potentially more emotionally vivid prospections. However, these findings would 
require replication and supporting evidence from measures of the content of 
participants’ EFT – such as the adapted-AI (Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2008). 
5.11 Of particular interest to this project, are the statistically significant differences during 
negative EFT tasks – as these are qualitatively linked to worry, a defining feature of 
anxiety disorders such as GAD (APA, 2013). Significantly higher recruitment of the Right 
BA 13 (Insular Cortex) and the Right BA 21 (MTG) was found in High Anxiey participants 
compared to Low Anxiety participants. The Insular Cortex has been implicated in the 
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development of meta-memory – the human neurocognitive capacity to introspectively 
examine the accuracy of memories (Fandokova et al., 2017). As children develop 
through ages 7-15 years of age, improvements in meta-memory is associated with 
cortical thinning of the anterior insula and increased thickness in the vmPFC. Meta-
memory is intrinsically similar to episodic memory and may rely on autonoetic 
consciousness (Tulving, 2001) to facilitate such introspection. Further support for this 
postion can be found in results by Philippi et al. (2017), who found that neural atrophy 
(from Alzheimer’s Disease) in the Insular Cortex (and mPFC) was related to a reduced 
sense of self. This is an important finding, as it suggests the insular cortex may play an 
important role in facilitating the neurocognitive faculty of autonoetic consciousness; 
which is key to introspective processes such as EFT. Arzy et al. (2009) found the insular 
cortex to be recruited during mental time travel into both past and future, suggesting it 
is integral to the underlying neural network of EM and EFT. Therefore, there is some 
evidence to suggest that the insular cortex is implicated in self-referential introspective 
processing, autonoetic consciousness and both EM and EFT. The insular cortex also has a 
relationship with anxiety disorders. For example, increased anticipatory anxiety 
(particularly related to predicted pain) is positively correlated with increased 
recruitment of the insular cortex (Lin et al., 2013). Terasawa, Shibata, Moriguchi & 
Umeda (2013) found that high social anxiety levels were positively correlated with 
increased activation of the right anterior insular. They also suggest that this increased 
recruitment is associated with increased introspective monitoring and this is a significant 
contributing factor to the participants’ high anxiety levels. Liu et al. (2015) utilised fMRI 
and found that increased amplitude of low-frequency fluctutations (ALFF) in the right 
dorsal anterior insular cortex was related to increased anxiety in anxious depressed 
patients relative to both healthy controls and depressed patients in remission. Shin & 
Liberzon (2010) also note that activity in the insular cortex is heightened across anxiety 
disorders. Another important role of the insular cortex (right anterior insular specifically) 
is to serve as an integrated control hub in the processing of multi-sensory information 
(Chen et al., 2015). Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest the insular cortex is 
central to the processing and representation of the material self, due to its wide-spread 
involvement in multi-sensory integration and interoception as it relates to self-other 
processes (Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2014).  
5.12 From the above findings, it is reasonable to assume that the positive recruitment of 
the right insular cortex (BA 13) in High Anxiety participants (relative to controls) is 
significant. Although participants within the present study were Subclinical, the neural 
activity during Negative EFT tasks is similar to what could be expected of clinical 
populations. Increased recruitment of the insular cortex supports the notion that High 
Anxiety participants were processing negative future events with higher concurrent 
levels of interoception and multisensory integration. The combined functions of the 
insular cortex (anticipatory anxiety, interoception, multi-sensory integration and its 
relation to the self) indicate that its recruitment during negative prospections may 
correlate with episodic thoughts that are self-relevant and involve physical and affective 
arousal. Unfortunately, as there was no measure of EFT content (as possible using the 
adapted-AI), it is difficult to draw such a conclusion. Future research may utilise such a 
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measure as to investigate this possible relationship. For now however, the suggestion is 
tentative and requires further empirical investigation.  
 
 
The Effect of Valence  
Hypothesis 3a: There will be significant differences between groups in the recruitment of 
neural regions (as estimated by sLORETA) comprising the Episodic Core Network during 
Negative Episodic Future Thinking (Accept) 
5.13 Across groups, there was an effect of valence on the differential activation of neural 
regions – as predicted. Specifically, negative valence stimuli were associated with 
increased (although not statistically significant) bilateralisation of mean amplitude at 
temporal regions in Low Anxiety participants (see topographic maps Fig 4a & 4b in 
Chapter FOUR); and peak activity in the lingual gyrus (OL) and PCC in High Anxiety 
participants (sLORETA images Fig. 6a & 6b in Chapter FOUR). Therefore, negative 
affective stimuli elicits a different neurophysiological pattern (mean amplitude) in High 
Anxiety and Low Anxiety participants. This suggests two possibilities: a.) high trait 
anxiety results in a significantly different affective processing of the cue word itself; or 
b.) high trait anxiety results in different negative prospections being generated by 
participants. For example, findings from Laeger et al. (2014) suggest that Subclinical 
Anxiety predicts increased amygdala activation when processing negative emotional 
words compared to neutral. This may support the first possibility; the neurophysiological 
differences found within the present study may reflect similar differences in affective 
processing of the cue words. However, increased amygdala-dlPFC coupling was also 
associated with emotional regulation in Subclinical Anxiety groups processing negative 
words in Laeger et al. (2014). No such dlPFC activation appeared within the current 
study. Furthermore, previous neurophysiological research into attentional biases for 
emotional words has focussed on early affective processing time windows. For example, 
Wabnitz, Martens & Neuner (2016) found significant differences in ERP components in 
participants with Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) compared to controls when presented 
with emotional words. Specifically, a diminished P100 ERP was present in SAD patients; 
heightened Early Posterior Negativity (EPN) – suggesting hypervigilance to emotional 
words. No difference between SAD and Control groups was found for N400 ERP 
component. However, N400 was sensitive to emotional vs. neutral cue words – 
demonstrating the effect of valence on neurophysiological responses. For the purpose of 
the present study’s analysis, a 50ms time window approximating the LPC (775-825ms 
after stimulus onset) was used because the LPC is believed to represent stronger 
episodic memory (and possibly prospections); furthermore, it relates specifically to self-
knowledge compared to knowledge of others (Coronel & Federmeier, 2016). The early 
attentional differences that seem to dissappear with later neurophysiological activity 
(from N400 – 400ms onwards) may not impact on the results for analyses focussing on 
800ms after stimulus onset. Furthermore, findings from Dresler et al. (2009) suggest that 
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emotional interference during a Stroop tasks is not effected by trait anxiety – but rather 
by state anxiety. The participants level of anxiety during the experiment predicted 
higher attention to emotionally salient information compared with others.  
5.14 Based on the above, the second possibility appears more likely – High Anxiety 
participants generated different negative prospections than Controls. Indeed, although 
there were no statistically significant differences between groups (on self-reported level 
of episodic detail), there was a significant positive correlation between GAD-7 scores 
and EFT-Negative scores on the behavioural measures (r = .61, p < .01). While no further 
data was collected regarding the qualitative content of these prospections, it appears – 
based on statistically significant neurophysiological differences – that each group may 
have generated negative prospections differently. This corresponds with existing 
empirical evidence suggesting that future thoughts in GAD are dominated by an 
expectancy of anxious experiences compared to other psychiatric disorders or the 
general population (see Ghahramanlou-Holloway, Wenzel, Lou & Beck, 2007).  
5.15 It is also reasonable to infer that across groups, negative affective stimuli elicited 
more episodic prospections. The Low Anxiety group (asymptomatic controls) showed 
increased bilateral temporal activity; whereas the High Anxiety group demonstrated 
peak amplitudes in OL and PCC regions. The differential activation of these ROIs 
demonstrates the mediating role that trait anxiety played when generating 
prospections. Further specification via source estimation (sLORETA) confirmed that High 
Anxiety participants recruited neural regions associated with introspection, 
socioemotional processing and multisensory integration significantly more than Low 
Anxiety participants during EFT.  Future research should focus on investigating the 
possible mediatory effect of anxiety on the content of negative EFT and examine its 
possible neurophysiological correlates. Neutral stimuli appeared to elicit peak activity 
reflective of baseline recruitment of the episodic core network for each group, with right 
hemispheric dominance for Low Anxiety participants. This suggests that the 
prospections produced were generally less episodic in their content compared to 
emotionally salient (affectively primed) prospections. It also provides further evidence 
for the role of trait anxiety (on a neurophysiological level) mediating the processes 
involved in episodic future thinking, even for neutral – not emotionally salient or 
threatening – stimuli.  
5.16 Within the current study, EFT-Positive data was not included in the analysis due to a 
technical error during the data collection sessions. Specifically, the data for EFT-Positive 
tasks was only recorded for a 1ms window instead of the intended 50ms window. Post-
hoc examination of the e-Prime 2.0 script did not indicate any particular reason for such 
a recording error. However, the focus of the study was to examine inherently negative 
prospections (threatening or worrisome thoughts) in those with higher trait anxiety 
compared to asymptomatic controls – so the loss of such data is not significant. 
However, it is important to note that future research into EFT differences arising from 
trait anxiety should consider the role of positive valence stimuli. There may be a similar 
pattern of neurophysiological activity in prospections that are highly affective (positive 
or negative) that is the cause of the difference that was found within the present study. 
This would mean that high trait anxiety was related to differential activation of areas 
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within the episodic core network related to affective stimuli overall – regardless of its 
valence. Szpunar & Schacter (2013) found that repeated simulation increased the 
participants’ likelihood ratings for future events – but only for emotional ones. This 
points to a potential similarity in negative and positive future event processing. 
However, Wu et al. (2015) found that participants with Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
(GAD) demonstrated a negativity bias for future events, rating negative future events as 
more plausible than asymptomatic controls. So far, the empirical consensus is that 
anxiety is related to a pessimistic threat-bias for future events, which is inherently 
negative in nature (Miloyan, Bulley & Suddendorf, 2016).  
Neurophysiological Similarities 
5.17 While there were significant neurophysiological differences between groups, there 
was a marked overlap in neural activity. For example, the main regions of the Episodic 
Core Network were activated across all EFT tasks. Based on previous research findings, 
this indicates that the participants were successfully producing episodic prospections 
when completing the task presented to them. This indicates that the procedure utilised 
here was therefore appropriate to ellicit such prospections. If this is the case, then 
results are (somewhat) comparable to other such studies that examine episodic 
processes, as the pattern of neurophysiological activity is similar. Therefore, the results 
of the present study provide more empirical support for the existence of a discrete 
functional neural network involved EFT – the Episodic Core Network (Addis et al., 2007) 
– consisting of MTLs, PCC, medial PFC, retrosplenial cortex, lateral temporal regions and 
frontal regions (see Chapter TWO). Such a large-scale functional network that overlaps 
significantly with the DMN, is an exciting prospect for future research to investigate. 
Differential activation of this network can be correlated with deficits or positive 
performance in episodic tasks and further knowledge can be gained for the discrete 
roles each ROI plays. This has already begun with research into dementia by Irish et al. 
(2018; see above), but there is still significant room for further investigation. For 
example, transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) studies could also provide 
supporting evidence for the discrete contributory functions of each region. Zwissler et 
al. (2014) found that stimulation of the left dlPFC impacted the accuracy of memory 
encoding and subsequent recall; similar to Leshikar et al. (2017), who found that 
stimulation of left dlPFC during encoding improved subsequent recall – even after one 
day. These tasks were not episodic in nature, rather recruiting basic semantic memory 
processes and recognition. However, Chen et al. (2016) found that tDCS over the left 
posterior parietal cortex (LPPC) was causally linked to improvements in episodic memory 
performance. Therefore, the potential to co-ordinate findings from EEG, ERP, sLORETA, 
fMRI and tDCS studies allows for stronger claims to be made about the functional neural 
network underlying these processes. The results of the present study also provide 
support for the Constructive Episodic Simulation Hypothesis (Schacter & Addis, 2007), as 
the neurophysiological activity at earlier stages (275-325ms) were reflective of 
concurrent recollection of semantic, multisensory information and initial emotional 
processing. The later stage (775-825ms) involved recruitment of higher order neural 
regions that integrate multisensory information, generate visuospatial information and 
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emotional processing. This would indicate that two distinct phases exist, as posited by 
Schacter & Addis (2007): 1.) initial recollection of stored semantic, schematic, emotional 
and sensory information, and 2.) reconstruction of this information into a novel future 
simulation with subsequent emotional processing.  
5.18 Cognitive research into EFT has posited the constructive episodic simulation 
hypothesis, which involves a variety of high-level cognitive processes that take stored 
information and flexibly recombine into a novel new scenario (Schacter & Addis, 2007). 
This hypothesis explicitly states that the overlap between EFT and EM is great at both 
the cognitive and neurophysiological level, as the same core networks and regions are 
differentially recruited across both functions. Furthermore, this field of research has 
rapidly expanded to investigate EFT deficits across clinical populations. For example, 
Mercuri et al. (2016) demonstrated how long-term opiate abuse can negatively impact 
on the quality and quantity of episodic future thoughts. There are multiple studies into 
EFT deficits in various dementias (see Duval et al., 2012; Irish, Hodges, Addis & Piguet, 
2012; Irish, Hodges & Piguet, 2013; Hsaio, Kaizer, Fong & Mendez, 2013; Irish et al., 
2016), which allow for inferences to be made regarding the role these discrete atrophied 
neural regions play when functioning normally. For example, Semantic Dementia 
presents a unique challenge and insight into the differences between EFT and EM. 
Sementic Dementia patients are able to retain some of their EM capabilities, but appear 
to decrease significantly in their EFT capacity. This allows for investigation at the 
cognitive and neurophysiological level as to how these differences may be related to 
Semantic Dementia’s discrete neurodegenerative pathology that atrophies the anterior 
temporal lobes (Hodges & Patterson, 2007). One can tentatively infer that the anterior 
temporal lobes play a unique role within the Episodic Core Network, particularly in 
prospective simulations (EFT) compared to EM.  
Methodology and Future Research 
5.19 The present study is the first – to the best of the researcher’s knowledge – to 
investigate possible cognitive and neurophysiological (neurocogntive) differences during 
EFT based on trait anxiety. To do this, a quasi-experimental design was utilised that 
divided participants into High Anxiety (Subclinical) and Low Anxiety (Asymptomatic 
Control) groups. However, it is important to emphasise that these groups were all non-
clinical – insofar as, no participants had a current or previous diagnosis of an anxiety 
disorder (or any other mental disorder), and had not received psychotherapy or drug 
treatments. Therefore, it is important to note that differences found between these two 
methodologically constructed groups are reflections of possible differences within the 
general, non-clinical population who’s trait anxiety varies on a spectrum. A diagnosis of 
GAD for example, would require that the level of recurrent fear and anxiety be difficult 
to control, and generalised to the point of impacting significantly on daily functioning; 
and have been occuring for three months or more (APA, 2013). This indicates a key cut-
off point from which the “subclinical” spectrum of trait anxiety progresses into a 
maladaptive anxiety disorder. Taking this developmental approach to anxiety disorders 
may also be prudent given the results of the current study. For example, the differences 
found between groups could indicate that an individual is approaching the clinically 
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significant cut-off point in the near future. From this perspective, the High Anxiety 
sample within this project could be seen as “pre-clinical” also because Subclinical 
Anxiety is predictive of future diagnosis (Wolitzky-Taylor et al., 2014). Indeed, some 
participants within the High Anxiety group did score in the category of “Severe Anxiety” 
for the GAD-7 psychometric measure, which does not constitute a diagnosis on its own 
but does carry important connotations of (potential) impact on everyday functioning. 
The researcer is keen to emphasise these points for the purpose of post-hoc discussion 
about this project’s key findings. Discrete neurophysiological differences were found at 
two levels of analysis – ERP-style statistical analysis at key electrode sites; and sLORETA 
source estimation. Furthermore, these differences appear to reflect pre-existing 
cognitive knowledge for anxiety disorders.  
5.20 Alternative methods and measures could have been used to complete the present 
study and answer the research questions. For example, there have recently been 
advancements in the development of self-report measures specifically for future-
oriented thinking – namely, the future-oriented repetitive thought (FoRT) scale 
(Miranda, Wheeler, Polanco-Roman, & Morruín, 2017). This measure combines items 
from many other established clinical self-report measures, including the PSWQ used 
within the present project. It consists of three subscales for discrete categories of 
repetitive future thinking: pessimism, goals and positive indulging. The scale would be 
useful for future research into this area of EFT, however, within the proposed study it 
was felt to be too broad a scale with insufficient application in other empirical research 
– as a newly developed tool. Further replication of its reliability and suitability for 
episodic research is needed before it is adopted here. Furthermore, the adapted-AI 
(Addis & Schacter, 2008) has been shown to produce a large quantity of information 
from participants that the researcher must analyse and score for episodic details and 
semantic information. While this measure has been used in previous research into EFT 
and was ranked as the most reliable measure at present by Ward (2015), there are 
issues with incorporating it within an EEG project. Firstly, the significant amount of time 
that would be needed for participants to verbalise their EFTs between cue words would 
cause potential issues with the EEG sensor net itself, as the sensors are known to begin 
drying out and becoming less accurate from 30 minutes onwards. This would therefore 
cause problems with scalp impedance and accuracy of EEG measure – the main subject 
of the project. Even if the Adapted-AI was used after the EEG session, it would become 
unclear whether participants would be remembering their previous prospections 
(generated moments ago) or truly engaging in prospection. Other issues include the 
significant time commitment needed to transcribe 54 events descriptions per 
participant, which within the present study would result in 594 event transcriptions (54 
events x 11 EEG participants). The adapted-AI has been utilised within fMRI studies; 
however, fMRI is not subject to the same physiological skin conductance issues that EEG 
is limited by.  
5.21 Neuropsychological research has limitations with regards to ecological validity due to 
its very nature of laboratory environments, with high levels of control and simple stimuli 
(Parsons, 2015). However, there are advancements in the field of neuroscience to 
increase the ecological validity of experiments using virtual reality (Bohil, Alicea, & 
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Biocca, 2011; Parsons, 2015). While these lend themselves to improvements in future 
research, the present study is limited to the use of standardized written emotional 
stimuli (ANEW). However, the benefit of using these stimuli is that the experiment has 
comparative ecological validity to existing research and therefore is able to contribute to 
discussions in the field as it stands. Future research should endevour to recruit more 
participants, particularly those with existing diagnoses to compare results. Furthermore, 
to gain information about the qualitative content of the prospections generated during 
the EFT tasks, alternative methodology should be employed. Specifically, the researcher 
recommends that future research utilise fMRI technology along with the adapted-AI to 
gain higher spatial resolution, and detail-rich transcriptions of participants’ prospections. 
Summary 
5.22 The present study was the first – to the best of the researcher’s knowledge – to 
investigate possible neurophysiological differences during EFT based on trait anxiety. 
Neurophysiological differences between groups (High vs Low Anxiety) were found at 
three levels of analysis: a.) statistical analyses of mean amplitude at electrodes at P300 
(275-325ms) and LPC (775-825ms) after stimulus presentation; b.) peak activity 
(sLORETA souce estimation) at LPC (775-825ms) after stimulus presentation; and c.) 
statistical analyses of sLORETA source estimation data at P300 (275-325ms) and LPC 
(775-825ms) – including specific analyses of neural activity during Negative EFT. The 
results indicate that both groups recruited areas of the Episodic Core Network as 
expected, providing support for this functional pattern of neural activity. However, High 
Anxiety participants showed increased bilateral activation in temporal regions 
(topographic maps) across valence conditions, and peak activity was localised to the 
lingual gyrus (OL) and PCC in negative EFT tasks. Low Anxiety participants demonstrated 
right hemispheric dominance across conditions, with slightly increased bilateralisation of 
temporal regions for EFT-Negative tasks. Further analyses of sLORETA data revealed 
statistically significant differences in the recruitment of regions between groups during 
EFT. Specifically, High Anxiety participants (compared to Asymptomatic Controls) 
recruited the MTL, mPFC, OfG and MTL significantly more during EFT tasks. Interesting 
to note is the significantly greater recruitment of the OfG and MTG in High Anxiety 
participants during Negative EFT tasks, as these tasks are more directly related to worry.  
Conclusion 
5.23 The nature of the neurophysiological differences suggest that High Anxiety 
participants generated negative prospections utilising more visuospatial, 
socioemotional, introspective and schematic information than Low Anxiety participants. 
Existing empirical knowledge indicates that anxiety disorders are characterised by 
uncontrollable, repetitive worrying about the future, and a negative threat-bias towards 
future events. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that these neurophysiological 
differences reflect some relationship to this negative threat-bias to future events. The 
present study provides a basis for further research into the neurophysiological 
differences during EFT related to trait anxiety, and anxiety disorders such as GAD. 
Furthermore, it provides the first set of neurophysiological correlates (differential neural 
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activity) to anxiety’s prospective and anticipatory negative threat-bias and how this 
relates to EFT.   
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Appendix B: Information Sheet & Consent Form 
 
Title: ‘Worry on the Brain’: Information and Consent Form 
Researcher: Jolian Ardolino 
Purpose of data collection: MSc Thesis 
Details of my participation: To complete two short questionnaires, followed by an EEG 
(electroencephalography) task where I will be asked to remember/imagine a series of past/future 
events. 
Purpose of the study/What to expect: 
As humans, we are able to remember events/episodes in 
our past in a very realistic way – this is known as “episodic 
memory.” Similarly, we all have the ability to imagine future 
events/episodes in this way – this is known as “episodic 
future thinking.”  
This study aims to investigate episodic future thinking and 
its possible links to levels of anxiety and worry. All people 
worry and experience anxiety from time to time. Imagine a 
spectrum, from low to high levels of anxiety and worry. We 
all fall onto this spectrum somewhere, and at the very high 
end of the spectrum lie anxiety disorders, such as 
Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD). The purpose of this 
study is to look at individuals without an anxiety disorder 
who still vary on this continuum of worry and anxiety. To 
measure your personal levels of anxiety and worry, you will 
complete two short questionnaires (taking approximately 5 
minutes). Your scores will place you in one of two groups, 
however, this is done after the experiment and no 
participants are able to see their scores (please see consent 
agreement below).  
Following these questionnaires, you will complete the EEG task. This involves having an EEG sensor 
net placed on your head by the researcher – almost like a cap (see picture on left). Once the EEG net 
is in place, you will be required to sit in front of a screen to complete the main task of the 
experiment. The task involves remembering past episodes and imagining future episodes. You will 
be presented with a positive/negative/neutral cue word to prompt you, however, you are 
encouraged to elaborate on this freely and simply use this as a starting point for the process. You are 
required to do this while wearing the EEG sensor net and will be asked to reduce your movements as 
much as possible to avoid disrupting the reading (e.g. fidgeting, blinking, clenching teeth, moving 
tongue). The EEG sensor will be measuring electrical activity across regions of your brain while you 
complete the task and its important to obtain the cleanest reading possible. 
If at any point during the experiment, you wish to stop or withdraw, please inform the researcher 
immediately. You may withdraw at any time within 4 weeks of taking part. There are no negative 
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consequences for withdrawing from the study, as our duty is to ensure your safety and wellbeing 
during the process. Your participation is entirely voluntary.  
Also, please see the consent agreement below for instructions on withdrawing your data from the 
study after the experiment. 
After the study is complete, the researcher will safely remove the EEG sensor net and will present 
you with a full written debrief of the study, verbally debrief you and answer any questions you may 
have relating to the research. 
 
Consent Statement: 
Please read the information below carefully and sign to indicate your understanding that: 
1.) My participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw from the study at any time during 
the course of the experiment with no negative consequences 
2.) I am also free to withdraw my information from the study within 4 weeks of taking part by e-
mailing the researcher and quoting my participant number  
3.) I have been given a brief explanation of the purpose of the experiment and will receive a 
written and verbal debrief following the experiment to provide further information  
4.) My data will be anonymised using a participant number and password protected by the 
researcher. Only the researcher and their supervisor/s will have access to this information 
5.) Results from questionnaires at the beginning of the experiment are to be used only for the 
purposes of grouping participants, and these scores will not be made available to individual 
participants (i.e. I am unable request access to my scores on these questionnaires) 
6.) The overall findings of the present experiment may be submitted for publication in a 
scientific journal, or presented at scientific conferences 
7.) The study will take approximately 1 ½ - 2 hours to complete 
8.) I am able to contact the researcher to obtain general information about the experiment 
using their e-mail address:  
I am giving consent for data to be used for the purposes of the proposed study and all questions that 
I have about the research have been answered. 
 
 
Participant Name: 
 
Sign: ……………………………………………………………………………. Date: ………………………………………………………… 
 
Researcher Name:  
 
Sign: ……………………………………………………………………………. Date: ………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix C: Debrief Form 
 
Debrief 
Thank you for taking part in my experiment – I really appreciate it.  
As you know by now, the experimental task was to remember past events and imagine future events 
related to a specific word. What you might be wondering is, “why?” 
Purpose of the study 
“Episodic future thinking” is a way of imagining a future event so that it seems realistic – like an 
“episode.” This is similar to the way we can remember episodes in our past – “episodic memory.” 
While there is a lot of general research into both - and some clinical research – there is little to no 
current research considering the relationship between anxiety and worry, and episodic future 
thinking. This is the first such study (to the best of the researcher’s knowledge) to examine this 
possible relationship from a neurocognitive approach (looking at brain activity and thoughts).  
As a participant, you completed two questionnaires designed to measure generalised anxiety, and 
worry. Your score on these questionnaires has put you into one of two groups: high vs. low anxiety. 
These scores do not equal a diagnosis – they are for measuring your general level of anxiety and 
worry. All scores have been anonymised using your participant number. Participants are not 
permitted access to their scores and they are used solely for the purpose of participant grouping. 
The EEG section of the study: you completed a series of tasks whereby you thought of past or future 
episodes/events, relating to the cue word. While you were doing this in your mind, the EEG was 
measuring activity across regions of your brain (reading the electrical activity). There is already an 
array of neuroscience research into episodic future thinking, which has found a Episodic Core 
Network that activates as we use episodic memory or future thinking.  
The hypothesis for the study, based on existing empirical knowledge, is that participants with high 
levels of anxiety and worry will perceive future events as more negative and potentially threatening 
than low anxiety participants. Therefore, it is proposed that these participants will recruit networks 
in the brain related to processing threats during the future thinking tasks. This was all measured 
using the EEG.  
As a participant, you have the right to withdraw your data from the study within 4 weeks of taking 
part by e-mailing the researcher at:  – just quote your participant 
number (below). 
If you have any immediate questions, please ask now. Alternatively, please e-mail me and I will do 
my best to respond as soon as possible. 
 
Thank you and all the best, 
 
Jolian Ardolino 
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Support 
If you are a student and feel in any way emotionally affected by taking part in the study, please 
contact the student Helpzone or Mental Health and Wellbeing Team (mhw@glos.ac.uk) for support 
and help with arranging Counselling.  
 
Samaritans 
Offering emotional support 24 hours a day 
Tel: 116 123 
Email: jo@samaritans.org 
Web: www.samaritans.org 
 
Sane Line 
Offering specialist mental health emotional support 6-11pm everyday. 
You can also email through their website. 
Tel: 0845 767 8000 
Web: www.sane.org.uk 
 
Alternatively, contact myself ( ), Dr Edgar (gedgar@glos.ac.uk) or Dr 
Baker (sbaker1@glos.ac.uk) for signposting to the relevant professionals. 
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Appendix D: Measures Used - GAD-7 and PSWQ 
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Appendix E – Descriptive Statistics Tables and Q-Q Plots 
 
Cognitive Data – Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
GAD7 16 1 20 10.38 6.217 .038 .564 -1.464 1.091 
PSWQ 16 30 69 53.13 14.528 -.356 .564 -1.489 1.091 
EFT_Score 16 5.04 8.16 6.8613 .80351 -.663 .564 .444 1.091 
EFT_NEG 16 4.11 10.00 6.7881 1.71992 .293 .564 -.627 1.091 
EFT_POS 16 5.67 9.56 7.6106 .91577 -.081 .564 .863 1.091 
EFT_NEUT 16 4.33 8.11 6.0813 1.03421 .123 .564 .000 1.091 
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Q-Q Plots for EFT Scores 
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EEG Descriptives – Mean Amplitude – P300 (275-325ms) 
 
 
AnxietyGroup Mean Std. Deviation N 
LTempo HighAnxiety 11.3896 2.68087 2 
LowAnxiety -7.1945 .04957 2 
Total 2.0976 10.84061 4 
PFC HighAnxiety 2.4095 2.07960 2 
LowAnxiety -4.0594 3.83278 2 
Total -.8250 4.50418 4 
RTempo HighAnxiety 11.8133 2.03870 2 
LowAnxiety 12.3444 .32621 2 
Total 12.0788 1.23082 4 
Occipital HighAnxiety -7.0224 5.46411 2 
LowAnxiety 15.8674 .54881 2 
Total 4.4225 13.59044 4 
RPosterior HighAnxiety 5.4678 .36953 2 
LowAnxiety 9.5122 .27742 2 
Total 7.4900 2.35021 4 
LPosterior HighAnxiety 11.4128 .93842 2 
LowAnxiety 3.7940 1.10833 2 
Total 7.6034 4.47793 4 
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EEG Descriptives – Mean Amplitude – LPC (775-825ms) 
 
 
AnxietyGroup Mean Std. Deviation N 
LTempo HighAnxiety 12.6647 1.08373 2 
LowAnxiety -5.2449 1.86411 2 
Total 3.7099 10.41477 4 
PFC HighAnxiety 4.4169 .48399 2 
LowAnxiety -6.4464 4.72908 2 
Total -1.0148 6.84612 4 
RTempo HighAnxiety 11.8782 1.29299 2 
LowAnxiety 12.1432 2.97038 2 
Total 12.0107 1.87663 4 
Occipital HighAnxiety -11.2312 3.89204 2 
LowAnxiety 15.2497 9.39247 2 
Total 2.0092 16.37687 4 
RPosterior HighAnxiety 5.3962 1.57160 2 
LowAnxiety 9.8222 7.35655 2 
Total 7.6092 5.03915 4 
LPosterior HighAnxiety 11.6121 .82209 2 
LowAnxiety 4.9724 9.47849 2 
Total 8.2922 6.69834 4 
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sLORETA Descriptive Statistics Table – All EFT Tasks 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
LBA08 12 11.09 14.85 13.3137 1.40965 -.553 .637 -1.520 1.232 
RBA08 12 8.71 12.69 10.2000 1.13995 1.211 .637 1.244 1.232 
LBA09 12 7.71 12.23 10.0807 1.33480 -.435 .637 -.084 1.232 
RBA09 12 5.35 7.43 6.6851 .65764 -1.242 .637 .752 1.232 
LBA10 12 8.66 13.77 10.9403 1.61782 .081 .637 -.906 1.232 
RBA10 12 8.21 13.53 10.2989 1.78028 .678 .637 -.998 1.232 
LBA11 12 10.75 19.40 15.7973 3.30679 -.675 .637 -1.480 1.232 
RBA11 12 9.55 20.51 15.7981 4.46106 -.671 .637 -1.620 1.232 
LBA13 12 9.38 15.55 13.0317 2.41321 -.630 .637 -1.564 1.232 
RBA13 12 5.96 10.76 7.8467 1.93113 .751 .637 -1.542 1.232 
LBA21 12 11.61 14.10 13.0204 .81935 -.168 .637 -1.026 1.232 
RBA21 12 15.02 20.11 17.3682 1.85087 .434 .637 -1.397 1.232 
LBA23 12 24.28 29.68 26.6097 1.43242 .515 .637 .849 1.232 
RBA23 12 17.48 20.12 18.7412 .78265 .452 .637 -.241 1.232 
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LBA24 12 6.62 11.53 9.1740 1.60432 -.357 .637 -1.122 1.232 
RBA24 12 5.20 9.48 7.5573 1.56255 -.264 .637 -1.446 1.232 
LBA25 12 17.56 23.17 19.8219 1.63352 .719 .637 .339 1.232 
RBA25 12 11.51 21.89 18.2444 3.72987 -.795 .637 -1.095 1.232 
LBA27 12 29.91 45.01 38.7170 4.99079 -.351 .637 -1.023 1.232 
RBA27 12 7.89 22.35 16.1212 5.48773 -.607 .637 -1.510 1.232 
LBA28 12 47.43 60.90 54.9451 4.41391 -.440 .637 -1.200 1.232 
RBA28 12 26.78 39.04 34.7283 3.76715 -1.010 .637 .364 1.232 
LBA29 12 17.30 22.81 19.8356 1.85033 .182 .637 -1.394 1.232 
RBA29 12 16.51 20.42 18.2957 1.02201 .323 .637 .726 1.232 
LBA31 12 14.51 23.85 18.7860 3.63481 .485 .637 -1.603 1.232 
RBA31 12 13.12 20.25 15.7702 3.02391 .778 .637 -1.610 1.232 
LBA32 12 7.24 10.14 8.3790 1.11113 .606 .637 -1.480 1.232 
RBA32 12 5.37 8.25 6.7999 1.09878 -.209 .637 -1.616 1.232 
LBA34 12 33.69 44.54 40.3356 3.38681 -.633 .637 -.356 1.232 
RBA34 12 13.61 21.84 19.2192 2.60873 -1.074 .637 .377 1.232 
LBA35 12 60.51 79.35 70.1613 6.23235 -.165 .637 -1.080 1.232 
RBA35 12 15.71 32.71 27.0859 5.47014 -1.121 .637 .176 1.232 
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LBA36 12 60.65 75.93 68.7803 4.92745 -.343 .637 -.871 1.232 
RBA36 12 30.48 48.62 41.6629 7.32702 -.779 .637 -1.539 1.232 
LBA41 12 8.37 19.53 12.8982 4.61100 .586 .637 -1.683 1.232 
RBA41 12 6.47 8.89 7.5093 .70861 .560 .637 -.247 1.232 
LBA42 12 9.84 21.64 14.3942 4.73085 .725 .637 -1.556 1.232 
RBA42 12 11.22 16.28 13.9636 1.55312 -.422 .637 -.720 1.232 
LBA44 12 7.46 22.05 15.3127 5.88658 -.584 .637 -1.618 1.232 
RBA44 12 7.18 13.51 10.0132 2.09356 .256 .637 -1.399 1.232 
LBA45 12 13.10 21.10 16.0154 2.78398 .649 .637 -.864 1.232 
RBA45 12 7.19 11.67 10.1025 1.27972 -1.414 .637 1.658 1.232 
LBA46 12 12.40 21.47 15.7837 3.23247 .669 .637 -1.142 1.232 
RBA46 12 7.68 14.78 10.3624 2.67076 .797 .637 -1.392 1.232 
LBA47 12 9.47 17.22 13.7330 2.94934 -.571 .637 -1.569 1.232 
RBA47 12 10.20 21.97 16.5245 4.45936 -.381 .637 -1.599 1.232 
LHippocampus 12 34.74 50.00 42.6761 4.94266 .020 .637 -1.103 1.232 
RHippocampus 12 19.90 33.19 28.1003 5.38759 -.769 .637 -1.546 1.232 
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Appendix F – ANOVA/ANCOVA Results Tables 
 
EFT Scores 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powere 
Corrected Model EFT_Score .733a 1 .733 1.146 .303 .076 1.146 .170 
EFT_NEG 6.115b 1 6.115 2.238 .157 .138 2.238 .286 
EFT_POS .074c 1 .074 .083 .778 .006 .083 .058 
EFT_NEUT .002d 1 .002 .002 .967 .000 .002 .050 
Intercept EFT_Score 694.825 1 694.825 1086.663 .000 .987 1086.663 1.000 
EFT_NEG 659.055 1 659.055 241.180 .000 .945 241.180 1.000 
EFT_POS 872.834 1 872.834 977.133 .000 .986 977.133 1.000 
EFT_NEUT 554.192 1 554.192 483.650 .000 .972 483.650 1.000 
AnxGroup EFT_Score .733 1 .733 1.146 .303 .076 1.146 .170 
EFT_NEG 6.115 1 6.115 2.238 .157 .138 2.238 .286 
EFT_POS .074 1 .074 .083 .778 .006 .083 .058 
EFT_NEUT .002 1 .002 .002 .967 .000 .002 .050 
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Error EFT_Score 8.952 14 .639      
EFT_NEG 38.257 14 2.733      
EFT_POS 12.506 14 .893      
EFT_NEUT 16.042 14 1.146      
Total EFT_Score 762.912 16       
EFT_NEG 781.630 16       
EFT_POS 939.325 16       
EFT_NEUT 607.750 16       
Corrected Total EFT_Score 9.684 15       
EFT_NEG 44.372 15       
EFT_POS 12.579 15       
EFT_NEUT 16.044 15       
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EEG Mean Potential – P300 (275-325ms) 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerg 
Corrected Model LTempo 345.367a 1 345.367 96.075 .010 .980 96.075 .991 
PFC 41.848b 1 41.848 4.402 .171 .688 4.402 .233 
RTempo .282c 1 .282 .132 .751 .062 .132 .056 
Occipital 523.943d 1 523.943 34.747 .028 .946 34.747 .825 
RPosterior 16.357e 1 16.357 153.217 .006 .987 153.217 .999 
LPosterior 58.046f 1 58.046 55.046 .018 .965 55.046 .935 
Intercept LTempo 17.599 1 17.599 4.896 .157 .710 4.896 .252 
PFC 2.722 1 2.722 .286 .646 .125 .286 .063 
RTempo 583.593 1 583.593 273.814 .004 .993 273.814 1.000 
Occipital 78.235 1 78.235 5.188 .150 .722 5.188 .262 
RPosterior 224.402 1 224.402 2102.001 .000 .999 2102.001 1.000 
LPosterior 231.246 1 231.246 219.292 .005 .991 219.292 1.000 
AnxietyGroup LTempo 345.367 1 345.367 96.075 .010 .980 96.075 .991 
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PFC 41.848 1 41.848 4.402 .171 .688 4.402 .233 
RTempo .282 1 .282 .132 .751 .062 .132 .056 
Occipital 523.943 1 523.943 34.747 .028 .946 34.747 .825 
RPosterior 16.357 1 16.357 153.217 .006 .987 153.217 .999 
LPosterior 58.046 1 58.046 55.046 .018 .965 55.046 .935 
Error LTempo 7.190 2 3.595      
PFC 19.015 2 9.507      
RTempo 4.263 2 2.131      
Occipital 30.158 2 15.079      
RPosterior .214 2 .107      
LPosterior 2.109 2 1.055      
Total LTempo 370.155 4       
PFC 63.585 4       
RTempo 588.138 4       
Occipital 632.335 4       
RPosterior 240.972 4       
LPosterior 291.401 4       
Corrected Total LTempo 352.556 3       
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PFC 60.863 3       
RTempo 4.545 3       
Occipital 554.100 3       
RPosterior 16.570 3       
LPosterior 60.155 3       
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EEG Mean Potential – LPC (775-825ms) - ANOVA 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerg 
Corrected Model LTempo 320.753a 1 320.753 137.977 .007 .986 137.977 .999 
PFC 118.010b 1 118.010 10.444 .084 .839 10.444 .429 
RTempo .070c 1 .070 .013 .918 .007 .013 .051 
Occipital 701.239d 1 701.239 13.568 .066 .872 13.568 .510 
RPosterior 19.590e 1 19.590 .692 .493 .257 .692 .082 
LPosterior 44.086f 1 44.086 .974 .428 .328 .974 .094 
Intercept LTempo 55.053 1 55.053 23.682 .040 .922 23.682 .701 
PFC 4.119 1 4.119 .365 .607 .154 .365 .067 
RTempo 577.029 1 577.029 109.963 .009 .982 109.963 .996 
Occipital 16.148 1 16.148 .312 .632 .135 .312 .064 
RPosterior 231.600 1 231.600 8.185 .104 .804 8.185 .363 
LPosterior 275.043 1 275.043 6.077 .133 .752 6.077 .294 
AnxietyGroup LTempo 320.753 1 320.753 137.977 .007 .986 137.977 .999 
131 
 
PFC 118.010 1 118.010 10.444 .084 .839 10.444 .429 
RTempo .070 1 .070 .013 .918 .007 .013 .051 
Occipital 701.239 1 701.239 13.568 .066 .872 13.568 .510 
RPosterior 19.590 1 19.590 .692 .493 .257 .692 .082 
LPosterior 44.086 1 44.086 .974 .428 .328 .974 .094 
Error LTempo 4.649 2 2.325      
PFC 22.598 2 11.299      
RTempo 10.495 2 5.247      
Occipital 103.367 2 51.683      
RPosterior 56.589 2 28.294      
LPosterior 90.518 2 45.259      
Total LTempo 380.455 4       
PFC 144.727 4       
RTempo 587.595 4       
Occipital 820.754 4       
RPosterior 307.779 4       
LPosterior 409.646 4       
Corrected Total LTempo 325.402 3       
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PFC 140.608 3       
RTempo 10.565 3       
Occipital 804.605 3       
RPosterior 76.179 3       
LPosterior 134.603 3       
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ANCOVA – (Variance of Anxiety Group – Variance of Valence) – P300 (275-325ms) 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerg 
Corrected Model LTempo 349.094a 2 174.547 50.420 .099 .990 100.840 .386 
PFC 43.385b 2 21.692 1.241 .536 .713 2.482 .077 
RTempo 1.748c 2 .874 .313 .784 .385 .625 .058 
Occipital 542.020d 2 271.010 22.434 .148 .978 44.869 .265 
RPosterior 16.361e 2 8.181 39.091 .112 .987 78.182 .344 
LPosterior 60.141f 2 30.071 2083.088 .015 1.000 4166.177 .999 
Intercept LTempo 18.763 1 18.763 5.420 .258 .844 5.420 .145 
PFC 4.175 1 4.175 .239 .711 .193 .239 .056 
RTempo 263.277 1 263.277 94.149 .065 .989 94.149 .554 
Occipital 85.763 1 85.763 7.100 .229 .877 7.100 .166 
RPosterior 113.179 1 113.179 540.824 .027 .998 540.824 .932 
LPosterior 138.679 1 138.679 9606.734 .006 1.000 9606.734 1.000 
Valence LTempo 3.728 1 3.728 1.077 .488 .518 1.077 .075 
134 
 
PFC 1.537 1 1.537 .088 .816 .081 .088 .052 
RTempo 1.466 1 1.466 .524 .601 .344 .524 .063 
Occipital 18.078 1 18.078 1.496 .436 .599 1.496 .083 
RPosterior .004 1 .004 .020 .910 .020 .020 .051 
LPosterior 2.095 1 2.095 145.099 .053 .993 145.099 .655 
AnxietyGroup LTempo 345.367 1 345.367 99.763 .064 .990 99.763 .567 
PFC 41.848 1 41.848 2.394 .365 .705 2.394 .100 
RTempo .282 1 .282 .101 .804 .092 .101 .052 
Occipital 523.943 1 523.943 43.372 .096 .977 43.372 .395 
RPosterior 16.357 1 16.357 78.161 .072 .987 78.161 .512 
LPosterior 58.046 1 58.046 4021.078 .010 1.000 4021.078 1.000 
Error LTempo 3.462 1 3.462      
PFC 17.478 1 17.478      
RTempo 2.796 1 2.796      
Occipital 12.080 1 12.080      
RPosterior .209 1 .209      
LPosterior .014 1 .014      
Total LTempo 370.155 4       
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PFC 63.585 4       
RTempo 588.138 4       
Occipital 632.335 4       
RPosterior 240.972 4       
LPosterior 291.401 4       
Corrected Total LTempo 352.556 3       
PFC 60.863 3       
RTempo 4.545 3       
Occipital 554.100 3       
RPosterior 16.570 3       
LPosterior 60.155 3       
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ANCOVA – (Variance of Anxiety Group – Variance of Valence) – LPC (775-825ms) 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerg 
Corrected Model LTempo 325.098a 2 162.549 533.828 .031 .999 1067.655 .898 
PFC 131.598b 2 65.799 7.303 .253 .936 14.605 .157 
RTempo 9.158c 2 4.579 3.255 .365 .867 6.510 .110 
Occipital 789.478d 2 394.739 26.094 .137 .981 52.189 .285 
RPosterior 36.323e 2 18.162 .456 .723 .477 .911 .061 
LPosterior 81.552f 2 40.776 .769 .628 .606 1.537 .068 
Intercept LTempo 45.165 1 45.165 148.327 .052 .993 148.327 .661 
PFC 16.335 1 16.335 1.813 .407 .644 1.813 .089 
RTempo 220.642 1 220.642 156.837 .051 .994 156.837 .674 
Occipital 89.942 1 89.942 5.946 .248 .856 5.946 .152 
RPosterior 186.418 1 186.418 4.677 .276 .824 4.677 .135 
LPosterior 257.768 1 257.768 4.859 .271 .829 4.859 .138 
Valence LTempo 4.345 1 4.345 14.269 .165 .935 14.269 .233 
PFC 13.588 1 13.588 1.508 .435 .601 1.508 .083 
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RTempo 9.088 1 9.088 6.460 .239 .866 6.460 .158 
Occipital 88.239 1 88.239 5.833 .250 .854 5.833 .151 
RPosterior 16.733 1 16.733 .420 .634 .296 .420 .060 
LPosterior 37.467 1 37.467 .706 .555 .414 .706 .067 
AnxietyGroup LTempo 320.753 1 320.753 1053.386 .020 .999 1053.386 .989 
PFC 118.010 1 118.010 13.097 .172 .929 13.097 .224 
RTempo .070 1 .070 .050 .860 .048 .050 .051 
Occipital 701.239 1 701.239 46.356 .093 .979 46.356 .407 
RPosterior 19.590 1 19.590 .492 .611 .330 .492 .062 
LPosterior 44.086 1 44.086 .831 .529 .454 .831 .069 
Error LTempo .304 1 .304      
PFC 9.010 1 9.010      
RTempo 1.407 1 1.407      
Occipital 15.127 1 15.127      
RPosterior 39.856 1 39.856      
LPosterior 53.051 1 53.051      
Total LTempo 380.455 4       
PFC 144.727 4       
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RTempo 587.595 4       
Occipital 820.754 4       
RPosterior 307.779 4       
LPosterior 409.646 4       
Corrected Total LTempo 325.402 3       
PFC 140.608 3       
RTempo 10.565 3       
Occipital 804.605 3       
RPosterior 76.179 3       
LPosterior 134.603 3       
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sLORETA Results – ANOVA – P300 (275-325ms) 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Poweraw 
Corrected Model LBA08 .635a 1 .635 .215 .667 .051 .215 .065 
RBA08 .168b 1 .168 1.088 .356 .214 1.088 .129 
LBA09 .329c 1 .329 .982 .378 .197 .982 .121 
RBA09 .098d 1 .098 .094 .775 .023 .094 .057 
LBA10 .232e 1 .232 .075 .797 .018 .075 .055 
RBA10 .389f 1 .389 .141 .726 .034 .141 .060 
LBA11 1.989g 1 1.989 .133 .734 .032 .133 .059 
RBA11 .721h 1 .721 .026 .879 .007 .026 .052 
LBA13 .369i 1 .369 .049 .835 .012 .049 .054 
RBA13 .226j 1 .226 .044 .845 .011 .044 .053 
LBA21 .436k 1 .436 1.156 .343 .224 1.156 .134 
RBA21 .649l 1 .649 .244 .647 .057 .244 .067 
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LBA23 2.429m 1 2.429 21.517 .010 .843 21.517 .926 
RBA23 1.536n 1 1.536 2.212 .211 .356 2.212 .211 
LBA24 .085o 1 .085 .025 .881 .006 .025 .052 
RBA24 .058p 1 .058 .015 .908 .004 .015 .051 
LBA25 1.066q 1 1.066 .426 .549 .096 .426 .081 
RBA25 2.073r 1 2.073 .136 .731 .033 .136 .060 
LBA27 2.915s 1 2.915 .174 .698 .042 .174 .062 
RBA27 6.490t 1 6.490 .152 .716 .037 .152 .061 
LBA28 6.756u 1 6.756 2.795 .170 .411 2.795 .252 
RBA28 2.496v 1 2.496 .267 .632 .063 .267 .069 
LBA29 1.056w 1 1.056 .362 .580 .083 .362 .076 
RBA29 1.491x 1 1.491 .682 .455 .146 .682 .099 
LBA31 .417y 1 .417 .028 .875 .007 .028 .052 
RBA31 .383z 1 .383 .035 .861 .009 .035 .052 
LBA32 .088aa 1 .088 .065 .812 .016 .065 .055 
RBA32 .032ab 1 .032 .022 .890 .005 .022 .052 
LBA34 2.550ac 1 2.550 .878 .402 .180 .878 .113 
RBA34 .939ad 1 .939 .232 .655 .055 .232 .067 
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LBA35 7.315ae 1 7.315 .494 .521 .110 .494 .085 
RBA35 5.957af 1 5.957 .402 .561 .091 .402 .079 
LBA36 7.498ag 1 7.498 1.087 .356 .214 1.087 .129 
RBA36 3.697ah 1 3.697 .056 .824 .014 .056 .054 
LBA38 3.882ai 1 3.882 .061 .818 .015 .061 .054 
RBA38 1.331aj 1 1.331 .034 .863 .008 .034 .052 
LBA41 .539ak 1 .539 .022 .890 .005 .022 .052 
RBA41 .199al 1 .199 1.224 .331 .234 1.224 .139 
LBA42 1.148am 1 1.148 .042 .848 .010 .042 .053 
RBA42 .789an 1 .789 .459 .535 .103 .459 .083 
LBA44 1.211ao 1 1.211 .027 .877 .007 .027 .052 
RBA44 1.416ap 1 1.416 .255 .640 .060 .255 .068 
LBA45 .984aq 1 .984 .193 .683 .046 .193 .064 
RBA45 .814ar 1 .814 2.454 .192 .380 2.454 .228 
LBA46 .470as 1 .470 .051 .833 .013 .051 .054 
RBA46 .355at 1 .355 .047 .839 .012 .047 .053 
LBA47 .923au 1 .923 .066 .809 .016 .066 .055 
RBA47 1.119av 1 1.119 .041 .850 .010 .041 .053 
142 
 
Intercept LBA08 1046.322 1 1046.322 354.177 .000 .989 354.177 1.000 
RBA08 606.150 1 606.150 3925.650 .000 .999 3925.650 1.000 
LBA09 600.920 1 600.920 1791.280 .000 .998 1791.280 1.000 
RBA09 260.787 1 260.787 249.342 .000 .984 249.342 1.000 
LBA10 673.593 1 673.593 219.114 .000 .982 219.114 1.000 
RBA10 620.044 1 620.044 225.263 .000 .983 225.263 1.000 
LBA11 1496.671 1 1496.671 99.968 .001 .962 99.968 1.000 
RBA11 1497.749 1 1497.749 54.712 .002 .932 54.712 .999 
LBA13 1062.308 1 1062.308 141.728 .000 .973 141.728 1.000 
RBA13 372.247 1 372.247 72.095 .001 .947 72.095 1.000 
LBA21 1074.556 1 1074.556 2847.907 .000 .999 2847.907 1.000 
RBA21 1905.457 1 1905.457 715.769 .000 .994 715.769 1.000 
LBA23 4267.429 1 4267.429 37796.489 .000 1.000 37796.489 1.000 
RBA23 2107.800 1 2107.800 3036.053 .000 .999 3036.053 1.000 
LBA24 466.558 1 466.558 139.619 .000 .972 139.619 1.000 
RBA24 328.305 1 328.305 85.656 .001 .955 85.656 1.000 
LBA25 2613.208 1 2613.208 1045.553 .000 .996 1045.553 1.000 
RBA25 2146.209 1 2146.209 140.882 .000 .972 140.882 1.000 
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LBA27 9943.621 1 9943.621 594.352 .000 .993 594.352 1.000 
RBA27 1579.176 1 1579.176 37.015 .004 .902 37.015 .992 
LBA28 20249.907 1 20249.907 8376.746 .000 1.000 8376.746 1.000 
RBA28 7927.564 1 7927.564 848.994 .000 .995 848.994 1.000 
LBA29 2394.947 1 2394.947 820.336 .000 .995 820.336 1.000 
RBA29 1989.209 1 1989.209 909.164 .000 .996 909.164 1.000 
LBA31 2184.450 1 2184.450 148.188 .000 .974 148.188 1.000 
RBA31 1499.088 1 1499.088 135.510 .000 .971 135.510 1.000 
LBA32 403.912 1 403.912 295.503 .000 .987 295.503 1.000 
RBA32 267.486 1 267.486 183.543 .000 .979 183.543 1.000 
LBA34 10732.762 1 10732.762 3693.984 .000 .999 3693.984 1.000 
RBA34 2457.290 1 2457.290 606.864 .000 .993 606.864 1.000 
LBA35 31795.138 1 31795.138 2148.810 .000 .998 2148.810 1.000 
RBA35 4668.569 1 4668.569 314.965 .000 .987 314.965 1.000 
LBA36 30271.097 1 30271.097 4388.615 .000 .999 4388.615 1.000 
RBA36 10607.516 1 10607.516 160.973 .000 .976 160.973 1.000 
LBA38 5301.317 1 5301.317 82.675 .001 .954 82.675 1.000 
RBA38 6530.377 1 6530.377 165.337 .000 .976 165.337 1.000 
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LBA41 1058.497 1 1058.497 42.413 .003 .914 42.413 .997 
RBA41 343.100 1 343.100 2114.963 .000 .998 2114.963 1.000 
LBA42 1242.455 1 1242.455 44.942 .003 .918 44.942 .998 
RBA42 1187.623 1 1187.623 691.031 .000 .994 691.031 1.000 
LBA44 1379.354 1 1379.354 31.196 .005 .886 31.196 .982 
RBA44 683.926 1 683.926 122.995 .000 .969 122.995 1.000 
LBA45 1530.824 1 1530.824 300.771 .000 .987 300.771 1.000 
RBA45 675.397 1 675.397 2036.096 .000 .998 2036.096 1.000 
LBA46 1479.863 1 1479.863 160.425 .000 .976 160.425 1.000 
RBA46 639.882 1 639.882 85.253 .001 .955 85.253 1.000 
LBA47 1173.361 1 1173.361 84.472 .001 .955 84.472 1.000 
RBA47 1747.029 1 1747.029 63.724 .001 .941 63.724 1.000 
AnxietyGroup LBA08 .635 1 .635 .215 .667 .051 .215 .065 
RBA08 .168 1 .168 1.088 .356 .214 1.088 .129 
LBA09 .329 1 .329 .982 .378 .197 .982 .121 
RBA09 .098 1 .098 .094 .775 .023 .094 .057 
LBA10 .232 1 .232 .075 .797 .018 .075 .055 
RBA10 .389 1 .389 .141 .726 .034 .141 .060 
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LBA11 1.989 1 1.989 .133 .734 .032 .133 .059 
RBA11 .721 1 .721 .026 .879 .007 .026 .052 
LBA13 .369 1 .369 .049 .835 .012 .049 .054 
RBA13 .226 1 .226 .044 .845 .011 .044 .053 
LBA21 .436 1 .436 1.156 .343 .224 1.156 .134 
RBA21 .649 1 .649 .244 .647 .057 .244 .067 
LBA23 2.429 1 2.429 21.517 .010 .843 21.517 .926 
RBA23 1.536 1 1.536 2.212 .211 .356 2.212 .211 
LBA24 .085 1 .085 .025 .881 .006 .025 .052 
RBA24 .058 1 .058 .015 .908 .004 .015 .051 
LBA25 1.066 1 1.066 .426 .549 .096 .426 .081 
RBA25 2.073 1 2.073 .136 .731 .033 .136 .060 
LBA27 2.915 1 2.915 .174 .698 .042 .174 .062 
RBA27 6.490 1 6.490 .152 .716 .037 .152 .061 
LBA28 6.756 1 6.756 2.795 .170 .411 2.795 .252 
RBA28 2.496 1 2.496 .267 .632 .063 .267 .069 
LBA29 1.056 1 1.056 .362 .580 .083 .362 .076 
RBA29 1.491 1 1.491 .682 .455 .146 .682 .099 
146 
 
LBA31 .417 1 .417 .028 .875 .007 .028 .052 
RBA31 .383 1 .383 .035 .861 .009 .035 .052 
LBA32 .088 1 .088 .065 .812 .016 .065 .055 
RBA32 .032 1 .032 .022 .890 .005 .022 .052 
LBA34 2.550 1 2.550 .878 .402 .180 .878 .113 
RBA34 .939 1 .939 .232 .655 .055 .232 .067 
LBA35 7.315 1 7.315 .494 .521 .110 .494 .085 
RBA35 5.957 1 5.957 .402 .561 .091 .402 .079 
LBA36 7.498 1 7.498 1.087 .356 .214 1.087 .129 
RBA36 3.697 1 3.697 .056 .824 .014 .056 .054 
LBA38 3.882 1 3.882 .061 .818 .015 .061 .054 
RBA38 1.331 1 1.331 .034 .863 .008 .034 .052 
LBA41 .539 1 .539 .022 .890 .005 .022 .052 
RBA41 .199 1 .199 1.224 .331 .234 1.224 .139 
LBA42 1.148 1 1.148 .042 .848 .010 .042 .053 
RBA42 .789 1 .789 .459 .535 .103 .459 .083 
LBA44 1.211 1 1.211 .027 .877 .007 .027 .052 
RBA44 1.416 1 1.416 .255 .640 .060 .255 .068 
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LBA45 .984 1 .984 .193 .683 .046 .193 .064 
RBA45 .814 1 .814 2.454 .192 .380 2.454 .228 
LBA46 .470 1 .470 .051 .833 .013 .051 .054 
RBA46 .355 1 .355 .047 .839 .012 .047 .053 
LBA47 .923 1 .923 .066 .809 .016 .066 .055 
RBA47 1.119 1 1.119 .041 .850 .010 .041 .053 
Error LBA08 11.817 4 2.954      
RBA08 .618 4 .154      
LBA09 1.342 4 .335      
RBA09 4.184 4 1.046      
LBA10 12.297 4 3.074      
RBA10 11.010 4 2.753      
LBA11 59.886 4 14.971      
RBA11 109.501 4 27.375      
LBA13 29.982 4 7.495      
RBA13 20.653 4 5.163      
LBA21 1.509 4 .377      
RBA21 10.648 4 2.662      
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LBA23 .452 4 .113      
RBA23 2.777 4 .694      
LBA24 13.367 4 3.342      
RBA24 15.331 4 3.833      
LBA25 9.997 4 2.499      
RBA25 60.936 4 15.234      
LBA27 66.921 4 16.730      
RBA27 170.651 4 42.663      
LBA28 9.670 4 2.417      
RBA28 37.350 4 9.338      
LBA29 11.678 4 2.919      
RBA29 8.752 4 2.188      
LBA31 58.964 4 14.741      
RBA31 44.250 4 11.063      
LBA32 5.467 4 1.367      
RBA32 5.829 4 1.457      
LBA34 11.622 4 2.905      
RBA34 16.197 4 4.049      
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LBA35 59.186 4 14.797      
RBA35 59.290 4 14.822      
LBA36 27.591 4 6.898      
RBA36 263.585 4 65.896      
LBA38 256.490 4 64.123      
RBA38 157.990 4 39.497      
LBA41 99.828 4 24.957      
RBA41 .649 4 .162      
LBA42 110.584 4 27.646      
RBA42 6.874 4 1.719      
LBA44 176.860 4 44.215      
RBA44 22.242 4 5.561      
LBA45 20.359 4 5.090      
RBA45 1.327 4 .332      
LBA46 36.899 4 9.225      
RBA46 30.023 4 7.506      
LBA47 55.562 4 13.890      
RBA47 109.663 4 27.416      
150 
 
Total LBA08 1058.774 6       
RBA08 606.935 6       
LBA09 602.591 6       
RBA09 265.069 6       
LBA10 686.122 6       
RBA10 631.443 6       
LBA11 1558.546 6       
RBA11 1607.971 6       
LBA13 1092.659 6       
RBA13 393.126 6       
LBA21 1076.501 6       
RBA21 1916.755 6       
LBA23 4270.310 6       
RBA23 2112.113 6       
LBA24 480.010 6       
RBA24 343.693 6       
LBA25 2624.271 6       
RBA25 2209.219 6       
151 
 
LBA27 10013.457 6       
RBA27 1756.317 6       
LBA28 20266.332 6       
RBA28 7967.410 6       
LBA29 2407.681 6       
RBA29 1999.452 6       
LBA31 2243.831 6       
RBA31 1543.722 6       
LBA32 409.468 6       
RBA32 273.347 6       
LBA34 10746.934 6       
RBA34 2474.426 6       
LBA35 31861.640 6       
RBA35 4733.815 6       
LBA36 30306.185 6       
RBA36 10874.799 6       
LBA38 5561.689 6       
RBA38 6689.698 6       
152 
 
LBA41 1158.864 6       
RBA41 343.948 6       
LBA42 1354.188 6       
RBA42 1195.286 6       
LBA44 1557.426 6       
RBA44 707.584 6       
LBA45 1552.166 6       
RBA45 677.538 6       
LBA46 1517.231 6       
RBA46 670.260 6       
LBA47 1229.846 6       
RBA47 1857.811 6       
Corrected Total LBA08 12.452 5       
RBA08 .786 5       
LBA09 1.671 5       
RBA09 4.282 5       
LBA10 12.528 5       
RBA10 11.399 5       
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LBA11 61.875 5       
RBA11 110.222 5       
LBA13 30.351 5       
RBA13 20.879 5       
LBA21 1.945 5       
RBA21 11.298 5       
LBA23 2.881 5       
RBA23 4.313 5       
LBA24 13.452 5       
RBA24 15.389 5       
LBA25 11.063 5       
RBA25 63.009 5       
LBA27 69.836 5       
RBA27 177.141 5       
LBA28 16.425 5       
RBA28 39.846 5       
LBA29 12.734 5       
RBA29 10.243 5       
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LBA31 59.381 5       
RBA31 44.634 5       
LBA32 5.556 5       
RBA32 5.861 5       
LBA34 14.172 5       
RBA34 17.136 5       
LBA35 66.502 5       
RBA35 65.247 5       
LBA36 35.089 5       
RBA36 267.282 5       
LBA38 260.372 5       
RBA38 159.321 5       
LBA41 100.367 5       
RBA41 .847 5       
LBA42 111.732 5       
RBA42 7.663 5       
LBA44 178.072 5       
RBA44 23.659 5       
155 
 
LBA45 21.343 5       
RBA45 2.141 5       
LBA46 37.368 5       
RBA46 30.378 5       
LBA47 56.485 5       
RBA47 110.782 5       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
156 
 
sLORETA Results - ANOVA – LPC (775-825ms) 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Poweraw 
Corrected Model LBA08 .603a 1 .603 .278 .626 .065 .278 .070 
RBA08 .357b 1 .357 .111 .756 .027 .111 .058 
LBA09 .343c 1 .343 .078 .793 .019 .078 .056 
RBA09 .321d 1 .321 24.764 .008 .861 24.764 .953 
LBA10 1.323e 1 1.323 .392 .565 .089 .392 .078 
RBA10 .736f 1 .736 .131 .736 .032 .131 .059 
LBA11 1.355g 1 1.355 .095 .773 .023 .095 .057 
RBA11 .974h 1 .974 .036 .858 .009 .036 .053 
LBA13 .667i 1 .667 .083 .787 .020 .083 .056 
RBA13 .190j 1 .190 .038 .855 .009 .038 .053 
LBA21 .771k 1 .771 .997 .374 .200 .997 .122 
RBA21 .838l 1 .838 .145 .723 .035 .145 .060 
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LBA23 1.991m 1 1.991 .451 .539 .101 .451 .082 
RBA23 1.073n 1 1.073 3.173 .149 .442 3.173 .279 
LBA24 .282o 1 .282 .086 .783 .021 .086 .056 
RBA24 .078p 1 .078 .028 .875 .007 .028 .052 
LBA25 2.765q 1 2.765 4.696 .096 .540 4.696 .382 
RBA25 3.010r 1 3.010 .147 .720 .036 .147 .061 
LBA27 7.659s 1 7.659 .206 .674 .049 .206 .065 
RBA27 2.734t 1 2.734 .072 .801 .018 .072 .055 
LBA28 22.647u 1 22.647 1.612 .273 .287 1.612 .167 
RBA28 6.163v 1 6.163 .314 .605 .073 .314 .072 
LBA29 .712w 1 .712 .119 .748 .029 .119 .058 
RBA29 .965x 1 .965 20.383 .011 .836 20.383 .914 
LBA31 .224y 1 .224 .011 .923 .003 .011 .051 
RBA31 .210z 1 .210 .015 .908 .004 .015 .051 
LBA32 .059aa 1 .059 .031 .869 .008 .031 .052 
RBA32 .051ab 1 .051 .028 .874 .007 .028 .052 
LBA34 10.224ac 1 10.224 .734 .440 .155 .734 .103 
RBA34 4.119ad 1 4.119 .400 .561 .091 .400 .079 
158 
 
LBA35 24.675ae 1 24.675 .390 .566 .089 .390 .078 
RBA35 7.279af 1 7.279 .117 .749 .028 .117 .058 
LBA36 21.703ag 1 21.703 .580 .489 .127 .580 .092 
RBA36 2.713ah 1 2.713 .034 .863 .008 .034 .052 
LBA38 6.374ai 1 6.374 .149 .720 .036 .149 .061 
RBA38 2.864aj 1 2.864 .051 .832 .013 .051 .054 
LBA41 .548ak 1 .548 .017 .903 .004 .017 .051 
RBA41 .273al 1 .273 .250 .643 .059 .250 .068 
LBA42 1.154am 1 1.154 .035 .861 .009 .035 .052 
RBA42 .858an 1 .858 .192 .684 .046 .192 .064 
LBA44 .784ao 1 .784 .016 .907 .004 .016 .051 
RBA44 1.880ap 1 1.880 .432 .547 .098 .432 .081 
LBA45 .968aq 1 .968 .062 .816 .015 .062 .054 
RBA45 1.057ar 1 1.057 .361 .581 .083 .361 .076 
LBA46 1.350as 1 1.350 .071 .803 .017 .071 .055 
RBA46 1.342at 1 1.342 .115 .752 .028 .115 .058 
LBA47 1.170au 1 1.170 .126 .741 .030 .126 .059 
RBA47 1.078av 1 1.078 .042 .848 .010 .042 .053 
159 
 
Intercept LBA08 1080.874 1 1080.874 499.041 .000 .992 499.041 1.000 
RBA08 642.606 1 642.606 199.479 .000 .980 199.479 1.000 
LBA09 618.587 1 618.587 141.226 .000 .972 141.226 1.000 
RBA09 275.608 1 275.608 21239.706 .000 1.000 21239.706 1.000 
LBA10 764.111 1 764.111 226.182 .000 .983 226.182 1.000 
RBA10 652.965 1 652.965 116.005 .000 .967 116.005 1.000 
LBA11 1497.966 1 1497.966 105.020 .001 .963 105.020 1.000 
RBA11 1497.199 1 1497.199 55.598 .002 .933 55.598 1.000 
LBA13 976.497 1 976.497 121.537 .000 .968 121.537 1.000 
RBA13 366.603 1 366.603 73.533 .001 .948 73.533 1.000 
LBA21 961.385 1 961.385 1242.879 .000 .997 1242.879 1.000 
RBA21 1716.845 1 1716.845 297.417 .000 .987 297.417 1.000 
LBA23 4229.548 1 4229.548 958.239 .000 .996 958.239 1.000 
RBA23 2106.983 1 2106.983 6231.889 .000 .999 6231.889 1.000 
LBA24 544.914 1 544.914 166.912 .000 .977 166.912 1.000 
RBA24 357.351 1 357.351 128.977 .000 .970 128.977 1.000 
LBA25 2114.839 1 2114.839 3592.242 .000 .999 3592.242 1.000 
RBA25 1853.442 1 1853.442 90.802 .001 .958 90.802 1.000 
160 
 
LBA27 8092.126 1 8092.126 217.457 .000 .982 217.457 1.000 
RBA27 1539.670 1 1539.670 40.714 .003 .911 40.714 .996 
LBA28 16096.747 1 16096.747 1145.557 .000 .997 1145.557 1.000 
RBA28 6576.633 1 6576.633 334.812 .000 .988 334.812 1.000 
LBA29 2326.708 1 2326.708 388.296 .000 .990 388.296 1.000 
RBA29 2027.678 1 2027.678 42827.247 .000 1.000 42827.247 1.000 
LBA31 2051.536 1 2051.536 96.905 .001 .960 96.905 1.000 
RBA31 1485.324 1 1485.324 106.617 .000 .964 106.617 1.000 
LBA32 438.948 1 438.948 230.962 .000 .983 230.962 1.000 
RBA32 287.556 1 287.556 160.042 .000 .976 160.042 1.000 
LBA34 8836.757 1 8836.757 634.056 .000 .994 634.056 1.000 
RBA34 1987.662 1 1987.662 193.134 .000 .980 193.134 1.000 
LBA35 27359.442 1 27359.442 432.874 .000 .991 432.874 1.000 
RBA35 4143.032 1 4143.032 66.614 .001 .943 66.614 1.000 
LBA36 26558.310 1 26558.310 710.209 .000 .994 710.209 1.000 
RBA36 10223.768 1 10223.768 128.288 .000 .970 128.288 1.000 
LBA38 4611.915 1 4611.915 107.521 .000 .964 107.521 1.000 
RBA38 5527.731 1 5527.731 99.216 .001 .961 99.216 1.000 
161 
 
LBA41 939.626 1 939.626 28.649 .006 .877 28.649 .973 
RBA41 333.601 1 333.601 305.408 .000 .987 305.408 1.000 
LBA42 1243.863 1 1243.863 37.324 .004 .903 37.324 .993 
RBA42 1152.307 1 1152.307 257.795 .000 .985 257.795 1.000 
LBA44 1434.652 1 1434.652 28.403 .006 .877 28.403 .972 
RBA44 524.530 1 524.530 120.615 .000 .968 120.615 1.000 
LBA45 1547.130 1 1547.130 98.351 .001 .961 98.351 1.000 
RBA45 552.424 1 552.424 188.388 .000 .979 188.388 1.000 
LBA46 1509.707 1 1509.707 79.307 .001 .952 79.307 1.000 
RBA46 648.694 1 648.694 55.529 .002 .933 55.529 1.000 
LBA47 1090.554 1 1090.554 117.036 .000 .967 117.036 1.000 
RBA47 1533.185 1 1533.185 59.313 .002 .937 59.313 1.000 
AnxietyGroup LBA08 .603 1 .603 .278 .626 .065 .278 .070 
RBA08 .357 1 .357 .111 .756 .027 .111 .058 
LBA09 .343 1 .343 .078 .793 .019 .078 .056 
RBA09 .321 1 .321 24.764 .008 .861 24.764 .953 
LBA10 1.323 1 1.323 .392 .565 .089 .392 .078 
RBA10 .736 1 .736 .131 .736 .032 .131 .059 
162 
 
LBA11 1.355 1 1.355 .095 .773 .023 .095 .057 
RBA11 .974 1 .974 .036 .858 .009 .036 .053 
LBA13 .667 1 .667 .083 .787 .020 .083 .056 
RBA13 .190 1 .190 .038 .855 .009 .038 .053 
LBA21 .771 1 .771 .997 .374 .200 .997 .122 
RBA21 .838 1 .838 .145 .723 .035 .145 .060 
LBA23 1.991 1 1.991 .451 .539 .101 .451 .082 
RBA23 1.073 1 1.073 3.173 .149 .442 3.173 .279 
LBA24 .282 1 .282 .086 .783 .021 .086 .056 
RBA24 .078 1 .078 .028 .875 .007 .028 .052 
LBA25 2.765 1 2.765 4.696 .096 .540 4.696 .382 
RBA25 3.010 1 3.010 .147 .720 .036 .147 .061 
LBA27 7.659 1 7.659 .206 .674 .049 .206 .065 
RBA27 2.734 1 2.734 .072 .801 .018 .072 .055 
LBA28 22.647 1 22.647 1.612 .273 .287 1.612 .167 
RBA28 6.163 1 6.163 .314 .605 .073 .314 .072 
LBA29 .712 1 .712 .119 .748 .029 .119 .058 
RBA29 .965 1 .965 20.383 .011 .836 20.383 .914 
163 
 
LBA31 .224 1 .224 .011 .923 .003 .011 .051 
RBA31 .210 1 .210 .015 .908 .004 .015 .051 
LBA32 .059 1 .059 .031 .869 .008 .031 .052 
RBA32 .051 1 .051 .028 .874 .007 .028 .052 
LBA34 10.224 1 10.224 .734 .440 .155 .734 .103 
RBA34 4.119 1 4.119 .400 .561 .091 .400 .079 
LBA35 24.675 1 24.675 .390 .566 .089 .390 .078 
RBA35 7.279 1 7.279 .117 .749 .028 .117 .058 
LBA36 21.703 1 21.703 .580 .489 .127 .580 .092 
RBA36 2.713 1 2.713 .034 .863 .008 .034 .052 
LBA38 6.374 1 6.374 .149 .720 .036 .149 .061 
RBA38 2.864 1 2.864 .051 .832 .013 .051 .054 
LBA41 .548 1 .548 .017 .903 .004 .017 .051 
RBA41 .273 1 .273 .250 .643 .059 .250 .068 
LBA42 1.154 1 1.154 .035 .861 .009 .035 .052 
RBA42 .858 1 .858 .192 .684 .046 .192 .064 
LBA44 .784 1 .784 .016 .907 .004 .016 .051 
RBA44 1.880 1 1.880 .432 .547 .098 .432 .081 
164 
 
LBA45 .968 1 .968 .062 .816 .015 .062 .054 
RBA45 1.057 1 1.057 .361 .581 .083 .361 .076 
LBA46 1.350 1 1.350 .071 .803 .017 .071 .055 
RBA46 1.342 1 1.342 .115 .752 .028 .115 .058 
LBA47 1.170 1 1.170 .126 .741 .030 .126 .059 
RBA47 1.078 1 1.078 .042 .848 .010 .042 .053 
Error LBA08 8.664 4 2.166      
RBA08 12.886 4 3.221      
LBA09 17.520 4 4.380      
RBA09 .052 4 .013      
LBA10 13.513 4 3.378      
RBA10 22.515 4 5.629      
LBA11 57.054 4 14.264      
RBA11 107.715 4 26.929      
LBA13 32.138 4 8.035      
RBA13 19.942 4 4.986      
LBA21 3.094 4 .774      
RBA21 23.090 4 5.773      
165 
 
LBA23 17.656 4 4.414      
RBA23 1.352 4 .338      
LBA24 13.059 4 3.265      
RBA24 11.083 4 2.771      
LBA25 2.355 4 .589      
RBA25 81.647 4 20.412      
LBA27 148.850 4 37.213      
RBA27 151.267 4 37.817      
LBA28 56.206 4 14.051      
RBA28 78.571 4 19.643      
LBA29 23.968 4 5.992      
RBA29 .189 4 .047      
LBA31 84.682 4 21.171      
RBA31 55.725 4 13.931      
LBA32 7.602 4 1.901      
RBA32 7.187 4 1.797      
LBA34 55.747 4 13.937      
RBA34 41.166 4 10.292      
166 
 
LBA35 252.817 4 63.204      
RBA35 248.778 4 62.195      
LBA36 149.580 4 37.395      
RBA36 318.775 4 79.694      
LBA38 171.573 4 42.893      
RBA38 222.857 4 55.714      
LBA41 131.190 4 32.797      
RBA41 4.369 4 1.092      
LBA42 133.304 4 33.326      
RBA42 17.879 4 4.470      
LBA44 202.043 4 50.511      
RBA44 17.395 4 4.349      
LBA45 62.923 4 15.731      
RBA45 11.730 4 2.932      
LBA46 76.145 4 19.036      
RBA46 46.728 4 11.682      
LBA47 37.272 4 9.318      
RBA47 103.396 4 25.849      
167 
 
Total LBA08 1090.140 6       
RBA08 655.849 6       
LBA09 636.450 6       
RBA09 275.981 6       
LBA10 778.947 6       
RBA10 676.216 6       
LBA11 1556.375 6       
RBA11 1605.888 6       
LBA13 1009.303 6       
RBA13 386.735 6       
LBA21 965.251 6       
RBA21 1740.774 6       
LBA23 4249.194 6       
RBA23 2109.408 6       
LBA24 558.255 6       
RBA24 368.512 6       
LBA25 2119.958 6       
RBA25 1938.099 6       
168 
 
LBA27 8248.635 6       
RBA27 1693.671 6       
LBA28 16175.599 6       
RBA28 6661.367 6       
LBA29 2351.389 6       
RBA29 2028.832 6       
LBA31 2136.442 6       
RBA31 1541.259 6       
LBA32 446.609 6       
RBA32 294.794 6       
LBA34 8902.728 6       
RBA34 2032.947 6       
LBA35 27636.934 6       
RBA35 4399.089 6       
LBA36 26729.594 6       
RBA36 10545.256 6       
LBA38 4789.862 6       
RBA38 5753.452 6       
169 
 
LBA41 1071.364 6       
RBA41 338.244 6       
LBA42 1378.321 6       
RBA42 1171.044 6       
LBA44 1637.478 6       
RBA44 543.805 6       
LBA45 1611.022 6       
RBA45 565.211 6       
LBA46 1587.202 6       
RBA46 696.764 6       
LBA47 1128.996 6       
RBA47 1637.659 6       
Corrected Total LBA08 9.266 5       
RBA08 13.243 5       
LBA09 17.864 5       
RBA09 .373 5       
LBA10 14.836 5       
RBA10 23.251 5       
170 
 
LBA11 58.409 5       
RBA11 108.689 5       
LBA13 32.806 5       
RBA13 20.132 5       
LBA21 3.865 5       
RBA21 23.928 5       
LBA23 19.647 5       
RBA23 2.425 5       
LBA24 13.341 5       
RBA24 11.161 5       
LBA25 5.120 5       
RBA25 84.658 5       
LBA27 156.509 5       
RBA27 154.001 5       
LBA28 78.853 5       
RBA28 84.734 5       
LBA29 24.680 5       
RBA29 1.154 5       
171 
 
LBA31 84.906 5       
RBA31 55.935 5       
LBA32 7.661 5       
RBA32 7.238 5       
LBA34 65.971 5       
RBA34 45.285 5       
LBA35 277.492 5       
RBA35 256.057 5       
LBA36 171.283 5       
RBA36 321.488 5       
LBA38 177.947 5       
RBA38 225.721 5       
LBA41 131.738 5       
RBA41 4.643 5       
LBA42 134.458 5       
RBA42 18.738 5       
LBA44 202.827 5       
RBA44 19.275 5       
172 
 
LBA45 63.891 5       
RBA45 12.787 5       
LBA46 77.495 5       
RBA46 48.070 5       
LBA47 38.442 5       
RBA47 104.474 5       
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sLORETA Results – ANOVA – Negative EFT – LPC (775-825ms) 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Poweraw 
Corrected Model LBA08 .129a 1 .129 .864 .451 .302 .864 .089 
RBA08 .124b 1 .124 18.028 .051 .900 18.028 .606 
LBA09 .314c 1 .314 .993 .424 .332 .993 .095 
RBA09 .129d 1 .129 .616 .515 .235 .616 .078 
LBA10 1.133e 1 1.133 3.033 .224 .603 3.033 .181 
RBA10 .209f 1 .209 3.537 .201 .639 3.537 .200 
LBA11 1.028g 1 1.028 5.246 .149 .724 5.246 .264 
RBA11 .642h 1 .642 1.001 .423 .333 1.001 .095 
LBA13 .101i 1 .101 .593 .522 .229 .593 .077 
RBA13 .292j 1 .292 23.198 .041 .921 23.198 .693 
LBA21 .451k 1 .451 .512 .548 .204 .512 .073 
RBA21 .648l 1 .648 306.148 .003 .994 306.148 1.000 
LBA23 1.180m 1 1.180 .826 .459 .292 .826 .088 
174 
 
RBA23 .700n 1 .700 .786 .469 .282 .786 .086 
LBA24 .069o 1 .069 .712 .488 .262 .712 .082 
RBA24 .036p 1 .036 1.563 .338 .439 1.563 .120 
LBA25 .357q 1 .357 .171 .720 .079 .171 .058 
RBA25 .609r 1 .609 3.337 .209 .625 3.337 .193 
LBA27 2.712s 1 2.712 .195 .702 .089 .195 .059 
RBA27 2.031t 1 2.031 7.608 .110 .792 7.608 .344 
LBA28 5.411u 1 5.411 .153 .734 .071 .153 .057 
RBA28 1.350v 1 1.350 .648 .505 .245 .648 .080 
LBA29 .630w 1 .630 7.426 .112 .788 7.426 .339 
RBA29 .788x 1 .788 .943 .434 .320 .943 .093 
LBA31 .132y 1 .132 .203 .697 .092 .203 .059 
RBA31 .133z 1 .133 .644 .507 .243 .644 .079 
LBA32 .041aa 1 .041 .340 .619 .145 .340 .066 
RBA32 .037ab 1 .037 .831 .458 .293 .831 .088 
LBA34 2.709ac 1 2.709 .168 .721 .078 .168 .058 
RBA34 .713ad 1 .713 3.027 .224 .602 3.027 .180 
LBA35 7.874ae 1 7.874 .249 .667 .111 .249 .061 
175 
 
RBA35 4.079af 1 4.079 6.373 .128 .761 6.373 .304 
LBA36 7.335ag 1 7.335 .328 .625 .141 .328 .065 
RBA36 2.617ah 1 2.617 5.976 .134 .749 5.976 .290 
LBA38 3.214ai 1 3.214 .540 .539 .213 .540 .075 
RBA38 .933aj 1 .933 1.056 .412 .346 1.056 .098 
LBA41 .331ak 1 .331 10.852 .081 .844 10.852 .440 
RBA41 .167al 1 .167 1.241 .381 .383 1.241 .106 
LBA42 .608am 1 .608 .634 .509 .241 .634 .079 
RBA42 .371an 1 .371 .675 .498 .252 .675 .081 
LBA44 .035ao 1 .035 8.568 .100 .811 8.568 .374 
RBA44 1.518ap 1 1.518 2.343 .265 .540 2.343 .153 
LBA45 .537aq 1 .537 5.727 .139 .741 5.727 .281 
RBA45 1.013ar 1 1.013 3.914 .186 .662 3.914 .215 
LBA46 .762as 1 .762 4.625 .164 .698 4.625 .242 
RBA46 .815at 1 .815 3.082 .221 .606 3.082 .183 
LBA47 1.036au 1 1.036 1.540 .340 .435 1.540 .119 
RBA47 1.058av 1 1.058 2.631 .246 .568 2.631 .164 
Intercept LBA08 531.489 1 531.489 3568.412 .000 .999 3568.412 1.000 
176 
 
RBA08 376.230 1 376.230 54805.561 .000 1.000 54805.561 1.000 
LBA09 427.784 1 427.784 1354.581 .001 .999 1354.581 1.000 
RBA09 195.152 1 195.152 930.084 .001 .998 930.084 1.000 
LBA10 641.774 1 641.774 1718.201 .001 .999 1718.201 1.000 
RBA10 298.804 1 298.804 5067.321 .000 1.000 5067.321 1.000 
LBA11 1386.118 1 1386.118 7073.679 .000 1.000 7073.679 1.000 
RBA11 1282.840 1 1282.840 1998.635 .000 .999 1998.635 1.000 
LBA13 390.035 1 390.035 2291.991 .000 .999 2291.991 1.000 
RBA13 434.197 1 434.197 34453.194 .000 1.000 34453.194 1.000 
LBA21 685.701 1 685.701 778.553 .001 .997 778.553 1.000 
RBA21 1550.674 1 1550.674 733135.932 .000 1.000 733135.932 1.000 
LBA23 2595.943 1 2595.943 1818.519 .001 .999 1818.519 1.000 
RBA23 1428.190 1 1428.190 1604.884 .001 .999 1604.884 1.000 
LBA24 364.364 1 364.364 3742.517 .000 .999 3742.517 1.000 
RBA24 239.277 1 239.277 10439.925 .000 1.000 10439.925 1.000 
LBA25 1483.093 1 1483.093 709.297 .001 .997 709.297 1.000 
RBA25 1795.454 1 1795.454 9833.530 .000 1.000 9833.530 1.000 
LBA27 4519.476 1 4519.476 325.725 .003 .994 325.725 1.000 
177 
 
RBA27 1785.316 1 1785.316 6688.094 .000 1.000 6688.094 1.000 
LBA28 11369.488 1 11369.488 320.853 .003 .994 320.853 1.000 
RBA28 5413.545 1 5413.545 2597.449 .000 .999 2597.449 1.000 
LBA29 1278.592 1 1278.592 15064.024 .000 1.000 15064.024 1.000 
RBA29 1473.040 1 1473.040 1762.994 .001 .999 1762.994 1.000 
LBA31 931.876 1 931.876 1436.697 .001 .999 1436.697 1.000 
RBA31 735.052 1 735.052 3565.424 .000 .999 3565.424 1.000 
LBA32 384.080 1 384.080 3165.784 .000 .999 3165.784 1.000 
RBA32 255.192 1 255.192 5714.499 .000 1.000 5714.499 1.000 
LBA34 5671.694 1 5671.694 352.091 .003 .994 352.091 1.000 
RBA34 1766.164 1 1766.164 7496.601 .000 1.000 7496.601 1.000 
LBA35 18815.581 1 18815.581 595.939 .002 .997 595.939 1.000 
RBA35 3896.444 1 3896.444 6088.385 .000 1.000 6088.385 1.000 
LBA36 18646.107 1 18646.107 833.406 .001 .998 833.406 1.000 
RBA36 8935.486 1 8935.486 20403.708 .000 1.000 20403.708 1.000 
LBA38 5429.833 1 5429.833 911.872 .001 .998 911.872 1.000 
RBA38 5305.229 1 5305.229 6002.244 .000 1.000 6002.244 1.000 
LBA41 306.336 1 306.336 10043.855 .000 1.000 10043.855 1.000 
178 
 
RBA41 191.975 1 191.975 1428.599 .001 .999 1428.599 1.000 
LBA42 486.884 1 486.884 507.454 .002 .996 507.454 1.000 
RBA42 584.992 1 584.992 1065.791 .001 .998 1065.791 1.000 
LBA44 230.771 1 230.771 56235.960 .000 1.000 56235.960 1.000 
RBA44 605.209 1 605.209 934.155 .001 .998 934.155 1.000 
LBA45 738.470 1 738.470 7868.580 .000 1.000 7868.580 1.000 
RBA45 471.542 1 471.542 1822.173 .001 .999 1822.173 1.000 
LBA46 671.188 1 671.188 4075.605 .000 1.000 4075.605 1.000 
RBA46 298.691 1 298.691 1129.316 .001 .998 1129.316 1.000 
LBA47 1059.626 1 1059.626 1576.050 .001 .999 1576.050 1.000 
RBA47 1774.099 1 1774.099 4411.789 .000 1.000 4411.789 1.000 
AnxietyGroup LBA08 .129 1 .129 .864 .451 .302 .864 .089 
RBA08 .124 1 .124 18.028 .051 .900 18.028 .606 
LBA09 .314 1 .314 .993 .424 .332 .993 .095 
RBA09 .129 1 .129 .616 .515 .235 .616 .078 
LBA10 1.133 1 1.133 3.033 .224 .603 3.033 .181 
RBA10 .209 1 .209 3.537 .201 .639 3.537 .200 
LBA11 1.028 1 1.028 5.246 .149 .724 5.246 .264 
179 
 
RBA11 .642 1 .642 1.001 .423 .333 1.001 .095 
LBA13 .101 1 .101 .593 .522 .229 .593 .077 
RBA13 .292 1 .292 23.198 .041 .921 23.198 .693 
LBA21 .451 1 .451 .512 .548 .204 .512 .073 
RBA21 .648 1 .648 306.148 .003 .994 306.148 1.000 
LBA23 1.180 1 1.180 .826 .459 .292 .826 .088 
RBA23 .700 1 .700 .786 .469 .282 .786 .086 
LBA24 .069 1 .069 .712 .488 .262 .712 .082 
RBA24 .036 1 .036 1.563 .338 .439 1.563 .120 
LBA25 .357 1 .357 .171 .720 .079 .171 .058 
RBA25 .609 1 .609 3.337 .209 .625 3.337 .193 
LBA27 2.712 1 2.712 .195 .702 .089 .195 .059 
RBA27 2.031 1 2.031 7.608 .110 .792 7.608 .344 
LBA28 5.411 1 5.411 .153 .734 .071 .153 .057 
RBA28 1.350 1 1.350 .648 .505 .245 .648 .080 
LBA29 .630 1 .630 7.426 .112 .788 7.426 .339 
RBA29 .788 1 .788 .943 .434 .320 .943 .093 
LBA31 .132 1 .132 .203 .697 .092 .203 .059 
180 
 
RBA31 .133 1 .133 .644 .507 .243 .644 .079 
LBA32 .041 1 .041 .340 .619 .145 .340 .066 
RBA32 .037 1 .037 .831 .458 .293 .831 .088 
LBA34 2.709 1 2.709 .168 .721 .078 .168 .058 
RBA34 .713 1 .713 3.027 .224 .602 3.027 .180 
LBA35 7.874 1 7.874 .249 .667 .111 .249 .061 
RBA35 4.079 1 4.079 6.373 .128 .761 6.373 .304 
LBA36 7.335 1 7.335 .328 .625 .141 .328 .065 
RBA36 2.617 1 2.617 5.976 .134 .749 5.976 .290 
LBA38 3.214 1 3.214 .540 .539 .213 .540 .075 
RBA38 .933 1 .933 1.056 .412 .346 1.056 .098 
LBA41 .331 1 .331 10.852 .081 .844 10.852 .440 
RBA41 .167 1 .167 1.241 .381 .383 1.241 .106 
LBA42 .608 1 .608 .634 .509 .241 .634 .079 
RBA42 .371 1 .371 .675 .498 .252 .675 .081 
LBA44 .035 1 .035 8.568 .100 .811 8.568 .374 
RBA44 1.518 1 1.518 2.343 .265 .540 2.343 .153 
LBA45 .537 1 .537 5.727 .139 .741 5.727 .281 
181 
 
RBA45 1.013 1 1.013 3.914 .186 .662 3.914 .215 
LBA46 .762 1 .762 4.625 .164 .698 4.625 .242 
RBA46 .815 1 .815 3.082 .221 .606 3.082 .183 
LBA47 1.036 1 1.036 1.540 .340 .435 1.540 .119 
RBA47 1.058 1 1.058 2.631 .246 .568 2.631 .164 
Error LBA08 .298 2 .149      
RBA08 .014 2 .007      
LBA09 .632 2 .316      
RBA09 .420 2 .210      
LBA10 .747 2 .374      
RBA10 .118 2 .059      
LBA11 .392 2 .196      
RBA11 1.284 2 .642      
LBA13 .340 2 .170      
RBA13 .025 2 .013      
LBA21 1.761 2 .881      
RBA21 .004 2 .002      
LBA23 2.855 2 1.428      
182 
 
RBA23 1.780 2 .890      
LBA24 .195 2 .097      
RBA24 .046 2 .023      
LBA25 4.182 2 2.091      
RBA25 .365 2 .183      
LBA27 27.750 2 13.875      
RBA27 .534 2 .267      
LBA28 70.870 2 35.435      
RBA28 4.168 2 2.084      
LBA29 .170 2 .085      
RBA29 1.671 2 .836      
LBA31 1.297 2 .649      
RBA31 .412 2 .206      
LBA32 .243 2 .121      
RBA32 .089 2 .045      
LBA34 32.217 2 16.109      
RBA34 .471 2 .236      
LBA35 63.146 2 31.573      
183 
 
RBA35 1.280 2 .640      
LBA36 44.747 2 22.373      
RBA36 .876 2 .438      
LBA38 11.909 2 5.955      
RBA38 1.768 2 .884      
LBA41 .061 2 .030      
RBA41 .269 2 .134      
LBA42 1.919 2 .959      
RBA42 1.098 2 .549      
LBA44 .008 2 .004      
RBA44 1.296 2 .648      
LBA45 .188 2 .094      
RBA45 .518 2 .259      
LBA46 .329 2 .165      
RBA46 .529 2 .264      
LBA47 1.345 2 .672      
RBA47 .804 2 .402      
Total LBA08 531.916 4       
184 
 
RBA08 376.368 4       
LBA09 428.729 4       
RBA09 195.701 4       
LBA10 643.654 4       
RBA10 299.131 4       
LBA11 1387.537 4       
RBA11 1284.766 4       
LBA13 390.476 4       
RBA13 434.515 4       
LBA21 687.914 4       
RBA21 1551.326 4       
LBA23 2599.978 4       
RBA23 1430.669 4       
LBA24 364.628 4       
RBA24 239.358 4       
LBA25 1487.632 4       
RBA25 1796.429 4       
LBA27 4549.939 4       
185 
 
RBA27 1787.881 4       
LBA28 11445.769 4       
RBA28 5419.064 4       
LBA29 1279.392 4       
RBA29 1475.499 4       
LBA31 933.305 4       
RBA31 735.597 4       
LBA32 384.364 4       
RBA32 255.319 4       
LBA34 5706.620 4       
RBA34 1767.348 4       
LBA35 18886.601 4       
RBA35 3901.802 4       
LBA36 18698.189 4       
RBA36 8938.979 4       
LBA38 5444.957 4       
RBA38 5307.930 4       
LBA41 306.728 4       
186 
 
RBA41 192.410 4       
LBA42 489.411 4       
RBA42 586.460 4       
LBA44 230.815 4       
RBA44 608.023 4       
LBA45 739.195 4       
RBA45 473.072 4       
LBA46 672.279 4       
RBA46 300.036 4       
LBA47 1062.006 4       
RBA47 1775.961 4       
Corrected Total LBA08 .427 3       
RBA08 .137 3       
LBA09 .945 3       
RBA09 .549 3       
LBA10 1.880 3       
RBA10 .327 3       
LBA11 1.420 3       
187 
 
RBA11 1.926 3       
LBA13 .441 3       
RBA13 .318 3       
LBA21 2.213 3       
RBA21 .652 3       
LBA23 4.035 3       
RBA23 2.479 3       
LBA24 .264 3       
RBA24 .082 3       
LBA25 4.539 3       
RBA25 .975 3       
LBA27 30.463 3       
RBA27 2.565 3       
LBA28 76.282 3       
RBA28 5.518 3       
LBA29 .800 3       
RBA29 2.459 3       
LBA31 1.429 3       
188 
 
RBA31 .545 3       
LBA32 .284 3       
RBA32 .126 3       
LBA34 34.926 3       
RBA34 1.184 3       
LBA35 71.020 3       
RBA35 5.359 3       
LBA36 52.082 3       
RBA36 3.493 3       
LBA38 15.124 3       
RBA38 2.701 3       
LBA41 .392 3       
RBA41 .436 3       
LBA42 2.527 3       
RBA42 1.468 3       
LBA44 .043 3       
RBA44 2.814 3       
LBA45 .725 3       
189 
 
RBA45 1.530 3       
LBA46 1.091 3       
RBA46 1.344 3       
LBA47 2.380 3       
RBA47 1.862 3       
 
 
